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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c235
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c52
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head64.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/resource.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/setup.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S2
9 files changed, 279 insertions, 58 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 03364dc40d8d..4c8b6ae802ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -36,10 +36,6 @@ KCSAN_SANITIZE := n
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_test_nx.o := y
-ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
-OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
-endif
-
# If instrumentation of this dir is enabled, boot hangs during first second.
# Probably could be more selective here, but note that files related to irqs,
# boot, dumpstack/stacktrace, etc are either non-interesting or can lead to
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
index 8b8cbf22461a..734b96454896 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
@@ -11,6 +11,16 @@
/* Refer to drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c for the description of functions */
+bool cpc_supported_by_cpu(void)
+{
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ case X86_VENDOR_HYGON:
+ return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CPPC);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
bool cpc_ffh_supported(void)
{
return true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d879a6c93609..74c62cc47a5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -41,8 +41,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -85,6 +87,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
*/
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
+/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -117,17 +123,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation();
- mds_select_mitigation();
- taa_select_mitigation();
+ md_clear_select_mitigation();
srbds_select_mitigation();
l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
- /*
- * As MDS and TAA mitigations are inter-related, print MDS
- * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done.
- */
- mds_print_mitigation();
-
arch_smt_update();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -267,14 +266,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
-static void __init mds_print_mitigation(void)
-{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off())
- return;
-
- pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
-}
-
static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
@@ -329,7 +320,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
- goto out;
+ return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -343,7 +334,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
*/
if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
- goto out;
+ return;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
@@ -375,18 +366,6 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
-
- /*
- * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
- * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
- */
- if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
- boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
- mds_select_mitigation();
- }
-out:
- pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
}
static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
@@ -411,6 +390,151 @@ static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
+ * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
+ * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
+ * is required irrespective of SMT state.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+ *
+ * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+ * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+ * affected systems.
+ */
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation, if necessary.
+ */
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+ }
+out:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
+ * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation selection is done.
+ */
+ md_clear_update_mitigation();
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
enum srbds_mitigations {
@@ -478,11 +602,13 @@ static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
return;
/*
- * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting
- * TSX that are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled.
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+ * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+ * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
*/
ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
- if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
@@ -1116,6 +1242,8 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
/*
* Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
* affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@@ -1127,14 +1255,17 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
return;
- if (sched_smt_active())
+ if (sched_smt_active()) {
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
- else
+ } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ }
}
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
{
@@ -1179,6 +1310,16 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
break;
}
+ switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}
@@ -1781,6 +1922,20 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
+static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
@@ -1881,6 +2036,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
return srbds_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -1932,4 +2090,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c296cb1c0113..4730b0a58f24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1211,18 +1211,42 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO BIT(1)
+/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, BIT(2) | BIT(4), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
+ BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xC), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xD), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
{}
};
@@ -1243,6 +1267,13 @@ u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
return ia32_cap;
}
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+ return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
+}
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1296,12 +1327,27 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
/*
* SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
* in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ *
+ * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
+ * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
+ * SRBDS.
*/
if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
- cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS))
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+ /*
+ * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration
+ *
+ * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
+ * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
+ * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
+ !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
index 4ec13608d3c6..dfeb227de561 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(ftrace_caller_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
jmp ftrace_epilogue
SYM_FUNC_END(ftrace_caller);
+STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD_FP(ftrace_caller)
SYM_FUNC_START(ftrace_epilogue)
/*
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(ftrace_regs_caller_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
jmp ftrace_epilogue
SYM_FUNC_END(ftrace_regs_caller)
+STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD_FP(ftrace_regs_caller)
#else /* ! CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE */
@@ -311,10 +313,14 @@ trace:
jmp ftrace_stub
SYM_FUNC_END(__fentry__)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fentry__)
+STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD_FP(__fentry__)
+
#endif /* CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE */
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
-SYM_FUNC_START(return_to_handler)
+SYM_CODE_START(return_to_handler)
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
subq $16, %rsp
/* Save the return values */
@@ -339,7 +345,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(return_to_handler)
int3
.Ldo_rop:
mov %rdi, (%rsp)
- UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(return_to_handler)
+SYM_CODE_END(return_to_handler)
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index bd4a34100ed0..6a3cfaf6b72a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -426,10 +426,12 @@ void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
/* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized
yet. */
-static void __init clear_bss(void)
+void __init clear_bss(void)
{
memset(__bss_start, 0,
(unsigned long) __bss_stop - (unsigned long) __bss_start);
+ memset(__brk_base, 0,
+ (unsigned long) __brk_limit - (unsigned long) __brk_base);
}
static unsigned long get_cmd_line_ptr(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c b/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c
index db2b350a37b7..bba1abd05bfe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/resource.c
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-#include <linux/dev_printk.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/pci_x86.h>
static void resource_clip(struct resource *res, resource_size_t start,
resource_size_t end)
@@ -24,14 +25,14 @@ static void resource_clip(struct resource *res, resource_size_t start,
res->start = end + 1;
}
-void remove_e820_regions(struct device *dev, struct resource *avail)
+static void remove_e820_regions(struct resource *avail)
{
int i;
struct e820_entry *entry;
u64 e820_start, e820_end;
struct resource orig = *avail;
- if (!(avail->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM))
+ if (!pci_use_e820)
return;
for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) {
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ void remove_e820_regions(struct device *dev, struct resource *avail)
resource_clip(avail, e820_start, e820_end);
if (orig.start != avail->start || orig.end != avail->end) {
- dev_info(dev, "clipped %pR to %pR for e820 entry [mem %#010Lx-%#010Lx]\n",
+ pr_info("clipped %pR to %pR for e820 entry [mem %#010Lx-%#010Lx]\n",
&orig, avail, e820_start, e820_end);
orig = *avail;
}
@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@ void arch_remove_reservations(struct resource *avail)
* the low 1MB unconditionally, as this area is needed for some ISA
* cards requiring a memory range, e.g. the i82365 PCMCIA controller.
*/
- if (avail->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM)
+ if (avail->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM) {
resource_clip(avail, BIOS_ROM_BASE, BIOS_ROM_END);
+
+ remove_e820_regions(avail);
+ }
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 3ebb85327edb..bd6c6fd373ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -67,11 +67,6 @@ RESERVE_BRK(dmi_alloc, 65536);
#endif
-/*
- * Range of the BSS area. The size of the BSS area is determined
- * at link time, with RESERVE_BRK() facility reserving additional
- * chunks.
- */
unsigned long _brk_start = (unsigned long)__brk_base;
unsigned long _brk_end = (unsigned long)__brk_base;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index f5f6dc2e8007..9487ce8c13ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ SECTIONS
.brk : AT(ADDR(.brk) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__brk_base = .;
. += 64 * 1024; /* 64k alignment slop space */
- *(.brk_reservation) /* areas brk users have reserved */
+ *(.bss..brk) /* areas brk users have reserved */
__brk_limit = .;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-02-03 10:15:47 +0000