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-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c23
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 0ca31c8bc0b1..59bf3c1674c8 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -647,7 +647,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file,
+ bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -657,7 +658,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f
if (!file_caps_enabled)
return 0;
- if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
+ if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt))
return 0;
/*
@@ -665,10 +666,10 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f
* explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
* descendants.
*/
- if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
+ if (!current_in_userns(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
return 0;
- rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
+ rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
@@ -797,26 +798,27 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
}
/**
- * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
+ * cap_bprm_creds_from_file - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
+ * @file: The file to pull the credentials from
*
* Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
* constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
* which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
-int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
+ /* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
- new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
+ ret = get_file_caps(bprm, file, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -885,12 +887,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return -EPERM;
/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
- bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
if (is_setid ||
(!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
(effective ||
__cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
- bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
+ bprm->secureexec = 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -1347,7 +1348,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, cap_bprm_creds_from_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),