diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/.gitignore | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/Makefile | 43 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/file.c | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/net.h | 114 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/perms.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lib.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 387 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/net.c | 184 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 47 |
12 files changed, 840 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore index 9cdec70d72b8..d5b291e94264 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # # Generated include files # +net_names.h capability_names.h rlim_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index 81a34426d024..dafdd387d42b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -4,11 +4,44 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ - resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o + resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h +# Build a lower case string table of address family names +# Transform lines from +# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */ +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ +# to +# [1] = "local", +# [2] = "inet", +# +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping. +# Transforms lines from +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ +# to +# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet" +quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@ +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ + sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ + 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ ;\ + printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\ + sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \ + 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\ + $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ + +# Build a lower case string table of sock type names +# Transform lines from +# SOCK_STREAM = 1, +# to +# [1] = "stream", +quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@ +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ + sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \ + -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ + echo "};" >> $@ # Build a lower case string table of capability names # Transforms lines from @@ -61,6 +94,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h +$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(src)/Makefile @@ -68,3 +102,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ $(src)/Makefile $(call cmd,make-rlim) +$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \ + $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \ + $(src)/Makefile + $(call cmd,make-af) + $(call cmd,make-sock) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 7acea14c850b..125dad5c3fde 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -2202,6 +2202,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file), + AA_SFS_DIR("network", aa_sfs_entry_network), AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount), AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 3382518b87fa..db80221891c6 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/match.h" +#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/label.h" @@ -566,6 +567,32 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, return error; } +static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, + struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file, + u32 request, u32 denied) +{ + struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!sock); + + /* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */ + if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label)) + return 0; + + /* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */ + error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock); + if (denied) { + /* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */ + /* check every profile in file label to is cached */ + last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock)); + } + if (!error) + update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request); + + return error; +} + /** * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file * @op: operation being checked @@ -610,6 +637,9 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file, error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, denied); + else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request, + denied); done: rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 620e81169659..ff4316e1068d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -121,21 +121,29 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { /* these entries require a custom callback fn */ struct { struct aa_label *peer; - struct { - const char *target; - kuid_t ouid; - } fs; + union { + struct { + kuid_t ouid; + const char *target; + } fs; + struct { + int type, protocol; + struct sock *peer_sk; + void *addr; + int addrlen; + } net; + int signal; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + }; }; struct { struct aa_profile *profile; const char *ns; long pos; } iface; - int signal; - struct { - int rlim; - unsigned long max; - } rlim; struct { const char *src_name; const char *type; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..140c8efcf364 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_NET_H +#define __AA_NET_H + +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <linux/path.h> + +#include "apparmorfs.h" +#include "label.h" +#include "perms.h" +#include "policy.h" + +#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE +#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ + +#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE + +#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN +#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000 + +#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000 +#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000 + +#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000 +#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000 + +#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ + AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \ + AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \ + AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT) + +#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \ + AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\ + AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \ + AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ + AA_MAY_MPROT) + +#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \ + AA_MAY_ACCEPT) +struct aa_sk_ctx { + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_label *peer; + struct path path; +}; + +#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security) +#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \ + struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \ + .family = (F)}; \ + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \ + ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \ + LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \ + OP); \ + NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \ + aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \ + aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P) + +#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \ + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \ + (SK)->sk_protocol) + +/* struct aa_net - network confinement data + * @allow: basic network families permissions + * @audit: which network permissions to force audit + * @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects + */ +struct aa_net { + u16 allow[AF_MAX]; + u16 audit[AF_MAX]; + u16 quiet[AF_MAX]; +}; + + +extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[]; + +void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va); +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, u16 family, int type); +int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, + int type, int protocol); +static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, + struct sock *sk) +{ + return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family, + sk->sk_type); +} +int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk); + +int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct socket *sock); + + +static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new) +{ + /* NOP */ +} + +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index 2b27bb79aec4..af04d5a7d73d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -135,9 +135,10 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask); +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, + u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask); + u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask); void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms); void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index 17fe41a9cac3..4364088a0b9e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "file.h" #include "lib.h" #include "label.h" +#include "net.h" #include "perms.h" #include "resource.h" @@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ struct aa_data { * @policy: general match rules governing policy * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions * @caps: capabilities for the profile + * @net: network controls for the profile * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile * * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs @@ -148,6 +150,7 @@ struct aa_profile { struct aa_policydb policy; struct aa_file_rules file; struct aa_caps caps; + struct aa_net net; struct aa_rlimit rlimits; struct aa_loaddata *rawdata; @@ -220,6 +223,16 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; } +static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile, + u16 AF) { + unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET); + u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF); + + if (!state) + return 0; + return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2); +} + /** * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 08ca26bcca77..8818621b5d95 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask) *str = '\0'; } -void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) +void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names, + u32 mask) { const char *fmt = "%s"; unsigned int i, perm = 1; @@ -229,7 +230,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask) } void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs, - u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask) + u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask) { char str[33]; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 4ad0b3a45142..cc5ab23a2d84 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/file.h" #include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/net.h" #include "include/path.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" @@ -736,6 +737,368 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, return error; } +/** + * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field + */ +static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; + + ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags); + if (!ctx) + return -ENOMEM; + + SK_CTX(sk) = ctx; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field + */ +static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + SK_CTX(sk) = NULL; + aa_put_label(ctx->label); + aa_put_label(ctx->peer); + path_put(&ctx->path); + kfree(ctx); +} + +/** + * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field + */ +static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk); + + new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label); + new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer); + new->path = ctx->path; + path_get(&new->path); +} + +static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type, + int protocol) +{ + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type, + protocol); +} + + +/** + * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!(kern || unconfined(label))) + error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct + * + * Note: + * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to + * move to a special kernel label + * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or + * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in + * sock_graft. + */ +static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + + if (kern) { + struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns(); + + label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns)); + aa_put_ns(ns); + } else + label = aa_get_current_label(); + + if (sock->sk) { + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk); + + aa_put_label(ctx->label); + ctx->label = aa_get_label(label); + } + aa_put_label(label); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!address); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!address); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen + */ +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection. + * + * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept + * has not been done. + */ +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!newsock); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk); +} + +static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(!msg); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket + */ +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message + */ +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, + struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) +{ + return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size); +} + +/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */ +static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock); +} + +/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */ +static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, + int level, int optname) +{ + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk); +} + +/** + * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, + int optname) +{ + return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock, + level, optname); +} + +/** + * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options + */ +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, + int optname) +{ + return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock, + level, optname); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn + */ +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) +{ + return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk + * + * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held + * + * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram() + * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb() + */ +static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 0; +} + + +static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + if (ctx->peer) + return ctx->peer; + + return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT); +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer + * + * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, + char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, + unsigned int len) +{ + char *name; + int slen, error = 0; + struct aa_label *label; + struct aa_label *peer; + + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk); + if (IS_ERR(peer)) { + error = PTR_ERR(peer); + goto done; + } + slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer, + FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | + FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL); + /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */ + if (slen < 0) { + error = -ENOMEM; + } else { + if (slen > len) { + error = -ERANGE; + } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) { + error = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + if (put_user(slen, optlen)) + error = -EFAULT; +out: + kfree(name); + + } + +done: + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet + * @sock: the peer socket + * @skb: packet data + * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet + * + * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent + */ +static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) + +{ + /* TODO: requires secid support */ + return -ENOPROTOOPT; +} + +/** + * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket + * @sk: child sock + * @parent: parent socket + * + * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can + * just set sk security information off of current creating process label + * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based + * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled + * socket is shared by different tasks. + */ +static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ + struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk); + + if (!ctx->label) + ctx->label = aa_get_current_label(); +} + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), @@ -770,6 +1133,30 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, + apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, + apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare), diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..33d54435f8d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/label.h" +#include "include/net.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +#include "net_names.h" + + +struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK), + { } +}; + +static const char * const net_mask_names[] = { + "unknown", + "send", + "receive", + "unknown", + + "create", + "shutdown", + "connect", + "unknown", + + "setattr", + "getattr", + "setcred", + "getcred", + + "chmod", + "chown", + "chgrp", + "lock", + + "mmap", + "mprot", + "unknown", + "unknown", + + "accept", + "bind", + "listen", + "unknown", + + "setopt", + "getopt", + "unknown", + "unknown", + + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", + "unknown", +}; + + +/* audit callback for net specific fields */ +void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + audit_log_format(ab, " family="); + if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) + audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); + audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="); + if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]) + audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type); + audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol); + + if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0, + net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); + + if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); + aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0, + net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK); + } + } + if (aad(sa)->peer) { + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); + } +} + + +/* Generic af perm */ +int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, + u32 request, u16 family, int type) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + + AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX); + AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX); + + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) + return 0; + + perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ? + ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; + perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ? + ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; + perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ? + ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0; + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb); +} + +int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, + int type, int protocol) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol); + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family, + type)); +} + +static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk); + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sk); + + if (unconfined(label)) + return 0; + + return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk)); +} + +int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!sk); + AA_BUG(in_interrupt()); + + /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */ + label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); + error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk); + end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + + +int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, + struct socket *sock) +{ + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!sock); + AA_BUG(!sock->sk); + + return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 4ede87c30f8b..5a2aec358322 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -275,6 +275,19 @@ fail: return 0; } +static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name) +{ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) { + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16))) + return 0; + if (data) + *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos)); + e->pos += sizeof(u16); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) { if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) { @@ -584,7 +597,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL; const char *info = "failed to unpack profile"; - size_t ns_len; + size_t size = 0, ns_len; struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 }; char *key = NULL; struct aa_data *data; @@ -717,6 +730,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } + size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af"); + if (size) { + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will + * never request + */ + if (i >= AF_MAX) { + u16 tmp; + + if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + continue; + } + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL)) + goto fail; + } + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + } + if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) { + /* pre v7 policy always allowed these */ + profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff; + profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff; + } + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) { /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */ info = "failed to unpack policydb"; |