diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/include')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/include/asm-generic/atomic-gcc.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/include/linux/poison.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/include/uapi/linux/kcmp.h | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 200 |
5 files changed, 234 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/tools/include/asm-generic/atomic-gcc.h b/tools/include/asm-generic/atomic-gcc.h index 40b231fb95bd..4c1966f7c77a 100644 --- a/tools/include/asm-generic/atomic-gcc.h +++ b/tools/include/asm-generic/atomic-gcc.h @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ */ static inline int atomic_read(const atomic_t *v) { - return ACCESS_ONCE((v)->counter); + return READ_ONCE((v)->counter); } /** diff --git a/tools/include/linux/poison.h b/tools/include/linux/poison.h index 4bf6777a8a03..9fdcd3eaac3b 100644 --- a/tools/include/linux/poison.h +++ b/tools/include/linux/poison.h @@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ # define POISON_POINTER_DELTA 0 #endif +#ifdef __cplusplus +#define LIST_POISON1 NULL +#define LIST_POISON2 NULL +#else /* * These are non-NULL pointers that will result in page faults * under normal circumstances, used to verify that nobody uses @@ -22,6 +26,7 @@ */ #define LIST_POISON1 ((void *) 0x100 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA) #define LIST_POISON2 ((void *) 0x200 + POISON_POINTER_DELTA) +#endif /********** include/linux/timer.h **********/ /* diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h b/tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h index 6598fb76d2c2..9816590d3ad2 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/drm/i915_drm.h @@ -829,6 +829,7 @@ struct drm_i915_gem_exec_fence { #define I915_EXEC_FENCE_WAIT (1<<0) #define I915_EXEC_FENCE_SIGNAL (1<<1) +#define __I915_EXEC_FENCE_UNKNOWN_FLAGS (-(I915_EXEC_FENCE_SIGNAL << 1)) __u32 flags; }; diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/kcmp.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kcmp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..481e103da78e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/kcmp.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_KCMP_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_KCMP_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* Comparison type */ +enum kcmp_type { + KCMP_FILE, + KCMP_VM, + KCMP_FILES, + KCMP_FS, + KCMP_SIGHAND, + KCMP_IO, + KCMP_SYSVSEM, + KCMP_EPOLL_TFD, + + KCMP_TYPES, +}; + +/* Slot for KCMP_EPOLL_TFD */ +struct kcmp_epoll_slot { + __u32 efd; /* epoll file descriptor */ + __u32 tfd; /* target file number */ + __u32 toff; /* target offset within same numbered sequence */ +}; + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_KCMP_H */ diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a8d0759a9e40 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +#ifndef _LINUX_PRCTL_H +#define _LINUX_PRCTL_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* Values to pass as first argument to prctl() */ + +#define PR_SET_PDEATHSIG 1 /* Second arg is a signal */ +#define PR_GET_PDEATHSIG 2 /* Second arg is a ptr to return the signal */ + +/* Get/set current->mm->dumpable */ +#define PR_GET_DUMPABLE 3 +#define PR_SET_DUMPABLE 4 + +/* Get/set unaligned access control bits (if meaningful) */ +#define PR_GET_UNALIGN 5 +#define PR_SET_UNALIGN 6 +# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user accesses */ +# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user access */ + +/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from + * uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */ +#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7 +#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8 + +/* Get/set floating-point emulation control bits (if meaningful) */ +#define PR_GET_FPEMU 9 +#define PR_SET_FPEMU 10 +# define PR_FPEMU_NOPRINT 1 /* silently emulate fp operations accesses */ +# define PR_FPEMU_SIGFPE 2 /* don't emulate fp operations, send SIGFPE instead */ + +/* Get/set floating-point exception mode (if meaningful) */ +#define PR_GET_FPEXC 11 +#define PR_SET_FPEXC 12 +# define PR_FP_EXC_SW_ENABLE 0x80 /* Use FPEXC for FP exception enables */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_DIV 0x010000 /* floating point divide by zero */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_OVF 0x020000 /* floating point overflow */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_UND 0x040000 /* floating point underflow */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_RES 0x080000 /* floating point inexact result */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_INV 0x100000 /* floating point invalid operation */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_DISABLED 0 /* FP exceptions disabled */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_NONRECOV 1 /* async non-recoverable exc. mode */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_ASYNC 2 /* async recoverable exception mode */ +# define PR_FP_EXC_PRECISE 3 /* precise exception mode */ + +/* Get/set whether we use statistical process timing or accurate timestamp + * based process timing */ +#define PR_GET_TIMING 13 +#define PR_SET_TIMING 14 +# define PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL 0 /* Normal, traditional, + statistical process timing */ +# define PR_TIMING_TIMESTAMP 1 /* Accurate timestamp based + process timing */ + +#define PR_SET_NAME 15 /* Set process name */ +#define PR_GET_NAME 16 /* Get process name */ + +/* Get/set process endian */ +#define PR_GET_ENDIAN 19 +#define PR_SET_ENDIAN 20 +# define PR_ENDIAN_BIG 0 +# define PR_ENDIAN_LITTLE 1 /* True little endian mode */ +# define PR_ENDIAN_PPC_LITTLE 2 /* "PowerPC" pseudo little endian */ + +/* Get/set process seccomp mode */ +#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21 +#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22 + +/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */ +#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23 +#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24 + +/* Get/set the process' ability to use the timestamp counter instruction */ +#define PR_GET_TSC 25 +#define PR_SET_TSC 26 +# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the timestamp counter */ +# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of reading the TSC */ + +/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */ +#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27 +#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28 + +/* + * Get/set the timerslack as used by poll/select/nanosleep + * A value of 0 means "use default" + */ +#define PR_SET_TIMERSLACK 29 +#define PR_GET_TIMERSLACK 30 + +#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE 31 +#define PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE 32 + +/* + * Set early/late kill mode for hwpoison memory corruption. + * This influences when the process gets killed on a memory corruption. + */ +#define PR_MCE_KILL 33 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR 0 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_SET 1 + +# define PR_MCE_KILL_LATE 0 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY 1 +# define PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT 2 + +#define PR_MCE_KILL_GET 34 + +/* + * Tune up process memory map specifics. + */ +#define PR_SET_MM 35 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_CODE 1 +# define PR_SET_MM_END_CODE 2 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_DATA 3 +# define PR_SET_MM_END_DATA 4 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_STACK 5 +# define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK 6 +# define PR_SET_MM_BRK 7 +# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8 +# define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9 +# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10 +# define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11 +# define PR_SET_MM_AUXV 12 +# define PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE 13 +# define PR_SET_MM_MAP 14 +# define PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE 15 + +/* + * This structure provides new memory descriptor + * map which mostly modifies /proc/pid/stat[m] + * output for a task. This mostly done in a + * sake of checkpoint/restore functionality. + */ +struct prctl_mm_map { + __u64 start_code; /* code section bounds */ + __u64 end_code; + __u64 start_data; /* data section bounds */ + __u64 end_data; + __u64 start_brk; /* heap for brk() syscall */ + __u64 brk; + __u64 start_stack; /* stack starts at */ + __u64 arg_start; /* command line arguments bounds */ + __u64 arg_end; + __u64 env_start; /* environment variables bounds */ + __u64 env_end; + __u64 *auxv; /* auxiliary vector */ + __u32 auxv_size; /* vector size */ + __u32 exe_fd; /* /proc/$pid/exe link file */ +}; + +/* + * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task. + * A value of 0 mean "no process". + */ +#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61 +# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1) + +#define PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 36 +#define PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER 37 + +/* + * If no_new_privs is set, then operations that grant new privileges (i.e. + * execve) will either fail or not grant them. This affects suid/sgid, + * file capabilities, and LSMs. + * + * Operations that merely manipulate or drop existing privileges (setresuid, + * capset, etc.) will still work. Drop those privileges if you want them gone. + * + * Changing LSM security domain is considered a new privilege. So, for example, + * asking selinux for a specific new context (e.g. with runcon) will result + * in execve returning -EPERM. + * + * See Documentation/prctl/no_new_privs.txt for more details. + */ +#define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38 +#define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39 + +#define PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS 40 + +#define PR_SET_THP_DISABLE 41 +#define PR_GET_THP_DISABLE 42 + +/* + * Tell the kernel to start/stop helping userspace manage bounds tables. + */ +#define PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT 43 +#define PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT 44 + +#define PR_SET_FP_MODE 45 +#define PR_GET_FP_MODE 46 +# define PR_FP_MODE_FR (1 << 0) /* 64b FP registers */ +# define PR_FP_MODE_FRE (1 << 1) /* 32b compatibility */ + +/* Control the ambient capability set */ +#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3 +# define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4 + +#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ |