diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/Makefile | 77 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/modsign_pubkey.c | 113 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/module-internal.h | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/module.c | 157 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/module_signing.c | 243 |
5 files changed, 578 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index 5404911eaee9..0dfeca4324ee 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module.o +obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += module_signing.o modsign_pubkey.o obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o @@ -130,3 +131,79 @@ quiet_cmd_timeconst = TIMEC $@ targets += timeconst.h $(obj)/timeconst.h: $(src)/timeconst.pl FORCE $(call if_changed,timeconst) + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y) +# +# Pull the signing certificate and any extra certificates into the kernel +# +extra_certificates: + touch $@ + +kernel/modsign_pubkey.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates + +############################################################################### +# +# If module signing is requested, say by allyesconfig, but a key has not been +# supplied, then one will need to be generated to make sure the build does not +# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards. +# +############################################################################### +sign_key_with_hash := +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1),y) +sign_key_with_hash := -sha1 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224),y) +sign_key_with_hash := -sha224 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256),y) +sign_key_with_hash := -sha256 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384),y) +sign_key_with_hash := -sha384 +endif +ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512),y) +sign_key_with_hash := -sha512 +endif +ifeq ($(sign_key_with_hash),) +$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config) +endif + +signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey + @echo "###" + @echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules." + @echo "###" + @echo "### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the" + @echo "### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It" + @echo "### needs to be run as root, and should use a hardware random" + @echo "### number generator if one is available, eg:" + @echo "###" + @echo "### rngd -r /dev/hwrandom" + @echo "###" + openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 $(sign_key_with_hash) -days 36500 -batch \ + -x509 -config x509.genkey \ + -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \ + -keyout signing_key.priv + @echo "###" + @echo "### Key pair generated." + @echo "###" + +x509.genkey: + @echo Generating X.509 key generation config + @echo >x509.genkey "[ req ]" + @echo >>x509.genkey "default_bits = 4096" + @echo >>x509.genkey "distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name" + @echo >>x509.genkey "prompt = no" + @echo >>x509.genkey "string_mask = utf8only" + @echo >>x509.genkey "x509_extensions = myexts" + @echo >>x509.genkey + @echo >>x509.genkey "[ req_distinguished_name ]" + @echo >>x509.genkey "O = Magrathea" + @echo >>x509.genkey "CN = Glacier signing key" + @echo >>x509.genkey "emailAddress = slartibartfast@magrathea.h2g2" + @echo >>x509.genkey + @echo >>x509.genkey "[ myexts ]" + @echo >>x509.genkey "basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE" + @echo >>x509.genkey "keyUsage=digitalSignature" + @echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash" + @echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid" +endif diff --git a/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4646eb2c3820 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/modsign_pubkey.c @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* Public keys for module signature verification + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> +#include "module-internal.h" + +struct key *modsign_keyring; + +extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list[]; +extern __initdata const u8 modsign_certificate_list_end[]; +asm(".section .init.data,\"aw\"\n" + "modsign_certificate_list:\n" + ".incbin \"signing_key.x509\"\n" + ".incbin \"extra_certificates\"\n" + "modsign_certificate_list_end:" + ); + +/* + * We need to make sure ccache doesn't cache the .o file as it doesn't notice + * if modsign.pub changes. + */ +static __initdata const char annoy_ccache[] = __TIME__ "foo"; + +/* + * Load the compiled-in keys + */ +static __init int module_verify_init(void) +{ + pr_notice("Initialise module verification\n"); + + modsign_keyring = key_alloc(&key_type_keyring, ".module_sign", + KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), + current_cred(), + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + if (IS_ERR(modsign_keyring)) + panic("Can't allocate module signing keyring\n"); + + if (key_instantiate_and_link(modsign_keyring, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0) + panic("Can't instantiate module signing keyring\n"); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring. + */ +device_initcall(module_verify_init); + +/* + * Load the compiled-in keys + */ +static __init int load_module_signing_keys(void) +{ + key_ref_t key; + const u8 *p, *end; + size_t plen; + + pr_notice("Loading module verification certificates\n"); + + end = modsign_certificate_list_end; + p = modsign_certificate_list; + while (p < end) { + /* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more + * than 256 bytes in size. + */ + if (end - p < 4) + goto dodgy_cert; + if (p[0] != 0x30 && + p[1] != 0x82) + goto dodgy_cert; + plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3]; + plen += 4; + if (plen > end - p) + goto dodgy_cert; + + key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), + "asymmetric", + NULL, + p, + plen, + (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n", + PTR_ERR(key)); + else + pr_notice("MODSIGN: Loaded cert '%s'\n", + key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); + p += plen; + } + + return 0; + +dodgy_cert: + pr_err("MODSIGN: Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n"); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(load_module_signing_keys); diff --git a/kernel/module-internal.h b/kernel/module-internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6114a13419bd --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/module-internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/* Module internals + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +extern struct key *modsign_keyring; + +extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, + const void *sig, unsigned long siglen); diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 4edbd9c11aca..0e2da8695f8e 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ #include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/pfn.h> #include <linux/bsearch.h> +#include <linux/fips.h> +#include "module-internal.h" #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/module.h> @@ -102,6 +104,43 @@ static LIST_HEAD(modules); struct list_head *kdb_modules = &modules; /* kdb needs the list of modules */ #endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_KDB */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE +static bool sig_enforce = true; +#else +static bool sig_enforce = false; + +static int param_set_bool_enable_only(const char *val, + const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + int err; + bool test; + struct kernel_param dummy_kp = *kp; + + dummy_kp.arg = &test; + + err = param_set_bool(val, &dummy_kp); + if (err) + return err; + + /* Don't let them unset it once it's set! */ + if (!test && sig_enforce) + return -EROFS; + + if (test) + sig_enforce = true; + return 0; +} + +static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bool_enable_only = { + .set = param_set_bool_enable_only, + .get = param_get_bool, +}; +#define param_check_bool_enable_only param_check_bool + +module_param(sig_enforce, bool_enable_only, 0644); +#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE */ +#endif /* CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ /* Block module loading/unloading? */ int modules_disabled = 0; @@ -136,6 +175,7 @@ struct load_info { unsigned long symoffs, stroffs; struct _ddebug *debug; unsigned int num_debug; + bool sig_ok; struct { unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu; } index; @@ -1949,26 +1989,6 @@ static int simplify_symbols(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) return ret; } -int __weak apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, - const char *strtab, - unsigned int symindex, - unsigned int relsec, - struct module *me) -{ - pr_err("module %s: REL relocation unsupported\n", me->name); - return -ENOEXEC; -} - -int __weak apply_relocate_add(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, - const char *strtab, - unsigned int symindex, - unsigned int relsec, - struct module *me) -{ - pr_err("module %s: RELA relocation unsupported\n", me->name); - return -ENOEXEC; -} - static int apply_relocations(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) { unsigned int i; @@ -2399,7 +2419,52 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, } #endif -/* Sets info->hdr and info->len. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, + const void *mod, unsigned long *len) +{ + int err = -ENOKEY; + const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1; + const void *p = mod, *end = mod + *len; + + /* Poor man's memmem. */ + while ((p = memchr(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING[0], end - p))) { + if (p + markerlen > end) + break; + + if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) { + const void *sig = p + markerlen; + /* Truncate module up to signature. */ + *len = p - mod; + err = mod_verify_sig(mod, *len, sig, end - sig); + break; + } + p++; + } + + if (!err) { + info->sig_ok = true; + return 0; + } + + /* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */ + if (err < 0 && fips_enabled) + panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n", + err); + if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) + err = 0; + + return err; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ +static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, + void *mod, unsigned long *len) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */ + +/* Sets info->hdr, info->len and info->sig_ok. */ static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info, const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, const char __user *uargs) @@ -2419,6 +2484,10 @@ static int copy_and_check(struct load_info *info, goto free_hdr; } + err = module_sig_check(info, hdr, &len); + if (err) + goto free_hdr; + /* Sanity checks against insmoding binaries or wrong arch, weird elf version */ if (memcmp(hdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) != 0 @@ -2730,6 +2799,10 @@ static int check_module_license_and_versions(struct module *mod) if (strcmp(mod->name, "driverloader") == 0) add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + /* lve claims to be GPL but upstream won't provide source */ + if (strcmp(mod->name, "lve") == 0) + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE); + #ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS if ((mod->num_syms && !mod->crcs) || (mod->num_gpl_syms && !mod->gpl_crcs) @@ -2861,6 +2934,20 @@ static int post_relocation(struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info) return module_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod); } +/* Is this module of this name done loading? No locks held. */ +static bool finished_loading(const char *name) +{ + struct module *mod; + bool ret; + + mutex_lock(&module_mutex); + mod = find_module(name); + ret = !mod || mod->state != MODULE_STATE_COMING; + mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + + return ret; +} + /* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod, @@ -2868,7 +2955,7 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod, const char __user *uargs) { struct load_info info = { NULL, }; - struct module *mod; + struct module *mod, *old; long err; pr_debug("load_module: umod=%p, len=%lu, uargs=%p\n", @@ -2886,6 +2973,12 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod, goto free_copy; } +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG + mod->sig_ok = info.sig_ok; + if (!mod->sig_ok) + add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE); +#endif + /* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */ err = module_unload_init(mod); if (err) @@ -2934,8 +3027,18 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod, * function to insert in a way safe to concurrent readers. * The mutex protects against concurrent writers. */ +again: mutex_lock(&module_mutex); - if (find_module(mod->name)) { + if ((old = find_module(mod->name)) != NULL) { + if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING) { + /* Wait in case it fails to load. */ + mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq, + finished_loading(mod->name)); + if (err) + goto free_arch_cleanup; + goto again; + } err = -EEXIST; goto unlock; } @@ -2975,7 +3078,7 @@ static struct module *load_module(void __user *umod, /* Unlink carefully: kallsyms could be walking list. */ list_del_rcu(&mod->list); module_bug_cleanup(mod); - + wake_up_all(&module_wq); ddebug: dynamic_debug_remove(info.debug); unlock: @@ -3050,7 +3153,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod, blocking_notifier_call_chain(&module_notify_list, MODULE_STATE_GOING, mod); free_module(mod); - wake_up(&module_wq); + wake_up_all(&module_wq); return ret; } if (ret > 0) { @@ -3062,9 +3165,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod, dump_stack(); } - /* Now it's a first class citizen! Wake up anyone waiting for it. */ + /* Now it's a first class citizen! */ mod->state = MODULE_STATE_LIVE; - wake_up(&module_wq); blocking_notifier_call_chain(&module_notify_list, MODULE_STATE_LIVE, mod); @@ -3087,6 +3189,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod, mod->init_ro_size = 0; mod->init_text_size = 0; mutex_unlock(&module_mutex); + wake_up_all(&module_wq); return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6b09f6983ac0 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +/* Module signature checker + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> +#include "module-internal.h" + +/* + * Module signature information block. + * + * The constituents of the signature section are, in order: + * + * - Signer's name + * - Key identifier + * - Signature data + * - Information block + */ +struct module_signature { + enum pkey_algo algo : 8; /* Public-key crypto algorithm */ + enum pkey_hash_algo hash : 8; /* Digest algorithm */ + enum pkey_id_type id_type : 8; /* Key identifier type */ + u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name */ + u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier */ + u8 __pad[3]; + __be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */ +}; + +/* + * Digest the module contents. + */ +static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum pkey_hash_algo hash, + const void *mod, + unsigned long modlen) +{ + struct public_key_signature *pks; + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *desc; + size_t digest_size, desc_size; + int ret; + + pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); + + /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how + * big the hash operational data will be. + */ + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo[hash], 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm); + + desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our + * context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that. + */ + ret = -ENOMEM; + pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pks) + goto error_no_pks; + + pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash; + pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size; + pks->digest_size = digest_size; + + desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks); + desc->tfm = tfm; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__); + return pks; + +error: + kfree(pks); +error_no_pks: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ERR_PTR(ret); +} + +/* + * Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual + * signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the + * size of the MPI in bytes. + * + * RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one. + */ +static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks, + const void *data, size_t len) +{ + size_t nbytes; + MPI mpi; + + if (len < 3) + return -EBADMSG; + nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1]; + data += 2; + len -= 2; + if (len != nbytes) + return -EBADMSG; + + mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes); + if (!mpi) + return -ENOMEM; + pks->mpi[0] = mpi; + pks->nr_mpi = 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Request an asymmetric key. + */ +static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len, + const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len) +{ + key_ref_t key; + size_t i; + char *id, *q; + + pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len); + + /* Construct an identifier. */ + id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!id) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + + memcpy(id, signer, signer_len); + + q = id + signer_len; + *q++ = ':'; + *q++ = ' '; + for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) { + *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4]; + *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f]; + } + + *q = 0; + + pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); + + key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(modsign_keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, id); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n", + id, PTR_ERR(key)); + kfree(id); + + if (IS_ERR(key)) { + switch (PTR_ERR(key)) { + /* Hide some search errors */ + case -EACCES: + case -ENOTDIR: + case -EAGAIN: + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + default: + return ERR_CAST(key); + } + } + + pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key))); + return key_ref_to_ptr(key); +} + +/* + * Verify the signature on a module. + */ +int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen, + const void *sig, unsigned long siglen) +{ + struct public_key_signature *pks; + struct module_signature ms; + struct key *key; + size_t sig_len; + int ret; + + pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu,,%lu,)\n", __func__, modlen, siglen); + + if (siglen <= sizeof(ms)) + return -EBADMSG; + + memcpy(&ms, sig + (siglen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms)); + siglen -= sizeof(ms); + + sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len); + if (sig_len >= siglen || + siglen - sig_len != (size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len) + return -EBADMSG; + + /* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */ + if (ms.algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA || + ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_X509) + return -ENOPKG; + + if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST || + !pkey_hash_algo[ms.hash]) + return -ENOPKG; + + key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len, + sig + ms.signer_len, ms.key_id_len); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key); + + pks = mod_make_digest(ms.hash, mod, modlen); + if (IS_ERR(pks)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(pks); + goto error_put_key; + } + + ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len, + sig_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free_pks; + + ret = verify_signature(key, pks); + pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret); + +error_free_pks: + mpi_free(pks->rsa.s); + kfree(pks); +error_put_key: + key_put(key); + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + return ret; +} |