diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 1 |
11 files changed, 77 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 8a82a6c7f48a..f2193c531f4a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) { struct key_restriction *restriction; key_perm_t perm; + int ret; perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH; @@ -154,7 +155,10 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE; out: - return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction); + ret = __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction); + if (ret) + kfree(restriction); + return ret; } static int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data, diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 708de9656bbd..fa5ff13fa8c9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -335,14 +335,15 @@ static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); if (rc <= 0) { if (rc == -ENODATA) - return 0; - return rc; + rc = 0; + goto out; } if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) rc = 1; else rc = 0; +out: kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index e01cfd4ad896..f02e609460e2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -455,14 +455,17 @@ static int evm_xattr_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr_name, &xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); - if (rc < 0) - return 1; + if (rc < 0) { + rc = 1; + goto out; + } if (rc == xattr_value_len) rc = !!memcmp(xattr_value, xattr_data, rc); else rc = 1; +out: kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 7249f16257c7..39caeca47444 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ choice config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 bool "SM3" - depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y + depends on CRYPTO_SM3_GENERIC=y endchoice config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index be965a8715e4..03b440921e61 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len); int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len); #else static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -372,7 +372,8 @@ ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) } static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, + int xattr_len) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 3c9af3dc0713..ee6f7e237f2e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -221,12 +221,12 @@ enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, } int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, - struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value, int xattr_len) { - ssize_t ret; + int ret; ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, - (char **)xattr_value, 0, GFP_NOFS); + (char **)xattr_value, xattr_len, GFP_NOFS); if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ret = 0; return ret; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 040b03ddc1c7..377300973e6c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -293,7 +293,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */ if ((action & IMA_HASH) && !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) { - xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); + xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), + &xattr_value, xattr_len); if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) && (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -316,7 +317,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) || strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) { /* read 'security.ima' */ - xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); + xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), + &xattr_value, xattr_len); /* * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow @@ -542,8 +544,13 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL); - if (rc < 0) + if (rc < 0) { + /* ima_hash could be allocated in case of failure. */ + if (rc != -ENOMEM) + kfree(tmp_iint.ima_hash); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } iint = &tmp_iint; mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index edd95ba02c11..6a68ec270822 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -422,12 +422,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type; nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p; - /* - * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated - * memory will not be freed during a later call to - * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry). - */ - entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL; ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, @@ -441,6 +435,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { + int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); @@ -455,7 +450,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * references and the entry itself. All other memory references will now * be owned by nentry. */ - ima_lsm_free_rule(entry); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule); kfree(entry); return 0; @@ -573,6 +569,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, const char *func_data) { int i; + bool result = false; + struct ima_rule_entry *lsm_rule = rule; + bool rule_reinitialized = false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) @@ -636,35 +635,55 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int rc = 0; u32 osid; - if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) { - if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p) + if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) { + if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p) continue; else return false; } + +retry: switch (i) { case LSM_OBJ_USER: case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type, + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); break; case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); break; default: break; } - if (!rc) - return false; + + if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + if (lsm_rule) { + rule_reinitialized = true; + goto retry; + } + } + if (!rc) { + result = false; + goto out; + } } - return true; + result = true; + +out: + if (rule_reinitialized) { + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) + ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); + kfree(lsm_rule); + } + return result; } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index c25079faa208..04c49f05cb74 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -245,11 +245,11 @@ int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt, } if (fields && num_fields) { - *fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); + *fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(**fields), GFP_KERNEL); if (*fields == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields)); + memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(**fields)); *num_fields = i; } @@ -340,8 +340,11 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *restore_template_fmt(char *template_name) template_desc->name = ""; template_desc->fmt = kstrdup(template_name, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!template_desc->fmt) + if (!template_desc->fmt) { + kfree(template_desc); + template_desc = NULL; goto out; + } spin_lock(&template_list); list_add_tail_rcu(&template_desc->list, &defined_templates); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 7bf9b1507220..4564faae7d67 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -601,16 +601,15 @@ int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, file_dentry(event_data->file), XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); - if (rc <= 0) - return 0; - - if (xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { - kfree(xattr_data); - return 0; + if (rc <= 0 || xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { + rc = 0; + goto out; } rc = ima_write_template_field_data((char *)xattr_data, rc, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); + +out: kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index b78753d27d8e..d1fdd113450a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = { { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMacPro1,1") }, { } }; |