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-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.debug79
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.kasan168
-rw-r--r--lib/crypto/Kconfig6
-rw-r--r--lib/crypto/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--lib/crypto/sm3.c246
-rw-r--r--lib/crypto/sm4.c176
-rw-r--r--lib/fault-inject.c3
-rw-r--r--lib/glob.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/kstrtox.c6
-rw-r--r--lib/lockref.c9
-rw-r--r--lib/string.c25
-rw-r--r--lib/string_helpers.c3
-rw-r--r--lib/test_meminit.c12
-rw-r--r--lib/test_string.c33
14 files changed, 147 insertions, 627 deletions
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index b8cc65d22169..2e24db4bff19 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -699,41 +699,6 @@ config DEBUG_OBJECTS_ENABLE_DEFAULT
help
Debug objects boot parameter default value
-config DEBUG_SLAB
- bool "Debug slab memory allocations"
- depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && SLAB
- help
- Say Y here to have the kernel do limited verification on memory
- allocation as well as poisoning memory on free to catch use of freed
- memory. This can make kmalloc/kfree-intensive workloads much slower.
-
-config SLUB_DEBUG_ON
- bool "SLUB debugging on by default"
- depends on SLUB && SLUB_DEBUG
- select STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT if STACKTRACE_SUPPORT
- default n
- help
- Boot with debugging on by default. SLUB boots by default with
- the runtime debug capabilities switched off. Enabling this is
- equivalent to specifying the "slub_debug" parameter on boot.
- There is no support for more fine grained debug control like
- possible with slub_debug=xxx. SLUB debugging may be switched
- off in a kernel built with CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON by specifying
- "slub_debug=-".
-
-config SLUB_STATS
- default n
- bool "Enable SLUB performance statistics"
- depends on SLUB && SYSFS
- help
- SLUB statistics are useful to debug SLUBs allocation behavior in
- order find ways to optimize the allocator. This should never be
- enabled for production use since keeping statistics slows down
- the allocator by a few percentage points. The slabinfo command
- supports the determination of the most active slabs to figure
- out which slabs are relevant to a particular load.
- Try running: slabinfo -DA
-
config HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
bool
@@ -1073,13 +1038,6 @@ config BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC
Say N if unsure.
-config BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC_VALUE
- int
- depends on SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR
- range 0 1
- default 0 if !BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC
- default 1 if BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC
-
config HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF
bool
select SOFTLOCKUP_DETECTOR
@@ -1121,13 +1079,6 @@ config BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC
Say N if unsure.
-config BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC_VALUE
- int
- depends on HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR
- range 0 1
- default 0 if !BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC
- default 1 if BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC
-
config DETECT_HUNG_TASK
bool "Detect Hung Tasks"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
@@ -1175,13 +1126,6 @@ config BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC
Say N if unsure.
-config BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC_VALUE
- int
- depends on DETECT_HUNG_TASK
- range 0 1
- default 0 if !BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC
- default 1 if BOOTPARAM_HUNG_TASK_PANIC
-
config WQ_WATCHDOG
bool "Detect Workqueue Stalls"
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
@@ -1546,29 +1490,6 @@ config CSD_LOCK_WAIT_DEBUG
include the IPI handler function currently executing (if any)
and relevant stack traces.
-choice
- prompt "Lock debugging: prove subsystem device_lock() correctness"
- depends on PROVE_LOCKING
- help
- For subsystems that have instrumented their usage of the device_lock()
- with nested annotations, enable lock dependency checking. The locking
- hierarchy 'subclass' identifiers are not compatible across
- sub-systems, so only one can be enabled at a time.
-
-config PROVE_NVDIMM_LOCKING
- bool "NVDIMM"
- depends on LIBNVDIMM
- help
- Enable lockdep to validate nd_device_lock() usage.
-
-config PROVE_CXL_LOCKING
- bool "CXL"
- depends on CXL_BUS
- help
- Enable lockdep to validate cxl_device_lock() usage.
-
-endchoice
-
endmenu # lock debugging
config TRACE_IRQFLAGS
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
index 1f3e620188a2..f0973da583e0 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
# This config refers to the generic KASAN mode.
config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN
bool
@@ -15,9 +16,8 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
config ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
bool
help
- An architecture might not support inline instrumentation.
- When this option is selected, inline and stack instrumentation are
- disabled.
+ Disables both inline and stack instrumentation. Selected by
+ architectures that do not support these instrumentation types.
config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address)
@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@ config CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS
def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress)
# This option is only required for software KASAN modes.
-# Old GCC versions don't have proper support for no_sanitize_address.
+# Old GCC versions do not have proper support for no_sanitize_address.
# See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=89124 for details.
config CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS
def_bool !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 80300
menuconfig KASAN
- bool "KASAN: runtime memory debugger"
+ bool "KASAN: dynamic memory safety error detector"
depends on (((HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC) || \
(HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) && \
CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS) || \
@@ -40,10 +40,13 @@ menuconfig KASAN
depends on (SLUB && SYSFS) || (SLAB && !DEBUG_SLAB)
select STACKDEPOT_ALWAYS_INIT
help
- Enables KASAN (KernelAddressSANitizer) - runtime memory debugger,
- designed to find out-of-bounds accesses and use-after-free bugs.
+ Enables KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) - a dynamic memory safety
+ error detector designed to find out-of-bounds and use-after-free bugs.
+
See Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst for details.
+ For better error reports, also enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
+
if KASAN
choice
@@ -51,75 +54,71 @@ choice
default KASAN_GENERIC
help
KASAN has three modes:
- 1. generic KASAN (similar to userspace ASan,
- x86_64/arm64/xtensa, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC),
- 2. software tag-based KASAN (arm64 only, based on software
- memory tagging (similar to userspace HWASan), enabled with
- CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS), and
- 3. hardware tag-based KASAN (arm64 only, based on hardware
- memory tagging, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS).
- All KASAN modes are strictly debugging features.
+ 1. Generic KASAN (supported by many architectures, enabled with
+ CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC, similar to userspace ASan),
+ 2. Software Tag-Based KASAN (arm64 only, based on software memory
+ tagging, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS, similar to userspace
+ HWASan), and
+ 3. Hardware Tag-Based KASAN (arm64 only, based on hardware memory
+ tagging, enabled with CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS).
- For better error reports enable CONFIG_STACKTRACE.
+ See Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst for details about each mode.
config KASAN_GENERIC
- bool "Generic mode"
+ bool "Generic KASAN"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN && CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
depends on CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS
select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB
select CONSTRUCTORS
help
- Enables generic KASAN mode.
+ Enables Generic KASAN.
- This mode is supported in both GCC and Clang. With GCC it requires
- version 8.3.0 or later. Any supported Clang version is compatible,
- but detection of out-of-bounds accesses for global variables is
- supported only since Clang 11.
+ Requires GCC 8.3.0+ or Clang.
- This mode consumes about 1/8th of available memory at kernel start
- and introduces an overhead of ~x1.5 for the rest of the allocations.
+ Consumes about 1/8th of available memory at kernel start and adds an
+ overhead of ~50% for dynamic allocations.
The performance slowdown is ~x3.
- Currently CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB
- (the resulting kernel does not boot).
+ (Incompatible with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB: the kernel does not boot.)
config KASAN_SW_TAGS
- bool "Software tag-based mode"
+ bool "Software Tag-Based KASAN"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS && CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS
depends on CC_HAS_WORKING_NOSANITIZE_ADDRESS
select SLUB_DEBUG if SLUB
select CONSTRUCTORS
help
- Enables software tag-based KASAN mode.
+ Enables Software Tag-Based KASAN.
- This mode require software memory tagging support in the form of
- HWASan-like compiler instrumentation.
+ Requires GCC 11+ or Clang.
- Currently this mode is only implemented for arm64 CPUs and relies on
- Top Byte Ignore. This mode requires Clang.
+ Supported only on arm64 CPUs and relies on Top Byte Ignore.
- This mode consumes about 1/16th of available memory at kernel start
- and introduces an overhead of ~20% for the rest of the allocations.
- This mode may potentially introduce problems relating to pointer
- casting and comparison, as it embeds tags into the top byte of each
- pointer.
+ Consumes about 1/16th of available memory at kernel start and
+ add an overhead of ~20% for dynamic allocations.
- Currently CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS doesn't work with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB
- (the resulting kernel does not boot).
+ May potentially introduce problems related to pointer casting and
+ comparison, as it embeds a tag into the top byte of each pointer.
+
+ (Incompatible with CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB: the kernel does not boot.)
config KASAN_HW_TAGS
- bool "Hardware tag-based mode"
+ bool "Hardware Tag-Based KASAN"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS
depends on SLUB
help
- Enables hardware tag-based KASAN mode.
+ Enables Hardware Tag-Based KASAN.
+
+ Requires GCC 10+ or Clang 12+.
- This mode requires hardware memory tagging support, and can be used
- by any architecture that provides it.
+ Supported only on arm64 CPUs starting from ARMv8.5 and relies on
+ Memory Tagging Extension and Top Byte Ignore.
- Currently this mode is only implemented for arm64 CPUs starting from
- ARMv8.5 and relies on Memory Tagging Extension and Top Byte Ignore.
+ Consumes about 1/32nd of available memory.
+
+ May potentially introduce problems related to pointer casting and
+ comparison, as it embeds a tag into the top byte of each pointer.
endchoice
@@ -131,83 +130,80 @@ choice
config KASAN_OUTLINE
bool "Outline instrumentation"
help
- Before every memory access compiler insert function call
- __asan_load*/__asan_store*. These functions performs check
- of shadow memory. This is slower than inline instrumentation,
- however it doesn't bloat size of kernel's .text section so
- much as inline does.
+ Makes the compiler insert function calls that check whether the memory
+ is accessible before each memory access. Slower than KASAN_INLINE, but
+ does not bloat the size of the kernel's .text section so much.
config KASAN_INLINE
bool "Inline instrumentation"
depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
help
- Compiler directly inserts code checking shadow memory before
- memory accesses. This is faster than outline (in some workloads
- it gives about x2 boost over outline instrumentation), but
- make kernel's .text size much bigger.
+ Makes the compiler directly insert memory accessibility checks before
+ each memory access. Faster than KASAN_OUTLINE (gives ~x2 boost for
+ some workloads), but makes the kernel's .text size much bigger.
endchoice
config KASAN_STACK
- bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
+ bool "Stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
default y if CC_IS_GCC
help
- The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that
- causes excessive stack usage in a lot of functions, see
- https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38809
- Disabling asan-stack makes it safe to run kernels build
- with clang-8 with KASAN enabled, though it loses some of
- the functionality.
- This feature is always disabled when compile-testing with clang
- to avoid cluttering the output in stack overflow warnings,
- but clang users can still enable it for builds without
- CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST. On gcc it is assumed to always be safe
- to use and enabled by default.
- If the architecture disables inline instrumentation, stack
- instrumentation is also disabled as it adds inline-style
- instrumentation that is run unconditionally.
+ Disables stack instrumentation and thus KASAN's ability to detect
+ out-of-bounds bugs in stack variables.
+
+ With Clang, stack instrumentation has a problem that causes excessive
+ stack usage, see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=38809. Thus,
+ with Clang, this option is deemed unsafe.
+
+ This option is always disabled when compile-testing with Clang to
+ avoid cluttering the log with stack overflow warnings.
+
+ With GCC, enabling stack instrumentation is assumed to be safe.
+
+ If the architecture disables inline instrumentation via
+ ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE, stack instrumentation gets disabled
+ as well, as it adds inline-style instrumentation that is run
+ unconditionally.
config KASAN_TAGS_IDENTIFY
- bool "Enable memory corruption identification"
+ bool "Memory corruption type identification"
depends on KASAN_SW_TAGS || KASAN_HW_TAGS
help
- This option enables best-effort identification of bug type
- (use-after-free or out-of-bounds) at the cost of increased
- memory consumption.
+ Enables best-effort identification of the bug types (use-after-free
+ or out-of-bounds) at the cost of increased memory consumption.
+ Only applicable for the tag-based KASAN modes.
config KASAN_VMALLOC
bool "Check accesses to vmalloc allocations"
depends on HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
help
- This mode makes KASAN check accesses to vmalloc allocations for
- validity.
+ Makes KASAN check the validity of accesses to vmalloc allocations.
- With software KASAN modes, checking is done for all types of vmalloc
- allocations. Enabling this option leads to higher memory usage.
+ With software KASAN modes, all types vmalloc allocations are
+ checked. Enabling this option leads to higher memory usage.
- With hardware tag-based KASAN, only VM_ALLOC mappings are checked.
- There is no additional memory usage.
+ With Hardware Tag-Based KASAN, only non-executable VM_ALLOC mappings
+ are checked. There is no additional memory usage.
config KASAN_KUNIT_TEST
tristate "KUnit-compatible tests of KASAN bug detection capabilities" if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
depends on KASAN && KUNIT
default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
help
- This is a KUnit test suite doing various nasty things like
- out of bounds and use after free accesses. It is useful for testing
- kernel debugging features like KASAN.
+ A KUnit-based KASAN test suite. Triggers different kinds of
+ out-of-bounds and use-after-free accesses. Useful for testing whether
+ KASAN can detect certain bug types.
For more information on KUnit and unit tests in general, please refer
- to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit.
+ to the KUnit documentation in Documentation/dev-tools/kunit/.
config KASAN_MODULE_TEST
tristate "KUnit-incompatible tests of KASAN bug detection capabilities"
depends on m && KASAN && !KASAN_HW_TAGS
help
- This is a part of the KASAN test suite that is incompatible with
- KUnit. Currently includes tests that do bad copy_from/to_user
- accesses.
+ A part of the KASAN test suite that is not integrated with KUnit.
+ Incompatible with Hardware Tag-Based KASAN.
endif # KASAN
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
index 379a66d7f504..9856e291f414 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -123,10 +123,4 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
config CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
tristate
-config CRYPTO_LIB_SM3
- tristate
-
-config CRYPTO_LIB_SM4
- tristate
-
endmenu
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile
index 6c872d05d1e6..26be2bbe09c5 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -37,12 +37,6 @@ libpoly1305-y += poly1305.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256) += libsha256.o
libsha256-y := sha256.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SM3) += libsm3.o
-libsm3-y := sm3.o
-
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SM4) += libsm4.o
-libsm4-y := sm4.o
-
ifneq ($(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS),y)
libblake2s-y += blake2s-selftest.o
libchacha20poly1305-y += chacha20poly1305-selftest.o
diff --git a/lib/crypto/sm3.c b/lib/crypto/sm3.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d473e358a873..000000000000
--- a/lib/crypto/sm3.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
-/*
- * SM3 secure hash, as specified by OSCCA GM/T 0004-2012 SM3 and described
- * at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sca-cfrg-sm3-02
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2017 ARM Limited or its affiliates.
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
- * Copyright (C) 2021 Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#include <crypto/sm3.h>
-
-static const u32 ____cacheline_aligned K[64] = {
- 0x79cc4519, 0xf3988a32, 0xe7311465, 0xce6228cb,
- 0x9cc45197, 0x3988a32f, 0x7311465e, 0xe6228cbc,
- 0xcc451979, 0x988a32f3, 0x311465e7, 0x6228cbce,
- 0xc451979c, 0x88a32f39, 0x11465e73, 0x228cbce6,
- 0x9d8a7a87, 0x3b14f50f, 0x7629ea1e, 0xec53d43c,
- 0xd8a7a879, 0xb14f50f3, 0x629ea1e7, 0xc53d43ce,
- 0x8a7a879d, 0x14f50f3b, 0x29ea1e76, 0x53d43cec,
- 0xa7a879d8, 0x4f50f3b1, 0x9ea1e762, 0x3d43cec5,
- 0x7a879d8a, 0xf50f3b14, 0xea1e7629, 0xd43cec53,
- 0xa879d8a7, 0x50f3b14f, 0xa1e7629e, 0x43cec53d,
- 0x879d8a7a, 0x0f3b14f5, 0x1e7629ea, 0x3cec53d4,
- 0x79d8a7a8, 0xf3b14f50, 0xe7629ea1, 0xcec53d43,
- 0x9d8a7a87, 0x3b14f50f, 0x7629ea1e, 0xec53d43c,
- 0xd8a7a879, 0xb14f50f3, 0x629ea1e7, 0xc53d43ce,
- 0x8a7a879d, 0x14f50f3b, 0x29ea1e76, 0x53d43cec,
- 0xa7a879d8, 0x4f50f3b1, 0x9ea1e762, 0x3d43cec5
-};
-
-/*
- * Transform the message X which consists of 16 32-bit-words. See
- * GM/T 004-2012 for details.
- */
-#define R(i, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t, w1, w2) \
- do { \
- ss1 = rol32((rol32((a), 12) + (e) + (t)), 7); \
- ss2 = ss1 ^ rol32((a), 12); \
- d += FF ## i(a, b, c) + ss2 + ((w1) ^ (w2)); \
- h += GG ## i(e, f, g) + ss1 + (w1); \
- b = rol32((b), 9); \
- f = rol32((f), 19); \
- h = P0((h)); \
- } while (0)
-
-#define R1(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t, w1, w2) \
- R(1, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t, w1, w2)
-#define R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t, w1, w2) \
- R(2, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t, w1, w2)
-
-#define FF1(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
-#define FF2(x, y, z) ((x & y) | (x & z) | (y & z))
-
-#define GG1(x, y, z) FF1(x, y, z)
-#define GG2(x, y, z) ((x & y) | (~x & z))
-
-/* Message expansion */
-#define P0(x) ((x) ^ rol32((x), 9) ^ rol32((x), 17))
-#define P1(x) ((x) ^ rol32((x), 15) ^ rol32((x), 23))
-#define I(i) (W[i] = get_unaligned_be32(data + i * 4))
-#define W1(i) (W[i & 0x0f])
-#define W2(i) (W[i & 0x0f] = \
- P1(W[i & 0x0f] \
- ^ W[(i-9) & 0x0f] \
- ^ rol32(W[(i-3) & 0x0f], 15)) \
- ^ rol32(W[(i-13) & 0x0f], 7) \
- ^ W[(i-6) & 0x0f])
-
-static void sm3_transform(struct sm3_state *sctx, u8 const *data, u32 W[16])
-{
- u32 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, ss1, ss2;
-
- a = sctx->state[0];
- b = sctx->state[1];
- c = sctx->state[2];
- d = sctx->state[3];
- e = sctx->state[4];
- f = sctx->state[5];
- g = sctx->state[6];
- h = sctx->state[7];
-
- R1(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[0], I(0), I(4));
- R1(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[1], I(1), I(5));
- R1(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[2], I(2), I(6));
- R1(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[3], I(3), I(7));
- R1(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[4], W1(4), I(8));
- R1(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[5], W1(5), I(9));
- R1(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[6], W1(6), I(10));
- R1(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[7], W1(7), I(11));
- R1(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[8], W1(8), I(12));
- R1(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[9], W1(9), I(13));
- R1(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[10], W1(10), I(14));
- R1(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[11], W1(11), I(15));
- R1(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[12], W1(12), W2(16));
- R1(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[13], W1(13), W2(17));
- R1(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[14], W1(14), W2(18));
- R1(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[15], W1(15), W2(19));
-
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[16], W1(16), W2(20));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[17], W1(17), W2(21));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[18], W1(18), W2(22));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[19], W1(19), W2(23));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[20], W1(20), W2(24));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[21], W1(21), W2(25));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[22], W1(22), W2(26));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[23], W1(23), W2(27));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[24], W1(24), W2(28));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[25], W1(25), W2(29));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[26], W1(26), W2(30));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[27], W1(27), W2(31));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[28], W1(28), W2(32));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[29], W1(29), W2(33));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[30], W1(30), W2(34));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[31], W1(31), W2(35));
-
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[32], W1(32), W2(36));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[33], W1(33), W2(37));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[34], W1(34), W2(38));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[35], W1(35), W2(39));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[36], W1(36), W2(40));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[37], W1(37), W2(41));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[38], W1(38), W2(42));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[39], W1(39), W2(43));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[40], W1(40), W2(44));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[41], W1(41), W2(45));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[42], W1(42), W2(46));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[43], W1(43), W2(47));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[44], W1(44), W2(48));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[45], W1(45), W2(49));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[46], W1(46), W2(50));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[47], W1(47), W2(51));
-
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[48], W1(48), W2(52));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[49], W1(49), W2(53));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[50], W1(50), W2(54));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[51], W1(51), W2(55));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[52], W1(52), W2(56));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[53], W1(53), W2(57));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[54], W1(54), W2(58));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[55], W1(55), W2(59));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[56], W1(56), W2(60));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[57], W1(57), W2(61));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[58], W1(58), W2(62));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[59], W1(59), W2(63));
- R2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, K[60], W1(60), W2(64));
- R2(d, a, b, c, h, e, f, g, K[61], W1(61), W2(65));
- R2(c, d, a, b, g, h, e, f, K[62], W1(62), W2(66));
- R2(b, c, d, a, f, g, h, e, K[63], W1(63), W2(67));
-
- sctx->state[0] ^= a;
- sctx->state[1] ^= b;
- sctx->state[2] ^= c;
- sctx->state[3] ^= d;
- sctx->state[4] ^= e;
- sctx->state[5] ^= f;
- sctx->state[6] ^= g;
- sctx->state[7] ^= h;
-}
-#undef R
-#undef R1
-#undef R2
-#undef I
-#undef W1
-#undef W2
-
-static inline void sm3_block(struct sm3_state *sctx,
- u8 const *data, int blocks, u32 W[16])
-{
- while (blocks--) {
- sm3_transform(sctx, data, W);
- data += SM3_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
-}
-
-void sm3_update(struct sm3_state *sctx, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
-{
- unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SM3_BLOCK_SIZE;
- u32 W[16];
-
- sctx->count += len;
-
- if ((partial + len) >= SM3_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- int blocks;
-
- if (partial) {
- int p = SM3_BLOCK_SIZE - partial;
-
- memcpy(sctx->buffer + partial, data, p);
- data += p;
- len -= p;
-
- sm3_block(sctx, sctx->buffer, 1, W);
- }
-
- blocks = len / SM3_BLOCK_SIZE;
- len %= SM3_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
- if (blocks) {
- sm3_block(sctx, data, blocks, W);
- data += blocks * SM3_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
-
- memzero_explicit(W, sizeof(W));
-
- partial = 0;
- }
- if (len)
- memcpy(sctx->buffer + partial, data, len);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sm3_update);
-
-void sm3_final(struct sm3_state *sctx, u8 *out)
-{
- const int bit_offset = SM3_BLOCK_SIZE - sizeof(u64);
- __be64 *bits = (__be64 *)(sctx->buffer + bit_offset);
- __be32 *digest = (__be32 *)out;
- unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SM3_BLOCK_SIZE;
- u32 W[16];
- int i;
-
- sctx->buffer[partial++] = 0x80;
- if (partial > bit_offset) {
- memset(sctx->buffer + partial, 0, SM3_BLOCK_SIZE - partial);
- partial = 0;
-
- sm3_block(sctx, sctx->buffer, 1, W);
- }
-
- memset(sctx->buffer + partial, 0, bit_offset - partial);
- *bits = cpu_to_be64(sctx->count << 3);
- sm3_block(sctx, sctx->buffer, 1, W);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
- put_unaligned_be32(sctx->state[i], digest++);
-
- /* Zeroize sensitive information. */
- memzero_explicit(W, sizeof(W));
- memzero_explicit(sctx, sizeof(*sctx));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sm3_final);
-
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic SM3 library");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/lib/crypto/sm4.c b/lib/crypto/sm4.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 284e62576d0c..000000000000
--- a/lib/crypto/sm4.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
-/*
- * SM4, as specified in
- * https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-10.html
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2018 ARM Limited or its affiliates.
- * Copyright (c) 2021 Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#include <crypto/sm4.h>
-
-static const u32 fk[4] = {
- 0xa3b1bac6, 0x56aa3350, 0x677d9197, 0xb27022dc
-};
-
-static const u32 ____cacheline_aligned ck[32] = {
- 0x00070e15, 0x1c232a31, 0x383f464d, 0x545b6269,
- 0x70777e85, 0x8c939aa1, 0xa8afb6bd, 0xc4cbd2d9,
- 0xe0e7eef5, 0xfc030a11, 0x181f262d, 0x343b4249,
- 0x50575e65, 0x6c737a81, 0x888f969d, 0xa4abb2b9,
- 0xc0c7ced5, 0xdce3eaf1, 0xf8ff060d, 0x141b2229,
- 0x30373e45, 0x4c535a61, 0x686f767d, 0x848b9299,
- 0xa0a7aeb5, 0xbcc3cad1, 0xd8dfe6ed, 0xf4fb0209,
- 0x10171e25, 0x2c333a41, 0x484f565d, 0x646b7279
-};
-
-static const u8 ____cacheline_aligned sbox[256] = {
- 0xd6, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xfe, 0xcc, 0xe1, 0x3d, 0xb7,
- 0x16, 0xb6, 0x14, 0xc2, 0x28, 0xfb, 0x2c, 0x05,
- 0x2b, 0x67, 0x9a, 0x76, 0x2a, 0xbe, 0x04, 0xc3,
- 0xaa, 0x44, 0x13, 0x26, 0x49, 0x86, 0x06, 0x99,
- 0x9c, 0x42, 0x50, 0xf4, 0x91, 0xef, 0x98, 0x7a,
- 0x33, 0x54, 0x0b, 0x43, 0xed, 0xcf, 0xac, 0x62,
- 0xe4, 0xb3, 0x1c, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x08, 0xe8, 0x95,
- 0x80, 0xdf, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x75, 0x8f, 0x3f, 0xa6,
- 0x47, 0x07, 0xa7, 0xfc, 0xf3, 0x73, 0x17, 0xba,
- 0x83, 0x59, 0x3c, 0x19, 0xe6, 0x85, 0x4f, 0xa8,
- 0x68, 0x6b, 0x81, 0xb2, 0x71, 0x64, 0xda, 0x8b,
- 0xf8, 0xeb, 0x0f, 0x4b, 0x70, 0x56, 0x9d, 0x35,
- 0x1e, 0x24, 0x0e, 0x5e, 0x63, 0x58, 0xd1, 0xa2,
- 0x25, 0x22, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x01, 0x21, 0x78, 0x87,
- 0xd4, 0x00, 0x46, 0x57, 0x9f, 0xd3, 0x27, 0x52,
- 0x4c, 0x36, 0x02, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xc4, 0xc8, 0x9e,
- 0xea, 0xbf, 0x8a, 0xd2, 0x40, 0xc7, 0x38, 0xb5,
- 0xa3, 0xf7, 0xf2, 0xce, 0xf9, 0x61, 0x15, 0xa1,
- 0xe0, 0xae, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0x9b, 0x34, 0x1a, 0x55,
- 0xad, 0x93, 0x32, 0x30, 0xf5, 0x8c, 0xb1, 0xe3,
- 0x1d, 0xf6, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x82, 0x66, 0xca, 0x60,
- 0xc0, 0x29, 0x23, 0xab, 0x0d, 0x53, 0x4e, 0x6f,
- 0xd5, 0xdb, 0x37, 0x45, 0xde, 0xfd, 0x8e, 0x2f,
- 0x03, 0xff, 0x6a, 0x72, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x5b, 0x51,
- 0x8d, 0x1b, 0xaf, 0x92, 0xbb, 0xdd, 0xbc, 0x7f,
- 0x11, 0xd9, 0x5c, 0x41, 0x1f, 0x10, 0x5a, 0xd8,
- 0x0a, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x88, 0xa5, 0xcd, 0x7b, 0xbd,
- 0x2d, 0x74, 0xd0, 0x12, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xb4, 0xb0,
- 0x89, 0x69, 0x97, 0x4a, 0x0c, 0x96, 0x77, 0x7e,
- 0x65, 0xb9, 0xf1, 0x09, 0xc5, 0x6e, 0xc6, 0x84,
- 0x18, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x3a, 0xdc, 0x4d, 0x20,
- 0x79, 0xee, 0x5f, 0x3e, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0x39, 0x48
-};
-
-static inline u32 sm4_t_non_lin_sub(u32 x)
-{
- u32 out;
-
- out = (u32)sbox[x & 0xff];
- out |= (u32)sbox[(x >> 8) & 0xff] << 8;
- out |= (u32)sbox[(x >> 16) & 0xff] << 16;
- out |= (u32)sbox[(x >> 24) & 0xff] << 24;
-
- return out;
-}
-
-static inline u32 sm4_key_lin_sub(u32 x)
-{
- return x ^ rol32(x, 13) ^ rol32(x, 23);
-}
-
-static inline u32 sm4_enc_lin_sub(u32 x)
-{
- return x ^ rol32(x, 2) ^ rol32(x, 10) ^ rol32(x, 18) ^ rol32(x, 24);
-}
-
-static inline u32 sm4_key_sub(u32 x)
-{
- return sm4_key_lin_sub(sm4_t_non_lin_sub(x));
-}
-
-static inline u32 sm4_enc_sub(u32 x)
-{
- return sm4_enc_lin_sub(sm4_t_non_lin_sub(x));
-}
-
-static inline u32 sm4_round(u32 x0, u32 x1, u32 x2, u32 x3, u32 rk)
-{
- return x0 ^ sm4_enc_sub(x1 ^ x2 ^ x3 ^ rk);
-}
-
-
-/**
- * sm4_expandkey - Expands the SM4 key as described in GB/T 32907-2016
- * @ctx: The location where the computed key will be stored.
- * @in_key: The supplied key.
- * @key_len: The length of the supplied key.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success. The function fails only if an invalid key size (or
- * pointer) is supplied.
- */
-int sm4_expandkey(struct sm4_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
- unsigned int key_len)
-{
- u32 rk[4];
- const u32 *key = (u32 *)in_key;
- int i;
-
- if (key_len != SM4_KEY_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- rk[0] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[0]) ^ fk[0];
- rk[1] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[1]) ^ fk[1];
- rk[2] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[2]) ^ fk[2];
- rk[3] = get_unaligned_be32(&key[3]) ^ fk[3];
-
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 4) {
- rk[0] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[1] ^ rk[2] ^ rk[3] ^ ck[i + 0]);
- rk[1] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[2] ^ rk[3] ^ rk[0] ^ ck[i + 1]);
- rk[2] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[3] ^ rk[0] ^ rk[1] ^ ck[i + 2]);
- rk[3] ^= sm4_key_sub(rk[0] ^ rk[1] ^ rk[2] ^ ck[i + 3]);
-
- ctx->rkey_enc[i + 0] = rk[0];
- ctx->rkey_enc[i + 1] = rk[1];
- ctx->rkey_enc[i + 2] = rk[2];
- ctx->rkey_enc[i + 3] = rk[3];
- ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 0 - i] = rk[0];
- ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 1 - i] = rk[1];
- ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 2 - i] = rk[2];
- ctx->rkey_dec[31 - 3 - i] = rk[3];
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sm4_expandkey);
-
-/**
- * sm4_crypt_block - Encrypt or decrypt a single SM4 block
- * @rk: The rkey_enc for encrypt or rkey_dec for decrypt
- * @out: Buffer to store output data
- * @in: Buffer containing the input data
- */
-void sm4_crypt_block(const u32 *rk, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
-{
- u32 x[4], i;
-
- x[0] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 0 * 4);
- x[1] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 1 * 4);
- x[2] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 2 * 4);
- x[3] = get_unaligned_be32(in + 3 * 4);
-
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 4) {
- x[0] = sm4_round(x[0], x[1], x[2], x[3], rk[i + 0]);
- x[1] = sm4_round(x[1], x[2], x[3], x[0], rk[i + 1]);
- x[2] = sm4_round(x[2], x[3], x[0], x[1], rk[i + 2]);
- x[3] = sm4_round(x[3], x[0], x[1], x[2], rk[i + 3]);
- }
-
- put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 0], out + 0 * 4);
- put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 1], out + 1 * 4);
- put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 2], out + 2 * 4);
- put_unaligned_be32(x[3 - 3], out + 3 * 4);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sm4_crypt_block);
-
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Generic SM4 library");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/lib/fault-inject.c b/lib/fault-inject.c
index ce12621b4275..423784d9c058 100644
--- a/lib/fault-inject.c
+++ b/lib/fault-inject.c
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(setup_fault_attr);
static void fail_dump(struct fault_attr *attr)
{
+ if (attr->no_warn)
+ return;
+
if (attr->verbose > 0 && __ratelimit(&attr->ratelimit_state)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.\n"
"name %pd, interval %lu, probability %lu, "
diff --git a/lib/glob.c b/lib/glob.c
index 85ecbda45cd8..15b73f490720 100644
--- a/lib/glob.c
+++ b/lib/glob.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ bool __pure glob_match(char const *pat, char const *str)
* (no exception for /), it can be easily proved that there's
* never a need to backtrack multiple levels.
*/
- char const *back_pat = NULL, *back_str = back_str;
+ char const *back_pat = NULL, *back_str;
/*
* Loop over each token (character or class) in pat, matching
diff --git a/lib/kstrtox.c b/lib/kstrtox.c
index 886510d248e5..08c14019841a 100644
--- a/lib/kstrtox.c
+++ b/lib/kstrtox.c
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kstrtos8);
* @s: input string
* @res: result
*
- * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'Yy1Nn0', or
+ * This routine returns 0 iff the first character is one of 'YyTt1NnFf0', or
* [oO][NnFf] for "on" and "off". Otherwise it will return -EINVAL. Value
* pointed to by res is updated upon finding a match.
*/
@@ -353,11 +353,15 @@ int kstrtobool(const char *s, bool *res)
switch (s[0]) {
case 'y':
case 'Y':
+ case 't':
+ case 'T':
case '1':
*res = true;
return 0;
case 'n':
case 'N':
+ case 'f':
+ case 'F':
case '0':
*res = false;
return 0;
diff --git a/lib/lockref.c b/lib/lockref.c
index 5b34bbd3eba8..c6f0b183b937 100644
--- a/lib/lockref.c
+++ b/lib/lockref.c
@@ -14,12 +14,11 @@
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(old) != 8); \
old.lock_count = READ_ONCE(lockref->lock_count); \
while (likely(arch_spin_value_unlocked(old.lock.rlock.raw_lock))) { \
- struct lockref new = old, prev = old; \
+ struct lockref new = old; \
CODE \
- old.lock_count = cmpxchg64_relaxed(&lockref->lock_count, \
- old.lock_count, \
- new.lock_count); \
- if (likely(old.lock_count == prev.lock_count)) { \
+ if (likely(try_cmpxchg64_relaxed(&lockref->lock_count, \
+ &old.lock_count, \
+ new.lock_count))) { \
SUCCESS; \
} \
if (!--retry) \
diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c
index 485777c9da83..6f334420f687 100644
--- a/lib/string.c
+++ b/lib/string.c
@@ -517,21 +517,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strnlen);
size_t strspn(const char *s, const char *accept)
{
const char *p;
- const char *a;
- size_t count = 0;
for (p = s; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
- for (a = accept; *a != '\0'; ++a) {
- if (*p == *a)
- break;
- }
- if (*a == '\0')
- return count;
- ++count;
+ if (!strchr(accept, *p))
+ break;
}
- return count;
+ return p - s;
}
-
EXPORT_SYMBOL(strspn);
#endif
@@ -544,17 +536,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(strspn);
size_t strcspn(const char *s, const char *reject)
{
const char *p;
- const char *r;
- size_t count = 0;
for (p = s; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
- for (r = reject; *r != '\0'; ++r) {
- if (*p == *r)
- return count;
- }
- ++count;
+ if (strchr(reject, *p))
+ break;
}
- return count;
+ return p - s;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(strcspn);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/string_helpers.c b/lib/string_helpers.c
index 4f877e9551d5..5ed3beb066e6 100644
--- a/lib/string_helpers.c
+++ b/lib/string_helpers.c
@@ -757,6 +757,9 @@ char **devm_kasprintf_strarray(struct device *dev, const char *prefix, size_t n)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
+ ptr->n = n;
+ devres_add(dev, ptr);
+
return ptr->array;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(devm_kasprintf_strarray);
diff --git a/lib/test_meminit.c b/lib/test_meminit.c
index 3ca717f11397..c95db11a6906 100644
--- a/lib/test_meminit.c
+++ b/lib/test_meminit.c
@@ -279,13 +279,18 @@ static int __init do_kmem_cache_rcu_persistent(int size, int *total_failures)
c = kmem_cache_create("test_cache", size, size, SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU,
NULL);
buf = kmem_cache_alloc(c, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto out;
saved_ptr = buf;
fill_with_garbage(buf, size);
buf_contents = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!buf_contents)
+ if (!buf_contents) {
+ kmem_cache_free(c, buf);
goto out;
+ }
used_objects = kmalloc_array(maxiter, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!used_objects) {
+ kmem_cache_free(c, buf);
kfree(buf_contents);
goto out;
}
@@ -306,11 +311,14 @@ static int __init do_kmem_cache_rcu_persistent(int size, int *total_failures)
}
}
+ for (iter = 0; iter < maxiter; iter++)
+ kmem_cache_free(c, used_objects[iter]);
+
free_out:
- kmem_cache_destroy(c);
kfree(buf_contents);
kfree(used_objects);
out:
+ kmem_cache_destroy(c);
*total_failures += fail;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/lib/test_string.c b/lib/test_string.c
index 9dfd6f52de92..c5cb92fb710e 100644
--- a/lib/test_string.c
+++ b/lib/test_string.c
@@ -179,6 +179,34 @@ static __init int strnchr_selftest(void)
return 0;
}
+static __init int strspn_selftest(void)
+{
+ static const struct strspn_test {
+ const char str[16];
+ const char accept[16];
+ const char reject[16];
+ unsigned a;
+ unsigned r;
+ } tests[] __initconst = {
+ { "foobar", "", "", 0, 6 },
+ { "abba", "abc", "ABBA", 4, 4 },
+ { "abba", "a", "b", 1, 1 },
+ { "", "abc", "abc", 0, 0},
+ };
+ const struct strspn_test *s = tests;
+ size_t i, res;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tests); ++i, ++s) {
+ res = strspn(s->str, s->accept);
+ if (res != s->a)
+ return 0x100 + 2*i;
+ res = strcspn(s->str, s->reject);
+ if (res != s->r)
+ return 0x100 + 2*i + 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static __exit void string_selftest_remove(void)
{
}
@@ -212,6 +240,11 @@ static __init int string_selftest_init(void)
if (subtest)
goto fail;
+ test = 6;
+ subtest = strspn_selftest();
+ if (subtest)
+ goto fail;
+
pr_info("String selftests succeeded\n");
return 0;
fail:
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-07-02 21:13:26 +0000