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-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c80
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c14
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched/core.c2
4 files changed, 60 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 2c1d6ab7106e..57e3f5107937 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -601,13 +601,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
- if (security_netlink_recv(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index b463871a4e69..0fcf1c14a297 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -287,74 +287,84 @@ error:
}
/**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
+ * has_ns_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
* @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = security_capable(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return (ret == 0);
}
/**
- * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in a specific user ns
+ * has_capability - Does a task have a capability in init_user_ns
* @t: The task in question
- * @ns: target user namespace
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * currently in effect to the initial user namespace, false if not.
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+bool has_capability(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable(t, ns, cap);
-
- return (ret == 0);
+ return has_ns_capability(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
/**
- * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * has_ns_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited)
+ * in a specific user ns.
* @t: The task in question
+ * @ns: target user namespace
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
- * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
- * audit message for the check.
+ * currently in effect to the specified user namespace, false if not.
+ * Do not write an audit message for the check.
*
* Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- int ret = security_real_capable_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ret = security_capable_noaudit(__task_cred(t), ns, cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
return (ret == 0);
}
/**
- * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * has_capability_noaudit - Does a task have a capability (unaudited) in the
+ * initial user ns
+ * @t: The task in question
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
+ * Return true if the specified task has the given superior capability
+ * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
+ * audit message for the check.
*
- * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
- * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
*/
-bool capable(int cap)
+bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
- return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
+ return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
@@ -374,7 +384,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
BUG();
}
- if (security_capable(ns, current_cred(), cap) == 0) {
+ if (has_ns_capability(current, ns, cap)) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return true;
}
@@ -383,18 +393,20 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
/**
- * task_ns_capable - Determine whether current task has a superior
- * capability targeted at a specific task's user namespace.
- * @t: The task whose user namespace is targeted.
- * @cap: The capability in question.
+ * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
*
- * Return true if it does, false otherwise.
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
*/
-bool task_ns_capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
+bool capable(int cap)
{
- return ns_capable(task_cred_xxx(t, user)->user_ns, cap);
+ return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_ns_capable);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
* nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 78ab24a7b0e4..00ab2ca5ed11 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -172,6 +172,14 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
return ret;
}
+static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
+ return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ else
+ return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+}
+
int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
@@ -198,7 +206,7 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
cred->gid == tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -207,7 +215,7 @@ ok:
smp_rmb();
if (task->mm)
dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
- if (!dumpable && !task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (!dumpable && !ptrace_has_cap(task_user_ns(task), mode))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
@@ -277,7 +285,7 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
if (seize)
task->ptrace |= PT_SEIZED;
- if (task_ns_capable(task, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (ns_capable(task_user_ns(task), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
__ptrace_link(task, current);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index fd7b25e90079..df00cb09263e 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4330,7 +4330,7 @@ long sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, const struct cpumask *in_mask)
goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
}
retval = -EPERM;
- if (!check_same_owner(p) && !task_ns_capable(p, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ if (!check_same_owner(p) && !ns_capable(task_user_ns(p), CAP_SYS_NICE))
goto out_unlock;
retval = security_task_setscheduler(p);