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-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c91
-rw-r--r--security/security.c32
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c160
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h4
5 files changed, 222 insertions, 67 deletions
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index 5ef7e5240563..c65b39bafdfe 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -15,15 +15,6 @@
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#define ACC_MKNOD 1
-#define ACC_READ 2
-#define ACC_WRITE 4
-#define ACC_MASK (ACC_MKNOD | ACC_READ | ACC_WRITE)
-
-#define DEV_BLOCK 1
-#define DEV_CHAR 2
-#define DEV_ALL 4 /* this represents all devices */
-
static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex);
enum devcg_behavior {
@@ -246,21 +237,21 @@ static void set_access(char *acc, short access)
{
int idx = 0;
memset(acc, 0, ACCLEN);
- if (access & ACC_READ)
+ if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ)
acc[idx++] = 'r';
- if (access & ACC_WRITE)
+ if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE)
acc[idx++] = 'w';
- if (access & ACC_MKNOD)
+ if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD)
acc[idx++] = 'm';
}
static char type_to_char(short type)
{
- if (type == DEV_ALL)
+ if (type == DEVCG_DEV_ALL)
return 'a';
- if (type == DEV_CHAR)
+ if (type == DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)
return 'c';
- if (type == DEV_BLOCK)
+ if (type == DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK)
return 'b';
return 'X';
}
@@ -287,10 +278,10 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
* This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices"
*/
if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
- set_access(acc, ACC_MASK);
+ set_access(acc, DEVCG_ACC_MASK);
set_majmin(maj, ~0);
set_majmin(min, ~0);
- seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEV_ALL),
+ seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEVCG_DEV_ALL),
maj, min, acc);
} else {
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) {
@@ -309,10 +300,10 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/**
* match_exception - iterates the exception list trying to find a complete match
* @exceptions: list of exceptions
- * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR)
+ * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)
* @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all
* @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all
- * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD)
+ * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD)
*
* It is considered a complete match if an exception is found that will
* contain the entire range of provided parameters.
@@ -325,9 +316,9 @@ static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
struct dev_exception_item *ex;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) {
- if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
+ if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK))
continue;
- if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
+ if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR))
continue;
if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != major)
continue;
@@ -344,10 +335,10 @@ static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
/**
* match_exception_partial - iterates the exception list trying to find a partial match
* @exceptions: list of exceptions
- * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR)
+ * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)
* @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all
* @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all
- * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD)
+ * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD)
*
* It is considered a partial match if an exception's range is found to
* contain *any* of the devices specified by provided parameters. This is
@@ -362,9 +353,9 @@ static bool match_exception_partial(struct list_head *exceptions, short type,
struct dev_exception_item *ex;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) {
- if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
+ if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK))
continue;
- if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
+ if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR))
continue;
/*
* We must be sure that both the exception and the provided
@@ -647,10 +638,10 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
}
return 0;
case 'b':
- ex.type = DEV_BLOCK;
+ ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK;
break;
case 'c':
- ex.type = DEV_CHAR;
+ ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_CHAR;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -703,13 +694,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) {
switch (*b) {
case 'r':
- ex.access |= ACC_READ;
+ ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_READ;
break;
case 'w':
- ex.access |= ACC_WRITE;
+ ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_WRITE;
break;
case 'm':
- ex.access |= ACC_MKNOD;
+ ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD;
break;
case '\n':
case '\0':
@@ -806,12 +797,12 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = {
* @type: device type
* @major: device major number
* @minor: device minor number
- * @access: combination of ACC_WRITE, ACC_READ and ACC_MKNOD
+ * @access: combination of DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_READ and DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD
*
* returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted
*/
-static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
- short access)
+int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
+ short access)
{
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
bool rc;
@@ -833,37 +824,3 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor,
return 0;
}
-
-int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
-{
- short type, access = 0;
-
- if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
- type = DEV_BLOCK;
- if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
- type = DEV_CHAR;
- if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
- access |= ACC_WRITE;
- if (mask & MAY_READ)
- access |= ACC_READ;
-
- return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, imajor(inode), iminor(inode),
- access);
-}
-
-int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
-{
- short type;
-
- if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
- return 0;
-
- if (S_ISBLK(mode))
- type = DEV_BLOCK;
- else
- type = DEV_CHAR;
-
- return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev),
- ACC_MKNOD);
-
-}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4bf0f571b4ef..1cd8526cb0b7 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
* (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -1703,3 +1704,34 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
actx);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
+}
+int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
+}
+int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
+}
+int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
+}
+int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
+}
+void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
+}
+void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f5d304736852..2e3a627fc0b1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -1814,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
+#endif
+
/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
@@ -1844,6 +1849,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
goto out;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+#endif
+
/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
rc = 0;
if (av)
@@ -2164,6 +2175,12 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
return rc;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+#endif
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
@@ -6252,6 +6269,139 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ int ret;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
+ av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
+ if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
+ return av;
+}
+
+/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
+ * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
+ * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
+ * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
+ * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
+ * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
+ * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
+ */
+static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+ struct bpf_map *map;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
+ map = file->private_data;
+ bpfsec = map->security;
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
+ prog = file->private_data;
+ bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+ ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = map->security;
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+ u32 sid = current_sid();
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+ BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bpfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ map->security = bpfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
+
+ map->security = NULL;
+ kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+
+static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
+
+ bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bpfsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
+ aux->security = bpfsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+ struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
+
+ aux->security = NULL;
+ kfree(bpfsec);
+}
+#endif
+
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
@@ -6471,6 +6621,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index cc35695d97b4..acdee7795297 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ "access", NULL } },
{ "infiniband_endport",
{ "manage_subnet", NULL } },
+ { "bpf",
+ {"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 1649cd18eb0b..3d54468ce334 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ struct pkey_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */
};
+struct bpf_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
+};
+
extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */