summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/lsm_audit.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c72
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.h8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c10
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h8
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c43
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c99
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c97
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/.gitignore2
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/Makefile55
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default2
-rw-r--r--security/yama/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c13
16 files changed, 324 insertions, 115 deletions
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 69fdf3bc765b..b526ddc3add5 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
struct common_audit_data *a)
{
- struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
/*
* To keep stack sizes in check force programers to notice if they
@@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(a->u) > sizeof(void *)*2);
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(tsk));
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm)));
switch (a->type) {
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE:
@@ -276,16 +276,19 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
break;
}
- case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK:
- tsk = a->u.tsk;
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK: {
+ struct task_struct *tsk = a->u.tsk;
if (tsk) {
pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
if (pid) {
+ char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", pid);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+ memcpy(comm, tsk->comm, sizeof(comm)));
}
}
break;
+ }
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
if (a->u.net->sk) {
struct sock *sk = a->u.net->sk;
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index afcc0aed9393..3c17dda9571d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -724,12 +724,10 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- if (unlikely(!node)) {
+ if (unlikely(!node))
node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
- } else {
+ else
memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
- avd = &node->ae.avd;
- }
denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
if (unlikely(denied))
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index a3dd9faa19c0..b64f2772b030 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -25,10 +25,43 @@
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
-static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u16 mask)
+/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
+ * public domain.
+ */
+static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
{
- return ((keyp->target_class + (keyp->target_type << 2) +
- (keyp->source_type << 9)) & mask);
+ static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
+ static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
+ static const u32 r1 = 15;
+ static const u32 r2 = 13;
+ static const u32 m = 5;
+ static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64;
+
+ u32 hash = 0;
+
+#define mix(input) { \
+ u32 v = input; \
+ v *= c1; \
+ v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
+ v *= c2; \
+ hash ^= v; \
+ hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
+ hash = hash * m + n; \
+}
+
+ mix(keyp->target_class);
+ mix(keyp->target_type);
+ mix(keyp->source_type);
+
+#undef mix
+
+ hash ^= hash >> 16;
+ hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
+ hash ^= hash >> 13;
+ hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+ hash ^= hash >> 16;
+
+ return hash & mask;
}
static struct avtab_node*
@@ -46,8 +79,12 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
newnode->next = prev->next;
prev->next = newnode;
} else {
- newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
- h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+ newnode->next = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
+ if (flex_array_put_ptr(h->htable, hvalue, newnode,
+ GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO)) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
h->nel++;
@@ -64,7 +101,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
return -EINVAL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
- for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
cur;
prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -104,7 +141,7 @@ avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datu
if (!h || !h->htable)
return NULL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
- for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
cur;
prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -135,7 +172,8 @@ struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
return NULL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
- for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
@@ -170,7 +208,8 @@ avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
return NULL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
- for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
@@ -228,15 +267,14 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
return;
for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
- cur = h->htable[i];
+ cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
while (cur) {
temp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
}
- h->htable[i] = NULL;
}
- kfree(h->htable);
+ flex_array_free(h->htable);
h->htable = NULL;
h->nslot = 0;
h->mask = 0;
@@ -251,7 +289,7 @@ int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
{
- u16 mask = 0;
+ u32 mask = 0;
u32 shift = 0;
u32 work = nrules;
u32 nslot = 0;
@@ -270,7 +308,8 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
mask = nslot - 1;
- h->htable = kcalloc(nslot, sizeof(*(h->htable)), GFP_KERNEL);
+ h->htable = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct avtab_node *), nslot,
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!h->htable)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -293,7 +332,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
max_chain_len = 0;
chain2_len_sum = 0;
for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
- cur = h->htable[i];
+ cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
if (cur) {
slots_used++;
chain_len = 0;
@@ -534,7 +573,8 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
- for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(a->htable, i); cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 63ce2f9e441d..adb451cd44f9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#include <linux/flex_array.h>
+
struct avtab_key {
u16 source_type; /* source type */
u16 target_type; /* target type */
@@ -51,10 +53,10 @@ struct avtab_node {
};
struct avtab {
- struct avtab_node **htable;
+ struct flex_array *htable;
u32 nel; /* number of elements */
u32 nslot; /* number of hash slots */
- u16 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
+ u32 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
};
@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified
void avtab_cache_init(void);
void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
-#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 11
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index d307b37ddc2b..e1088842232c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -654,19 +654,15 @@ int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
secattr->attr.mls.cat);
- if (rc != 0)
- goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
-
- rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
- &context->range.level[0].cat);
- if (rc != 0)
+ if (rc)
goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
+ memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
+ sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
return 0;
import_netlbl_cat_failure:
ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
- ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[1].cat);
return rc;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a1d3944751b9..9e2d82070915 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3179,13 +3179,9 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
- rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
- secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
if (rc)
goto out;
- memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
- &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
- sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
}
rc = -EIDRM;
if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 67ccb7b2b89b..49eada6266ec 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct task_smack {
#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted */
+#define SMK_INODE_IMPURE 0x08 /* involved in an impure transaction */
/*
* A label access rule.
@@ -193,6 +194,10 @@ struct smk_port_label {
#define MAY_LOCK 0x00002000 /* Locks should be writes, but ... */
#define MAY_BRINGUP 0x00004000 /* Report use of this rule */
+#define SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW 1 /* Allow bringup mode */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT 2 /* Allow unconfined label */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT 3 /* Allow unconfined label */
+
/*
* Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
*/
@@ -254,6 +259,9 @@ extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
extern struct smack_known smack_cipso_option;
extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 1158430f5bb9..0f410fc56e33 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
/*
* Hardcoded comparisons.
- *
+ */
+ /*
* A star subject can't access any object.
*/
if (subject == &smack_known_star) {
@@ -189,10 +190,20 @@ int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
* succeed because of "b" rules.
*/
if (may & MAY_BRINGUP)
- rc = MAY_BRINGUP;
+ rc = SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW;
#endif
out_audit:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ if (object == smack_unconfined)
+ rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT;
+ if (subject == smack_unconfined)
+ rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT;
+ }
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
if (a)
smack_log(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
@@ -338,19 +349,16 @@ static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 5];
+#else
char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+#endif
struct smack_audit_data *sad;
struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
- /*
- * The result may be positive in bringup mode.
- */
- if (result > 0)
- result = 0;
-#endif
/* check if we have to log the current event */
- if (result != 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
+ if (result < 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
return;
if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
return;
@@ -364,6 +372,21 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
sad->subject = subject_label;
sad->object = object_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ /*
+ * The result may be positive in bringup mode.
+ * A positive result is an allow, but not for normal reasons.
+ * Mark it as successful, but don't filter it out even if
+ * the logging policy says to do so.
+ */
+ if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT)
+ strcat(request_buffer, "(US)");
+ else if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ strcat(request_buffer, "(UO)");
+
+ if (result > 0)
+ result = 0;
+#endif
sad->request = request_buffer;
sad->result = result;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1511965549b8..69fdc384af30 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
int smack_enabled;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
+ "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
+ "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
+ "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
+ "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
+};
+
static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
{
int i = 0;
@@ -87,9 +94,11 @@ static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
- pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s\n",
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
return 0;
}
@@ -106,9 +115,11 @@ static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
- pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n",
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
acc, current->comm, note);
return 0;
@@ -126,9 +137,11 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
- pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n",
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
current->comm, otp->comm);
return 0;
@@ -141,14 +154,25 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+ pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
+ if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
+ (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
- pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
- tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+ tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
return 0;
}
@@ -162,13 +186,20 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+ pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
- pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n",
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
current->comm);
@@ -185,13 +216,20 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+ pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
- pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n",
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
current->comm);
@@ -2449,7 +2487,21 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- if (family != PF_INET || sock->sk == NULL)
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+ if (sock->sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+ ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+ }
+
+ if (family != PF_INET)
return 0;
/*
* Set the outbound netlbl.
@@ -3983,6 +4035,36 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
return rc;
}
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
+ * @key points to the key to be queried
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ */
+static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+ size_t length;
+ char *copy;
+
+ if (key->security == NULL) {
+ *_buffer = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ length = strlen(copy) + 1;
+
+ *_buffer = copy;
+ return length;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
/*
@@ -4307,6 +4389,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.key_alloc = smack_key_alloc,
.key_free = smack_key_free,
.key_permission = smack_key_permission,
+ .key_getsecurity = smack_key_getsecurity,
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
/* Audit hooks */
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index bce4e8f1b267..06f719ed63c9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ enum smk_inos {
SMK_CHANGE_RULE = 19, /* change or add rules (long labels) */
SMK_SYSLOG = 20, /* change syslog label) */
SMK_PTRACE = 21, /* set ptrace rule */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ SMK_UNCONFINED = 22, /* define an unconfined label */
+#endif
};
/*
@@ -61,7 +64,6 @@ enum smk_inos {
*/
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_syslog_lock);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
/*
@@ -95,6 +97,16 @@ int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
*/
struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/*
+ * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
+ * debugging and application bring-up purposes only.
+ * It is bad and wrong, but everyone seems to expect
+ * to have it.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
+
/*
* If this value is set restrict syslog use to the label specified.
* It can be reset via smackfs/syslog
@@ -1717,6 +1729,85 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/**
+ * smk_read_unconfined - read() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_unconfined(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *smack = "";
+ ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+ int asize;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (smack_unconfined != NULL)
+ smack = smack_unconfined->smk_known;
+
+ asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+
+ if (cn >= asize)
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_unconfined - write() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ int rc = count;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Should the null string be passed in unset the unconfined value.
+ * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
+ * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
+ * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
+ * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
+ *
+ * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+ * so "-confine" will also work.
+ */
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ smack_unconfined = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+
+ kfree(data);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_unconfined_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_unconfined,
+ .write = smk_write_unconfined,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP */
+
/**
* smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
* @filp: file pointer, not actually used
@@ -2384,6 +2475,10 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
"syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SMK_PTRACE] = {
"ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ [SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
+ "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif
/* last one */
{""}
};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/.gitignore b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
index 5caf1a6f5907..dc0f220a210b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
+++ b/security/tomoyo/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
builtin-policy.h
-policy/
+policy/*.conf
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
index 604e718d68d3..404dce66952a 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ config SECURITY_TOMOYO
select SECURITY_PATH
select SECURITY_NETWORK
select SRCU
+ select BUILD_BIN2C
default n
help
This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
index 56a0c7be409e..65dbcb2fd850 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -1,48 +1,15 @@
obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o network.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o
-$(obj)/policy/profile.conf:
- @mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
- @echo Creating an empty policy/profile.conf
- @touch $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/exception_policy.conf:
- @mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
- @echo Creating a default policy/exception_policy.conf
- @echo initialize_domain /sbin/modprobe from any >> $@
- @echo initialize_domain /sbin/hotplug from any >> $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/domain_policy.conf:
- @mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
- @echo Creating an empty policy/domain_policy.conf
- @touch $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/manager.conf:
- @mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
- @echo Creating an empty policy/manager.conf
- @touch $@
-
-$(obj)/policy/stat.conf:
- @mkdir -p $(obj)/policy/
- @echo Creating an empty policy/stat.conf
- @touch $@
-
-$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(obj)/policy/profile.conf $(obj)/policy/exception_policy.conf $(obj)/policy/domain_policy.conf $(obj)/policy/manager.conf $(obj)/policy/stat.conf
- @echo Generating built-in policy for TOMOYO 2.5.x.
- @echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_profile[] __initdata =" > $@.tmp
- @sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/profile.conf >> $@.tmp
- @echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
- @echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_exception_policy[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
- @sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/exception_policy.conf >> $@.tmp
- @echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
- @echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_domain_policy[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
- @sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/domain_policy.conf >> $@.tmp
- @echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
- @echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_manager[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
- @sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/manager.conf >> $@.tmp
- @echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
- @echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_stat[] __initdata =" >> $@.tmp
- @sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' -e 's/\"/\\"/g' -e 's/\(.*\)/"\1\\n"/' < $(obj)/policy/stat.conf >> $@.tmp
- @echo "\"\";" >> $@.tmp
- @mv $@.tmp $@
+targets += builtin-policy.h
+define do_policy
+echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_$(1)[] __initdata ="; \
+$(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c <$(firstword $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/$(1).conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/$(1).conf.default) /dev/null); \
+echo ";"
+endef
+quiet_cmd_policy = POLICY $@
+ cmd_policy = ($(call do_policy,profile); $(call do_policy,exception_policy); $(call do_policy,domain_policy); $(call do_policy,manager); $(call do_policy,stat)) >$@
+
+$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,policy)
$(obj)/common.o: $(obj)/builtin-policy.h
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default b/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2678df4964ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+initialize_domain /sbin/modprobe from any
+initialize_domain /sbin/hotplug from any
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
index 20ef5143c0c0..3123e1da2fed 100644
--- a/security/yama/Kconfig
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
config SECURITY_YAMA
bool "Yama support"
depends on SECURITY
- select SECURITYFS
- select SECURITY_PATH
default n
help
This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 13c88fbcf037..24aae2ae2b30 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -379,20 +379,17 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- int rc;
+ struct ctl_table table_copy;
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return -EPERM;
- rc = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
/* Lock the max value if it ever gets set. */
- if (write && *(int *)table->data == *(int *)table->extra2)
- table->extra1 = table->extra2;
+ table_copy = *table;
+ if (*(int *)table_copy.data == *(int *)table_copy.extra2)
+ table_copy.extra1 = table_copy.extra2;
- return rc;
+ return proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
static int zero;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-18 15:26:11 +0000