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-rw-r--r--MAINTAINERS2
-rw-r--r--fs/kernfs/dir.c24
-rw-r--r--fs/kernfs/inode.c162
-rw-r--r--fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h8
-rw-r--r--fs/kernfs/symlink.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/base.c5
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kernfs.h13
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h13
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h9
-rwxr-xr-xscripts/selinux/install_policy.sh92
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c165
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c229
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c7
17 files changed, 487 insertions, 269 deletions
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index fbb6e45018f5..20dc1a125e24 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -13994,7 +13994,7 @@ W: https://selinuxproject.org
W: https://github.com/SELinuxProject
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
S: Supported
-F: include/linux/selinux*
+F: include/uapi/linux/selinux_netlink.h
F: security/selinux/
F: scripts/selinux/
F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SELinux.rst
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index 1e7a74b8e064..016ba88f7335 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -532,9 +532,6 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)
kfree_const(kn->name);
if (kn->iattr) {
- if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata)
- security_release_secctx(kn->iattr->ia_secdata,
- kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len);
simple_xattrs_free(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
kmem_cache_free(kernfs_iattrs_cache, kn->iattr);
}
@@ -618,6 +615,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
}
static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root,
+ struct kernfs_node *parent,
const char *name, umode_t mode,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid,
unsigned flags)
@@ -673,6 +671,12 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root,
goto err_out3;
}
+ if (parent) {
+ ret = security_kernfs_init_security(parent, kn);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out3;
+ }
+
return kn;
err_out3:
@@ -691,7 +695,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_node *parent,
{
struct kernfs_node *kn;
- kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent),
+ kn = __kernfs_new_node(kernfs_root(parent), parent,
name, mode, uid, gid, flags);
if (kn) {
kernfs_get(parent);
@@ -794,9 +798,8 @@ int kernfs_add_one(struct kernfs_node *kn)
/* Update timestamps on the parent */
ps_iattr = parent->iattr;
if (ps_iattr) {
- struct iattr *ps_iattrs = &ps_iattr->ia_iattr;
- ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattrs->ia_ctime);
- ps_iattrs->ia_mtime = ps_iattrs->ia_ctime;
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_ctime);
+ ps_iattr->ia_mtime = ps_iattr->ia_ctime;
}
mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
@@ -961,7 +964,7 @@ struct kernfs_root *kernfs_create_root(struct kernfs_syscall_ops *scops,
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root->supers);
root->next_generation = 1;
- kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO,
+ kn = __kernfs_new_node(root, NULL, "", S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO,
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
KERNFS_DIR);
if (!kn) {
@@ -1328,9 +1331,8 @@ static void __kernfs_remove(struct kernfs_node *kn)
/* update timestamps on the parent */
if (ps_iattr) {
- ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_ctime);
- ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_mtime =
- ps_iattr->ia_iattr.ia_ctime;
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&ps_iattr->ia_ctime);
+ ps_iattr->ia_mtime = ps_iattr->ia_ctime;
}
kernfs_put(pos);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/inode.c b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
index 0c1fd945ce42..f89a0f13840e 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/inode.c
@@ -31,30 +31,27 @@ static const struct inode_operations kernfs_iops = {
.listxattr = kernfs_iop_listxattr,
};
-static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+static struct kernfs_iattrs *__kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn, int alloc)
{
static DEFINE_MUTEX(iattr_mutex);
struct kernfs_iattrs *ret;
- struct iattr *iattrs;
mutex_lock(&iattr_mutex);
- if (kn->iattr)
+ if (kn->iattr || !alloc)
goto out_unlock;
kn->iattr = kmem_cache_zalloc(kernfs_iattrs_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kn->iattr)
goto out_unlock;
- iattrs = &kn->iattr->ia_iattr;
/* assign default attributes */
- iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode;
- iattrs->ia_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
- iattrs->ia_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
+ kn->iattr->ia_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+ kn->iattr->ia_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
- ktime_get_real_ts64(&iattrs->ia_atime);
- iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_atime;
- iattrs->ia_ctime = iattrs->ia_atime;
+ ktime_get_real_ts64(&kn->iattr->ia_atime);
+ kn->iattr->ia_mtime = kn->iattr->ia_atime;
+ kn->iattr->ia_ctime = kn->iattr->ia_atime;
simple_xattrs_init(&kn->iattr->xattrs);
out_unlock:
@@ -63,32 +60,37 @@ out_unlock:
return ret;
}
+static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ return __kernfs_iattrs(kn, 1);
+}
+
+static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ return __kernfs_iattrs(kn, 0);
+}
+
int __kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn, const struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
- struct iattr *iattrs;
unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
if (!attrs)
return -ENOMEM;
- iattrs = &attrs->ia_iattr;
-
if (ia_valid & ATTR_UID)
- iattrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
+ attrs->ia_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_GID)
- iattrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
+ attrs->ia_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
- iattrs->ia_atime = iattr->ia_atime;
+ attrs->ia_atime = iattr->ia_atime;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
- iattrs->ia_mtime = iattr->ia_mtime;
+ attrs->ia_mtime = iattr->ia_mtime;
if (ia_valid & ATTR_CTIME)
- iattrs->ia_ctime = iattr->ia_ctime;
- if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
- umode_t mode = iattr->ia_mode;
- iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode = mode;
- }
+ attrs->ia_ctime = iattr->ia_ctime;
+ if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
+ kn->mode = iattr->ia_mode;
return 0;
}
@@ -135,23 +137,6 @@ out:
return error;
}
-static int kernfs_node_setsecdata(struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs, void **secdata,
- u32 *secdata_len)
-{
- void *old_secdata;
- size_t old_secdata_len;
-
- old_secdata = attrs->ia_secdata;
- old_secdata_len = attrs->ia_secdata_len;
-
- attrs->ia_secdata = *secdata;
- attrs->ia_secdata_len = *secdata_len;
-
- *secdata = old_secdata;
- *secdata_len = old_secdata_len;
- return 0;
-}
-
ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buf, size_t size)
{
struct kernfs_node *kn = kernfs_dentry_node(dentry);
@@ -171,14 +156,15 @@ static inline void set_default_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
}
-static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *iattr)
+static inline void set_inode_attr(struct inode *inode,
+ struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
- inode->i_uid = iattr->ia_uid;
- inode->i_gid = iattr->ia_gid;
- inode->i_atime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_atime, sb->s_time_gran);
- inode->i_mtime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_mtime, sb->s_time_gran);
- inode->i_ctime = timespec64_trunc(iattr->ia_ctime, sb->s_time_gran);
+ inode->i_uid = attrs->ia_uid;
+ inode->i_gid = attrs->ia_gid;
+ inode->i_atime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_atime, sb->s_time_gran);
+ inode->i_mtime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_mtime, sb->s_time_gran);
+ inode->i_ctime = timespec64_trunc(attrs->ia_ctime, sb->s_time_gran);
}
static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
@@ -186,15 +172,12 @@ static void kernfs_refresh_inode(struct kernfs_node *kn, struct inode *inode)
struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kn->iattr;
inode->i_mode = kn->mode;
- if (attrs) {
+ if (attrs)
/*
* kernfs_node has non-default attributes get them from
* persistent copy in kernfs_node.
*/
- set_inode_attr(inode, &attrs->ia_iattr);
- security_inode_notifysecctx(inode, attrs->ia_secdata,
- attrs->ia_secdata_len);
- }
+ set_inode_attr(inode, attrs);
if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR)
set_nlink(inode, kn->dir.subdirs + 2);
@@ -305,78 +288,57 @@ int kernfs_iop_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return generic_permission(inode, mask);
}
-static int kernfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
- struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
- const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size)
+int kernfs_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
{
- const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
- struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
- struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
-
- attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
+ struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kernfs_iattrs_noalloc(kn);
if (!attrs)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return -ENODATA;
return simple_xattr_get(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size);
}
-static int kernfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
- struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
- const char *suffix, const void *value,
- size_t size, int flags)
+int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
- struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
- struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
-
- attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
+ struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
if (!attrs)
return -ENOMEM;
return simple_xattr_set(&attrs->xattrs, name, value, size, flags);
}
-static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = {
- .prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
- .get = kernfs_xattr_get,
- .set = kernfs_xattr_set,
-};
-
-static int kernfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
- struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
- const char *suffix, const void *value,
- size_t size, int flags)
+static int kernfs_vfs_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+ struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
+ const char *suffix, void *value, size_t size)
{
+ const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
- struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs;
- void *secdata;
- u32 secdata_len = 0;
- int error;
-
- attrs = kernfs_iattrs(kn);
- if (!attrs)
- return -ENOMEM;
- error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, size, flags);
- if (error)
- return error;
- error = security_inode_getsecctx(inode, &secdata, &secdata_len);
- if (error)
- return error;
+ return kernfs_xattr_get(kn, name, value, size);
+}
- mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex);
- error = kernfs_node_setsecdata(attrs, &secdata, &secdata_len);
- mutex_unlock(&kernfs_mutex);
+static int kernfs_vfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
+ struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode,
+ const char *suffix, const void *value,
+ size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ const char *name = xattr_full_name(handler, suffix);
+ struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
- if (secdata)
- security_release_secctx(secdata, secdata_len);
- return error;
+ return kernfs_xattr_set(kn, name, value, size, flags);
}
+static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_trusted_xattr_handler = {
+ .prefix = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
+ .get = kernfs_vfs_xattr_get,
+ .set = kernfs_vfs_xattr_set,
+};
+
static const struct xattr_handler kernfs_security_xattr_handler = {
.prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- .get = kernfs_xattr_get,
- .set = kernfs_security_xattr_set,
+ .get = kernfs_vfs_xattr_get,
+ .set = kernfs_vfs_xattr_set,
};
const struct xattr_handler *kernfs_xattr_handlers[] = {
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
index 0b7d197a904c..3c437990f39a 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
+++ b/fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h
@@ -20,9 +20,11 @@
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
struct kernfs_iattrs {
- struct iattr ia_iattr;
- void *ia_secdata;
- u32 ia_secdata_len;
+ kuid_t ia_uid;
+ kgid_t ia_gid;
+ struct timespec64 ia_atime;
+ struct timespec64 ia_mtime;
+ struct timespec64 ia_ctime;
struct simple_xattrs xattrs;
};
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/symlink.c b/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
index 162f43b80c84..eb46c3a16e2f 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/symlink.c
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_create_link(struct kernfs_node *parent,
kgid_t gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
if (target->iattr) {
- uid = target->iattr->ia_iattr.ia_uid;
- gid = target->iattr->ia_iattr.ia_gid;
+ uid = target->iattr->ia_uid;
+ gid = target->iattr->ia_gid;
}
kn = kernfs_new_node(parent, name, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, uid, gid,
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index f179568b4c76..b6ccb6c57706 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2535,6 +2535,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EACCES;
}
+ /* Prevent changes to overridden credentials. */
+ if (current_cred() != current_real_cred()) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
rcu_read_unlock();
if (count > PAGE_SIZE)
diff --git a/include/linux/kernfs.h b/include/linux/kernfs.h
index e446ab97ee0c..2bf477f86eb1 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernfs.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernfs.h
@@ -371,6 +371,11 @@ __poll_t kernfs_generic_poll(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
struct poll_table_struct *pt);
void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn);
+int kernfs_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size);
+int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+
const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb);
int kernfs_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc);
void kernfs_free_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
@@ -473,6 +478,14 @@ static inline int kernfs_setattr(struct kernfs_node *kn,
static inline void kernfs_notify(struct kernfs_node *kn) { }
+static inline int kernfs_xattr_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
+{ return -ENOSYS; }
+
+static inline int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{ return -ENOSYS; }
+
static inline const void *kernfs_super_ns(struct super_block *sb)
{ return NULL; }
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index a240a3fc5fc4..f7e55d0d2672 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -445,6 +445,15 @@
* to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading
* and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter.
*
+ * Security hooks for kernfs node operations
+ *
+ * @kernfs_init_security:
+ * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based
+ * on its own and its parent's attributes.
+ *
+ * @kn_dir the parent kernfs node
+ * @kn the new child kernfs node
+ *
* Security hooks for file operations
*
* @file_permission:
@@ -1570,6 +1579,9 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
+ int (*kernfs_init_security)(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn);
+
int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file);
@@ -1871,6 +1883,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct hlist_head inode_getsecid;
struct hlist_head inode_copy_up;
struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
+ struct hlist_head kernfs_init_security;
struct hlist_head file_permission;
struct hlist_head file_alloc_security;
struct hlist_head file_free_security;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 49f2685324b0..d543293216b9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct fown_struct;
struct file_operations;
struct msg_msg;
struct xattr;
+struct kernfs_node;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
struct mm_struct;
struct fs_context;
@@ -299,6 +300,8 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
+int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -801,6 +804,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
index 0b86c47baf7d..2dccf141241d 100755
--- a/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
+++ b/scripts/selinux/install_policy.sh
@@ -1,30 +1,61 @@
#!/bin/sh
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+set -e
if [ `id -u` -ne 0 ]; then
echo "$0: must be root to install the selinux policy"
exit 1
fi
+
SF=`which setfiles`
if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
- if [ -f /sbin/setfiles ]; then
- SF="/usr/setfiles"
- else
- echo "no selinux tools installed: setfiles"
- exit 1
- fi
+ echo "Could not find setfiles"
+ echo "Do you have policycoreutils installed?"
+ exit 1
fi
-cd mdp
-
CP=`which checkpolicy`
+if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
+ echo "Could not find checkpolicy"
+ echo "Do you have checkpolicy installed?"
+ exit 1
+fi
VERS=`$CP -V | awk '{print $1}'`
-./mdp policy.conf file_contexts
-$CP -o policy.$VERS policy.conf
+ENABLED=`which selinuxenabled`
+if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
+ echo "Could not find selinuxenabled"
+ echo "Do you have libselinux-utils installed?"
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+if selinuxenabled; then
+ echo "SELinux is already enabled"
+ echo "This prevents safely relabeling all files."
+ echo "Boot with selinux=0 on the kernel command-line or"
+ echo "SELINUX=disabled in /etc/selinux/config."
+ exit 1
+fi
+
+cd mdp
+./mdp -m policy.conf file_contexts
+$CP -U allow -M -o policy.$VERS policy.conf
mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/policy
mkdir -p /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
+echo "__default__:user_u:s0" > /etc/selinux/dummy/seusers
+echo "base_r:base_t:s0" > /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/failsafe_context
+echo "base_r:base_t:s0 base_r:base_t:s0" > /etc/selinux/dummy/default_contexts
+cat > /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/x_contexts <<EOF
+client * user_u:base_r:base_t:s0
+property * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+extension * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+selection * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+event * user_u:object_r:base_t:s0
+EOF
+touch /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/virtual_domain_context
+touch /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/virtual_image_context
+
cp file_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
cp dbus_contexts /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts
cp policy.$VERS /etc/selinux/dummy/policy
@@ -33,37 +64,22 @@ FC_FILE=/etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files/file_contexts
if [ ! -d /etc/selinux ]; then
mkdir -p /etc/selinux
fi
-if [ ! -f /etc/selinux/config ]; then
- cat > /etc/selinux/config << EOF
-SELINUX=enforcing
+if [ -f /etc/selinux/config ]; then
+ echo "/etc/selinux/config exists, moving to /etc/selinux/config.bak."
+ mv /etc/selinux/config /etc/selinux/config.bak
+fi
+echo "Creating new /etc/selinux/config for dummy policy."
+cat > /etc/selinux/config << EOF
+SELINUX=permissive
SELINUXTYPE=dummy
EOF
-else
- TYPE=`cat /etc/selinux/config | grep "^SELINUXTYPE" | tail -1 | awk -F= '{ print $2 '}`
- if [ "eq$TYPE" != "eqdummy" ]; then
- selinuxenabled
- if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
- echo "SELinux already enabled with a non-dummy policy."
- echo "Exiting. Please install policy by hand if that"
- echo "is what you REALLY want."
- exit 1
- fi
- mv /etc/selinux/config /etc/selinux/config.mdpbak
- grep -v "^SELINUXTYPE" /etc/selinux/config.mdpbak >> /etc/selinux/config
- echo "SELINUXTYPE=dummy" >> /etc/selinux/config
- fi
-fi
cd /etc/selinux/dummy/contexts/files
-$SF file_contexts /
+$SF -F file_contexts /
-mounts=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | egrep "ext2|ext3|xfs|jfs|ext4|ext4dev|gfs2" | awk '{ print $2 '}`
-$SF file_contexts $mounts
+mounts=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | \
+ egrep "ext[234]|jfs|xfs|reiserfs|jffs2|gfs2|btrfs|f2fs|ocfs2" | \
+ awk '{ print $2 '}`
+$SF -F file_contexts $mounts
-
-dodev=`cat /proc/$$/mounts | grep "/dev "`
-if [ "eq$dodev" != "eq" ]; then
- mount --move /dev /mnt
- $SF file_contexts /dev
- mount --move /mnt /dev
-fi
+echo "-F" > /.autorelabel
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
index e9c92db7e2a3..8a1269a9d0ba 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
hostprogs-y := mdp
HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += \
-I$(srctree)/include/uapi -I$(srctree)/include \
- -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
+ -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include -I$(objtree)/include
always := $(hostprogs-y)
clean-files := policy.* file_contexts
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
index 6d51b74bc679..18fd6143888b 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/mdp/mdp.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <linux/kconfig.h>
static void usage(char *name)
{
@@ -94,10 +95,31 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
fprintf(fout, "\n");
- /* NOW PRINT OUT MLS STUFF */
+ /* print out mls declarations and constraints */
if (mls) {
- printf("MLS not yet implemented\n");
- exit(1);
+ fprintf(fout, "sensitivity s0;\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "sensitivity s1;\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "dominance { s0 s1 }\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "category c0;\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "category c1;\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "level s0:c0.c1;\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "level s1:c0.c1;\n");
+#define SYSTEMLOW "s0"
+#define SYSTEMHIGH "s1:c0.c1"
+ for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++) {
+ struct security_class_mapping *map = &secclass_map[i];
+
+ fprintf(fout, "mlsconstrain %s {\n", map->name);
+ for (j = 0; map->perms[j]; j++)
+ fprintf(fout, "\t%s\n", map->perms[j]);
+ /*
+ * This requires all subjects and objects to be
+ * single-level (l2 eq h2), and that the subject
+ * level dominate the object level (h1 dom h2)
+ * in order to have any permissions to it.
+ */
+ fprintf(fout, "} (l2 eq h2 and h1 dom h2);\n\n");
+ }
}
/* types, roles, and allows */
@@ -107,34 +129,127 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
for (i = 0; secclass_map[i].name; i++)
fprintf(fout, "allow base_t base_t:%s *;\n",
secclass_map[i].name);
- fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r };\n");
- fprintf(fout, "\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "user user_u roles { base_r }");
+ if (mls)
+ fprintf(fout, " level %s range %s - %s", SYSTEMLOW,
+ SYSTEMLOW, SYSTEMHIGH);
+ fprintf(fout, ";\n");
+
+#define SUBJUSERROLETYPE "user_u:base_r:base_t"
+#define OBJUSERROLETYPE "user_u:object_r:base_t"
/* default sids */
for (i = 1; i < initial_sid_to_string_len; i++)
- fprintf(fout, "sid %s user_u:base_r:base_t\n", initial_sid_to_string[i]);
+ fprintf(fout, "sid %s " SUBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n",
+ initial_sid_to_string[i], mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
fprintf(fout, "\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext3 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr ext4 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr xfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr reiserfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr jffs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_xattr gfs2 user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+#define FS_USE(behavior, fstype) \
+ fprintf(fout, "fs_use_%s %s " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s;\n", \
+ behavior, fstype, mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "")
+
+ /*
+ * Filesystems whose inode labels can be fetched via getxattr.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT2_FS_SECURITY
+ FS_USE("xattr", "ext2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_USE_FOR_EXT2
+ FS_USE("xattr", "ext2");
+#endif
+ FS_USE("xattr", "ext3");
+ FS_USE("xattr", "ext4");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_JFS_SECURITY
+ FS_USE("xattr", "jfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_REISERFS_FS_SECURITY
+ FS_USE("xattr", "reiserfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_JFFS2_FS_SECURITY
+ FS_USE("xattr", "jffs2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_FS
+ FS_USE("xattr", "xfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GFS2_FS
+ FS_USE("xattr", "gfs2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_FS
+ FS_USE("xattr", "btrfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY
+ FS_USE("xattr", "f2fs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OCFS2_FS
+ FS_USE("xattr", "ocsfs2");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS
+ FS_USE("xattr", "overlay");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XATTR
+ FS_USE("xattr", "squashfs");
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Filesystems whose inodes are labeled from allocating task.
+ */
+ FS_USE("task", "pipefs");
+ FS_USE("task", "sockfs");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task eventpollfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task pipefs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_task sockfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+ /*
+ * Filesystems whose inode labels are computed from both
+ * the allocating task and the superblock label.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS
+ FS_USE("trans", "devpts");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLBFS
+ FS_USE("trans", "hugetlbfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS
+ FS_USE("trans", "tmpfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEVTMPFS
+ FS_USE("trans", "devtmpfs");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE
+ FS_USE("trans", "mqueue");
+#endif
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans mqueue user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans devpts user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans hugetlbfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans tmpfs user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
- fprintf(fout, "fs_use_trans shm user_u:base_r:base_t;\n");
+#define GENFSCON(fstype, prefix) \
+ fprintf(fout, "genfscon %s %s " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", \
+ fstype, prefix, mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "")
- fprintf(fout, "genfscon proc / user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
+ /*
+ * Filesystems whose inodes are labeled from path prefix match
+ * relative to the filesystem root. Depending on the filesystem,
+ * only a single label for all inodes may be supported. Here
+ * we list the filesystem types for which per-file labeling is
+ * supported using genfscon; any other filesystem type can also
+ * be added by only with a single entry for all of its inodes.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+ GENFSCON("proc", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ GENFSCON("selinuxfs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+ GENFSCON("sysfs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+ GENFSCON("debugfs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
+ GENFSCON("tracefs", "/");
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PSTORE
+ GENFSCON("pstore", "/");
+#endif
+ GENFSCON("cgroup", "/");
+ GENFSCON("cgroup2", "/");
fclose(fout);
@@ -143,8 +258,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
printf("Wrote policy, but cannot open %s for writing\n", ctxout);
usage(argv[0]);
}
- fprintf(fout, "/ user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
- fprintf(fout, "/.* user_u:base_r:base_t\n");
+ fprintf(fout, "/ " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
+ fprintf(fout, "/.* " OBJUSERROLETYPE "%s\n", mls ? ":" SYSTEMLOW : "");
fclose(fout);
return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 23cbb1a295a3..8d6ef9da94eb 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1318,6 +1318,12 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
+int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
+}
+
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int ret;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0b37af2444..c61787b15f27 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@
#include <linux/msg.h>
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
#include "avc.h"
@@ -751,11 +753,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+
+ if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
- sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
if (!sbsec->behavior) {
/*
@@ -1354,6 +1358,67 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
return rc;
}
+static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+ u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
+{
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+ char *context;
+ unsigned int len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+ context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context[len] = '\0';
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
+ if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+ kfree(context);
+
+ /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = rc;
+ context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context[len] = '\0';
+ rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ context, len);
+ }
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(context);
+ if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ *sid = def_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
+ def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (rc) {
+ char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+ unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
+ ino, dev, context);
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
{
@@ -1362,9 +1427,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
u16 sclass;
struct dentry *dentry;
-#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
- char *context = NULL;
- unsigned len = 0;
int rc = 0;
if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
@@ -1432,72 +1494,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
goto out;
}
- len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
- context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!context) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- dput(dentry);
- goto out;
- }
- context[len] = '\0';
- rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
- if (rc == -ERANGE) {
- kfree(context);
-
- /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
- rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
- if (rc < 0) {
- dput(dentry);
- goto out;
- }
- len = rc;
- context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!context) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- dput(dentry);
- goto out;
- }
- context[len] = '\0';
- rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
- }
+ rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
+ &sid);
dput(dentry);
- if (rc < 0) {
- if (rc != -ENODATA) {
- pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
- "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
- -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
- kfree(context);
- goto out;
- }
- /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
- sid = sbsec->def_sid;
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
- context, rc, &sid,
- sbsec->def_sid,
- GFP_NOFS);
- if (rc) {
- char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
- unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
-
- if (rc == -EINVAL) {
- if (printk_ratelimit())
- pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
- "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
- "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
- } else {
- pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
- "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
- __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
- }
- kfree(context);
- /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
- rc = 0;
- break;
- }
- }
- kfree(context);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
break;
case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
sid = task_sid;
@@ -1548,9 +1549,21 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
goto out;
rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
sbsec->flags, &sid);
- dput(dentry);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ dput(dentry);
goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
+ (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
+ rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
+ sid, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ dput(dentry);
}
break;
}
@@ -3371,6 +3384,67 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+/* kernfs node operations */
+
+static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
+ struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+ u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
+ int rc;
+ char *context;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc == -ENODATA)
+ return 0;
+ else if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ clen = (u32)rc;
+ context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!context)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ kfree(context);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (tsec->create_sid) {
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+ } else {
+ u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
+ struct qstr q;
+
+ q.name = kn->name;
+ q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
+
+ rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
+ parent_sid, secclass, &q,
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
+ &context, &clen);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
+ XATTR_CREATE);
+ kfree(context);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -4438,7 +4512,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
- u16 family_sa = address->sa_family;
+ u16 family_sa;
unsigned short snum;
u32 sid, node_perm;
@@ -4448,6 +4522,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
* need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
* sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
*/
+ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ family_sa = address->sa_family;
switch (family_sa) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
@@ -4580,6 +4657,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
* need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
* sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
*/
+ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
@@ -6719,6 +6798,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
+
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b5b7c5aade8c..111121281c47 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100
#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200
#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400
+#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800
#define CONTEXT_STR "context"
#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext"
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 186e727b737b..6fd9954e1c08 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -288,11 +288,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
- struct sockaddr *addr;
struct sockaddr_in addr4;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
-#endif
if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
@@ -310,16 +307,15 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
- addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
- } else {
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr4, &secattr);
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && ip_hdr(skb)->version == 6) {
addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
- addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
-#endif
+ rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, (void *)&addr6, &secattr);
+ } else {
+ rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
- rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
if (rc == 0)
sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ec62918521b1..cc043bc8fd4c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1318,14 +1318,11 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
- if (only_invalid && !context->len) {
- scontext = NULL;
- scontext_len = 0;
+ if (only_invalid && !context->len)
rc = 0;
- } else {
+ else
rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
scontext_len);
- }
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
out:
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-01 07:50:20 +0000