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-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/smp.c702
1 files changed, 702 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..391888b88a92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,702 @@
+/*
+ BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
+ Copyright (C) 2011 Nokia Corporation and/or its subsidiary(-ies).
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ published by the Free Software Foundation;
+
+ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
+ OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
+ IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
+ WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+ ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
+ COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
+ SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
+*/
+
+#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
+
+#define SMP_TIMEOUT 30000 /* 30 seconds */
+
+static inline void swap128(u8 src[16], u8 dst[16])
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ dst[15 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static inline void swap56(u8 src[7], u8 dst[7])
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
+ dst[6 - i] = src[i];
+}
+
+static int smp_e(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+{
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ int err, iv_len;
+ unsigned char iv[128];
+
+ if (tfm == NULL) {
+ BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ desc.tfm = tfm;
+ desc.flags = 0;
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm, k, 16);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg, r, 16);
+
+ iv_len = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ if (iv_len) {
+ memset(&iv, 0xff, iv_len);
+ crypto_blkcipher_set_iv(tfm, iv, iv_len);
+ }
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sg, &sg, 16);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error %d", err);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16],
+ u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia,
+ u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
+{
+ u8 p1[16], p2[16];
+ int err;
+
+ memset(p1, 0, 16);
+
+ /* p1 = pres || preq || _rat || _iat */
+ swap56(pres, p1);
+ swap56(preq, p1 + 7);
+ p1[14] = _rat;
+ p1[15] = _iat;
+
+ memset(p2, 0, 16);
+
+ /* p2 = padding || ia || ra */
+ baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 4), ia);
+ baswap((bdaddr_t *) (p2 + 10), ra);
+
+ /* res = r XOR p1 */
+ u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
+
+ /* res = e(k, res) */
+ err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+ if (err) {
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* res = res XOR p2 */
+ u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
+
+ /* res = e(k, res) */
+ err = smp_e(tfm, k, res);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_s1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16],
+ u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /* Just least significant octets from r1 and r2 are considered */
+ memcpy(_r, r1 + 8, 8);
+ memcpy(_r + 8, r2 + 8, 8);
+
+ err = smp_e(tfm, k, _r);
+ if (err)
+ BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int smp_rand(u8 *buf)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(buf, 16);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
+ u16 dlen, void *data)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
+ int len;
+
+ len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
+
+ if (len > conn->mtu)
+ return NULL;
+
+ skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!skb)
+ return NULL;
+
+ lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
+ lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
+ lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+
+ memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
+
+ memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
+
+ return skb;
+}
+
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
+
+ BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+ if (!skb)
+ return;
+
+ hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 level)
+{
+ switch (level) {
+ case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+ /* Right now we don't support bonding */
+ return SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+ default:
+ return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
+ __u8 authreq)
+{
+ u8 dist_keys;
+
+ dist_keys = 0;
+ if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->flags)) {
+ dist_keys = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_ID_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+ }
+
+ if (rsp == NULL) {
+ req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+ req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+ req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+ req->init_key_dist = dist_keys;
+ req->resp_key_dist = dist_keys;
+ req->auth_req = authreq;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
+ rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
+ rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+ rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & dist_keys;
+ rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & dist_keys;
+ rsp->auth_req = authreq;
+}
+
+static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
+{
+ if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
+ (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ conn->smp_key_size = max_key_size;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+ u8 key_size;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&conn->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
+
+ if (req->oob_flag)
+ return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
+
+ /* We didn't start the pairing, so no requirements */
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ /* Just works */
+ memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
+
+ conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+
+ mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+ msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
+ int ret;
+ u8 res[16], key_size;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ req = (void *) &conn->preq[1];
+
+ key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp->max_key_size);
+ if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
+ if (rsp->oob_flag)
+ return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
+
+ /* Just works */
+ memset(conn->tk, 0, sizeof(conn->tk));
+
+ conn->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
+ memcpy(&conn->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
+
+ ret = smp_rand(conn->prnd);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
+ conn->src, conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, res);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = conn->hcon->hdev->tfm;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+ memcpy(conn->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(conn->pcnf));
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(conn->pcnf));
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ u8 random[16];
+
+ swap128(conn->prnd, random);
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
+ random);
+ } else {
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing_confirm cp;
+ int ret;
+ u8 res[16];
+
+ ret = smp_rand(conn->prnd);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, conn->preq, conn->prsp,
+ conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst,
+ 0, conn->src, res);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+
+ swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ }
+
+ mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+ msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = hcon->hdev->tfm;
+ int ret;
+ u8 key[16], res[16], random[16], confirm[16];
+
+ swap128(skb->data, random);
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(random));
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out)
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->preq, conn->prsp, 0,
+ conn->src, conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst,
+ res);
+ else
+ ret = smp_c1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->preq, conn->prsp,
+ conn->hcon->dst_type, conn->dst, 0, conn->src,
+ res);
+ if (ret)
+ return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
+
+ swap128(res, confirm);
+
+ if (memcmp(conn->pcnf, confirm, sizeof(conn->pcnf)) != 0) {
+ BT_ERR("Pairing failed (confirmation values mismatch)");
+ return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ u8 stk[16], rand[8];
+ __le16 ediv;
+
+ memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand));
+ ediv = 0;
+
+ smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, random, conn->prnd, key);
+ swap128(key, stk);
+
+ memset(stk + conn->smp_key_size, 0,
+ SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - conn->smp_key_size);
+
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = conn->smp_key_size;
+ } else {
+ u8 stk[16], r[16], rand[8];
+ __le16 ediv;
+
+ memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand));
+ ediv = 0;
+
+ swap128(conn->prnd, r);
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r);
+
+ smp_s1(tfm, conn->tk, conn->prnd, random, key);
+ swap128(key, stk);
+
+ memset(stk + conn->smp_key_size, 0,
+ SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE - conn->smp_key_size);
+
+ hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, 0, conn->dst, conn->smp_key_size,
+ ediv, rand, stk);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend))
+ return 0;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
+
+ conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+
+ mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+ msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
+ set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
+{
+ struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ __u8 authreq;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
+
+ if (!lmp_host_le_capable(hcon->hdev))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (IS_ERR(hcon->hdev->tfm))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (sec_level == BT_SECURITY_LOW)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (hcon->sec_level >= sec_level)
+ return 1;
+
+ authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
+
+ if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
+ struct link_key *key;
+
+ key = hci_find_link_key_type(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+ HCI_LK_SMP_LTK);
+ if (key) {
+ struct key_master_id *master = (void *) key->data;
+
+ hci_le_start_enc(hcon, master->ediv, master->rand,
+ key->val);
+ hcon->enc_key_size = key->pin_len;
+
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
+ conn->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
+ memcpy(&conn->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
+
+ mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+ msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ } else {
+ struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
+ cp.auth_req = authreq;
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ }
+
+done:
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+ set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->pend);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ memcpy(conn->tk, rp->ltk, sizeof(conn->tk));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
+
+ hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, 1, conn->src, conn->smp_key_size,
+ rp->ediv, rp->rand, conn->tk);
+
+ smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ __u8 code = skb->data[0];
+ __u8 reason;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!lmp_host_le_capable(conn->hcon->hdev)) {
+ err = -ENOTSUPP;
+ reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm);
+ reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
+
+ switch (code) {
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_req(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+ reason = 0;
+ err = -EPERM;
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ:
+ reason = smp_cmd_security_req(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM:
+ reason = smp_cmd_pairing_random(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO:
+ reason = smp_cmd_encrypt_info(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT:
+ reason = smp_cmd_master_ident(conn, skb);
+ break;
+
+ case SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO:
+ case SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO:
+ case SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO:
+ /* Just ignored */
+ reason = 0;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
+
+ reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (reason)
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+ &reason);
+
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return err;
+}
+
+int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
+{
+ struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+ __u8 *keydist;
+
+ BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(conn->hcon->hdev->tfm);
+
+ rsp = (void *) &conn->prsp[1];
+
+ /* The responder sends its keys first */
+ if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07))
+ return 0;
+
+ req = (void *) &conn->preq[1];
+
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
+ keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+ } else {
+ keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+ *keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+ }
+
+
+ BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+ struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+ __le16 ediv;
+
+ get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+ get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+ get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+ hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, 1, conn->dst, conn->smp_key_size,
+ ediv, ident.rand, enc.ltk);
+
+ ident.ediv = cpu_to_le16(ediv);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+ struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+ /* Send a dummy key */
+ get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+ /* Just public address */
+ memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo));
+ bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, conn->src);
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+ &addrinfo);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+ struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+
+ /* Send a dummy key */
+ get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+ smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+ *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}