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Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst')
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diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst index 525296121d89..e4d66e7c50de 100644 --- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst +++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst @@ -218,3 +218,66 @@ brk handler is used to print bug reports. A potential expansion of this mode is a hardware tag-based mode, which would use hardware memory tagging support instead of compiler instrumentation and manual shadow memory manipulation. + +What memory accesses are sanitised by KASAN? +-------------------------------------------- + +The kernel maps memory in a number of different parts of the address +space. This poses something of a problem for KASAN, which requires +that all addresses accessed by instrumented code have a valid shadow +region. + +The range of kernel virtual addresses is large: there is not enough +real memory to support a real shadow region for every address that +could be accessed by the kernel. + +By default +~~~~~~~~~~ + +By default, architectures only map real memory over the shadow region +for the linear mapping (and potentially other small areas). For all +other areas - such as vmalloc and vmemmap space - a single read-only +page is mapped over the shadow area. This read-only shadow page +declares all memory accesses as permitted. + +This presents a problem for modules: they do not live in the linear +mapping, but in a dedicated module space. By hooking in to the module +allocator, KASAN can temporarily map real shadow memory to cover +them. This allows detection of invalid accesses to module globals, for +example. + +This also creates an incompatibility with ``VMAP_STACK``: if the stack +lives in vmalloc space, it will be shadowed by the read-only page, and +the kernel will fault when trying to set up the shadow data for stack +variables. + +CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +With ``CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC``, KASAN can cover vmalloc space at the +cost of greater memory usage. Currently this is only supported on x86. + +This works by hooking into vmalloc and vmap, and dynamically +allocating real shadow memory to back the mappings. + +Most mappings in vmalloc space are small, requiring less than a full +page of shadow space. Allocating a full shadow page per mapping would +therefore be wasteful. Furthermore, to ensure that different mappings +use different shadow pages, mappings would have to be aligned to +``KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * PAGE_SIZE``. + +Instead, we share backing space across multiple mappings. We allocate +a backing page when a mapping in vmalloc space uses a particular page +of the shadow region. This page can be shared by other vmalloc +mappings later on. + +We hook in to the vmap infrastructure to lazily clean up unused shadow +memory. + +To avoid the difficulties around swapping mappings around, we expect +that the part of the shadow region that covers the vmalloc space will +not be covered by the early shadow page, but will be left +unmapped. This will require changes in arch-specific code. + +This allows ``VMAP_STACK`` support on x86, and can simplify support of +architectures that do not have a fixed module region. |