diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 17 |
3 files changed, 26 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h index 4baa6bceb232..d652a3808065 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h @@ -52,10 +52,6 @@ static inline void clear_page(void *page) void copy_page(void *to, void *from); -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE -#define arch_unmap_kpfn arch_unmap_kpfn -#endif - #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h index aa0d5df9dc60..e956eb267061 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce-internal.h @@ -115,4 +115,19 @@ static inline void mce_unregister_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb) { } extern struct mca_config mca_cfg; +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64 +/* + * On 32-bit systems it would be difficult to safely unmap a poison page + * from the kernel 1:1 map because there are no non-canonical addresses that + * we can use to refer to the address without risking a speculative access. + * However, this isn't much of an issue because: + * 1) Few unmappable pages are in the 1:1 map. Most are in HIGHMEM which + * are only mapped into the kernel as needed + * 2) Few people would run a 32-bit kernel on a machine that supports + * recoverable errors because they have too much memory to boot 32-bit. + */ +static inline void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) {} +#define mce_unmap_kpfn mce_unmap_kpfn +#endif + #endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c index 75f405ac085c..8ff94d1e2dce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c @@ -105,6 +105,10 @@ static struct irq_work mce_irq_work; static void (*quirk_no_way_out)(int bank, struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs); +#ifndef mce_unmap_kpfn +static void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn); +#endif + /* * CPU/chipset specific EDAC code can register a notifier call here to print * MCE errors in a human-readable form. @@ -590,7 +594,8 @@ static int srao_decode_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, if (mce_usable_address(mce) && (mce->severity == MCE_AO_SEVERITY)) { pfn = mce->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; - memory_failure(pfn, 0); + if (!memory_failure(pfn, 0)) + mce_unmap_kpfn(pfn); } return NOTIFY_OK; @@ -1057,12 +1062,13 @@ static int do_memory_failure(struct mce *m) ret = memory_failure(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, flags); if (ret) pr_err("Memory error not recovered"); + else + mce_unmap_kpfn(m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT); return ret; } -#if defined(arch_unmap_kpfn) && defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE) - -void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) +#ifndef mce_unmap_kpfn +static void mce_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) { unsigned long decoy_addr; @@ -1073,7 +1079,7 @@ void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) * We would like to just call: * set_memory_np((unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pfn), 1); * but doing that would radically increase the odds of a - * speculative access to the posion page because we'd have + * speculative access to the poison page because we'd have * the virtual address of the kernel 1:1 mapping sitting * around in registers. * Instead we get tricky. We create a non-canonical address @@ -1098,7 +1104,6 @@ void arch_unmap_kpfn(unsigned long pfn) if (set_memory_np(decoy_addr, 1)) pr_warn("Could not invalidate pfn=0x%lx from 1:1 map\n", pfn); - } #endif |