diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.c | 208 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index f886bcae1b7e..2a7ee7f6cd8b 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ #define AUTH_REQ_MASK 0x07 -static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16]) +static inline void swap128(const u8 src[16], u8 dst[16]) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) dst[15 - i] = src[i]; } -static inline void swap56(u8 src[7], u8 dst[7]) +static inline void swap56(const u8 src[7], u8 dst[7]) { int i; for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r) { struct blkcipher_desc desc; struct scatterlist sg; + uint8_t tmp[16], data[16]; int err; if (tfm == NULL) { @@ -63,34 +64,40 @@ static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r) desc.tfm = tfm; desc.flags = 0; - err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, k, 16); + /* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */ + swap128(k, tmp); + + err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16); if (err) { BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err); return err; } - sg_init_one(&sg, r, 16); + /* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */ + swap128(r, data); + + sg_init_one(&sg, data, 16); err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16); if (err) BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err); + /* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */ + swap128(data, r); + return err; } static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) { - u8 _res[16], k[16]; + u8 _res[16]; int err; /* r' = padding || r */ - memset(_res, 0, 13); - _res[13] = r[2]; - _res[14] = r[1]; - _res[15] = r[0]; + memcpy(_res, r, 3); + memset(_res + 3, 0, 13); - swap128(irk, k); - err = smp_e(tfm, k, _res); + err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res); if (err) { BT_ERR("Encrypt error"); return err; @@ -102,9 +109,7 @@ static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3]) * by taking the least significant 24 bits of the output of e as the * result of ah. */ - res[0] = _res[15]; - res[1] = _res[14]; - res[2] = _res[13]; + memcpy(res, _res, 3); return 0; } @@ -152,16 +157,15 @@ static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], memset(p1, 0, 16); /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */ - swap56(pres, p1); - swap56(preq, p1 + 7); - p1[14] = _rat; - p1[15] = _iat; - - memset(p2, 0, 16); + p1[0] = _iat; + p1[1] = _rat; + memcpy(p1 + 2, preq, 7); + memcpy(p1 + 9, pres, 7); /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */ - baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 4), ia); - baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 10), ra); + memcpy(p2, ra, 6); + memcpy(p2 + 6, ia, 6); + memset(p2 + 12, 0, 4); /* res = r XOR p1 */ u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1); @@ -190,8 +194,8 @@ static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], int err; /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */ - memcpy(_r, r1 + 8, 8); - memcpy(_r + 8, r2 + 8, 8); + memcpy(_r, r2, 8); + memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8); err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r); if (err) @@ -218,7 +222,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE); lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen); - lh->cid = __constant_cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP); + lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP); memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code)); @@ -273,8 +277,8 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0; if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) { - local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; - remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; + local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; + remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN; authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING; } else { authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING; @@ -403,16 +407,14 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, method = REQ_PASSKEY; } - /* Generate random passkey. Not valid until confirmed. */ + /* Generate random passkey. */ if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) { - u8 key[16]; - - memset(key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey)); passkey %= 1000000; - put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key); - swap128(key, smp->tk); + put_unaligned_le32(passkey, smp->tk); BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey); + set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags); } hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev); @@ -421,7 +423,7 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth, ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type); else - ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, + ret = mgmt_user_passkey_notify(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type, cpu_to_le32(passkey), 0); @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work) struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes; struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp; int ret; - u8 res[16], reason; + u8 reason; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); @@ -447,7 +449,8 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work) ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, - conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, res); + conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, + cp.confirm_val); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -458,7 +461,6 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work) clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags); - swap128(res, cp.confirm_val); smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp); return; @@ -474,7 +476,7 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hdev->tfm_aes; - u8 reason, confirm[16], res[16], key[16]; + u8 reason, confirm[16]; int ret; if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(tfm)) { @@ -489,7 +491,7 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, - hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, res); + hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -498,8 +500,6 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) goto error; } - swap128(res, confirm); - if (memcmp(smp->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(smp->pcnf)) != 0) { BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)"); reason = SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED; @@ -511,8 +511,7 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) __le64 rand = 0; __le16 ediv = 0; - smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, key); - swap128(key, stk); + smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk); memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); @@ -525,15 +524,14 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk); hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; } else { - u8 stk[16], r[16]; + u8 stk[16]; __le64 rand = 0; __le16 ediv = 0; - swap128(smp->prnd, r); - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r); + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), + smp->prnd); - smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, key); - swap128(key, stk); + smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk); memset(stk + smp->enc_key_size, 0, SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - smp->enc_key_size); @@ -596,6 +594,9 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags); mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete); + kfree(smp->csrk); + kfree(smp->slave_csrk); + /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ if (!complete) { if (smp->ltk) { @@ -625,7 +626,6 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn; struct smp_chan *smp; u32 value; - u8 key[16]; BT_DBG(""); @@ -637,10 +637,9 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey) switch (mgmt_op) { case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY: value = le32_to_cpu(passkey); - memset(key, 0, sizeof(key)); + memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk)); BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value); - put_unaligned_le32(value, key); - swap128(key, smp->tk); + put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk); /* Fall Through */ case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY: set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags); @@ -745,6 +744,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP; memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp)); + /* Update remote key distribution in case the remote cleared + * some bits that we had enabled in our request. + */ + smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; + if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && (rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING; @@ -758,10 +762,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags); /* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */ - if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) - return 0; - - queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm); + if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) + queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm); return 0; } @@ -779,17 +781,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf)); - if (conn->hcon->out) { - u8 random[16]; - - swap128(smp->prnd, random); - smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random), - random); - } else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) { + if (conn->hcon->out) + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd), + smp->prnd); + else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm); - } else { + else set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags); - } return 0; } @@ -804,7 +802,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd)) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; - swap128(skb->data, smp->rrnd); + memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd)); queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->random); @@ -910,6 +908,12 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level) authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level); + /* hcon->auth_type is set by pair_device in mgmt.c. If the MITM + * flag is set we should also set it for the SMP request. + */ + if ((hcon->auth_type & 0x01)) + authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM; + if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) { struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; @@ -1065,6 +1069,41 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, return 0; } +static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data; + struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan; + struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev; + struct smp_csrk *csrk; + + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); + + if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) + return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; + + /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */ + if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)) + return 0; + + /* Mark the information as received */ + smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; + + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); + + hci_dev_lock(hdev); + csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); + if (csrk) { + csrk->master = 0x01; + memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); + } + smp->csrk = csrk; + if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)) + smp_distribute_keys(conn); + hci_dev_unlock(hdev); + + return 0; +} + int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; @@ -1147,8 +1186,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) break; case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO: - /* Just ignored */ - reason = 0; + reason = smp_cmd_sign_info(conn, skb); break; default: @@ -1172,20 +1210,40 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; + struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; + struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; + bool persistent; if (smp->remote_irk) mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk); + /* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides + * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests. + */ + persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING); + + if (smp->csrk) { + smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent); + } + + if (smp->slave_csrk) { + smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; + bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); + mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent); + } + if (smp->ltk) { smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk); + mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent); } if (smp->slave_ltk) { smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type; bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst); - mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk); + mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent); } } @@ -1274,10 +1332,18 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) { struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign; + struct smp_csrk *csrk; - /* Send a dummy key */ + /* Generate a new random key */ get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk)); + csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL); + if (csrk) { + csrk->master = 0x00; + memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val)); + } + smp->slave_csrk = csrk; + smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign); *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; |