diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 91 |
1 files changed, 87 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index 70dea9337816..cad08703c4ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -46,13 +46,13 @@ .code64 .section .entry.text, "ax" -#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT +#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL SYM_CODE_START(native_usergs_sysret64) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY swapgs sysretq SYM_CODE_END(native_usergs_sysret64) -#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT */ +#endif /* CONFIG_PARAVIRT_XXL */ /* * 64-bit SYSCALL instruction entry. Up to 6 arguments in registers. @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL_64) SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp +SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) + /* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */ pushq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2) /* pt_regs->sp */ @@ -446,6 +448,84 @@ _ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym) SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym) .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +/** + * idtentry_vc - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC + * @vector: Vector number + * @asmsym: ASM symbol for the entry point + * @cfunc: C function to be called + * + * The macro emits code to set up the kernel context for #VC. The #VC handler + * runs on an IST stack and needs to be able to cause nested #VC exceptions. + * + * To make this work the #VC entry code tries its best to pretend it doesn't use + * an IST stack by switching to the task stack if coming from user-space (which + * includes early SYSCALL entry path) or back to the stack in the IRET frame if + * entered from kernel-mode. + * + * If entered from kernel-mode the return stack is validated first, and if it is + * not safe to use (e.g. because it points to the entry stack) the #VC handler + * will switch to a fall-back stack (VC2) and call a special handler function. + * + * The macro is only used for one vector, but it is planned to be extended in + * the future for the #HV exception. + */ +.macro idtentry_vc vector asmsym cfunc +SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym) + UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS + ASM_CLAC + + /* + * If the entry is from userspace, switch stacks and treat it as + * a normal entry. + */ + testb $3, CS-ORIG_RAX(%rsp) + jnz .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@ + + /* + * paranoid_entry returns SWAPGS flag for paranoid_exit in EBX. + * EBX == 0 -> SWAPGS, EBX == 1 -> no SWAPGS + */ + call paranoid_entry + + UNWIND_HINT_REGS + + /* + * Switch off the IST stack to make it free for nested exceptions. The + * vc_switch_off_ist() function will switch back to the interrupted + * stack if it is safe to do so. If not it switches to the VC fall-back + * stack. + */ + movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ + call vc_switch_off_ist + movq %rax, %rsp /* Switch to new stack */ + + UNWIND_HINT_REGS + + /* Update pt_regs */ + movq ORIG_RAX(%rsp), %rsi /* get error code into 2nd argument*/ + movq $-1, ORIG_RAX(%rsp) /* no syscall to restart */ + + movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ + + call \cfunc + + /* + * No need to switch back to the IST stack. The current stack is either + * identical to the stack in the IRET frame or the VC fall-back stack, + * so it is definitly mapped even with PTI enabled. + */ + jmp paranoid_exit + + /* Switch to the regular task stack */ +.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@: + idtentry_body safe_stack_\cfunc, has_error_code=1 + +_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym) +SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym) +.endm +#endif + /* * Double fault entry. Straight paranoid. No checks from which context * this comes because for the espfix induced #DF this would do the wrong @@ -682,6 +762,8 @@ SYM_CODE_END(.Lbad_gs) * rdx: Function argument (can be NULL if none) */ SYM_FUNC_START(asm_call_on_stack) +SYM_INNER_LABEL(asm_call_sysvec_on_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) +SYM_INNER_LABEL(asm_call_irq_on_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) /* * Save the frame pointer unconditionally. This allows the ORC * unwinder to handle the stack switch. @@ -840,8 +922,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry) * retrieve and set the current CPUs kernel GSBASE. The stored value * has to be restored in paranoid_exit unconditionally. * - * The MSR write ensures that no subsequent load is based on a - * mispredicted GSBASE. No extra FENCE required. + * The unconditional write to GS base below ensures that no subsequent + * loads based on a mispredicted GS base can happen, therefore no LFENCE + * is needed here. */ SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx ret |