diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c | 48 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 2 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_flowtable.sh | 1 | ||||
| -rwxr-xr-x | tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh | 145 |
8 files changed, 164 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c index 83d1798dfbb4..ba045f35114d 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c @@ -926,7 +926,9 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *net, const char *name, return -ENOMEM; for_each_possible_cpu(i) { newinfo->chainstack[i] = - vmalloc(array_size(udc_cnt, sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack[0])))); + vmalloc_node(array_size(udc_cnt, + sizeof(*(newinfo->chainstack[0]))), + cpu_to_node(i)); if (!newinfo->chainstack[i]) { while (i) vfree(newinfo->chainstack[--i]); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c index 733c83d38b30..4ad8b2032f1f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rt.c @@ -25,12 +25,7 @@ MODULE_AUTHOR("Andras Kis-Szabo <kisza@sch.bme.hu>"); static inline bool segsleft_match(u_int32_t min, u_int32_t max, u_int32_t id, bool invert) { - bool r; - pr_debug("segsleft_match:%c 0x%x <= 0x%x <= 0x%x\n", - invert ? '!' : ' ', min, id, max); - r = (id >= min && id <= max) ^ invert; - pr_debug(" result %s\n", r ? "PASS" : "FAILED"); - return r; + return (id >= min && id <= max) ^ invert; } static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) @@ -65,30 +60,6 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return false; } - pr_debug("IPv6 RT LEN %u %u ", hdrlen, rh->hdrlen); - pr_debug("TYPE %04X ", rh->type); - pr_debug("SGS_LEFT %u %02X\n", rh->segments_left, rh->segments_left); - - pr_debug("IPv6 RT segsleft %02X ", - segsleft_match(rtinfo->segsleft[0], rtinfo->segsleft[1], - rh->segments_left, - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_SGS))); - pr_debug("type %02X %02X %02X ", - rtinfo->rt_type, rh->type, - (!(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_TYP) || - ((rtinfo->rt_type == rh->type) ^ - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_TYP)))); - pr_debug("len %02X %04X %02X ", - rtinfo->hdrlen, hdrlen, - !(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_LEN) || - ((rtinfo->hdrlen == hdrlen) ^ - !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_LEN))); - pr_debug("res %02X %02X %02X ", - rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_RES, - ((const struct rt0_hdr *)rh)->reserved, - !((rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_RES) && - (((const struct rt0_hdr *)rh)->reserved))); - ret = (segsleft_match(rtinfo->segsleft[0], rtinfo->segsleft[1], rh->segments_left, !!(rtinfo->invflags & IP6T_RT_INV_SGS))) && @@ -107,22 +78,22 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) reserved), sizeof(_reserved), &_reserved); + if (!rp) { + par->hotdrop = true; + return false; + } ret = (*rp == 0); } - pr_debug("#%d ", rtinfo->addrnr); if (!(rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_FST)) { return ret; } else if (rtinfo->flags & IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT) { - pr_debug("Not strict "); if (rtinfo->addrnr > (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16)) { - pr_debug("There isn't enough space\n"); return false; } else { unsigned int i = 0; - pr_debug("#%d ", rtinfo->addrnr); for (temp = 0; temp < (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16); temp++) { @@ -138,26 +109,20 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return false; } - if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) { - pr_debug("i=%d temp=%d;\n", i, temp); + if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) i++; - } if (i == rtinfo->addrnr) break; } - pr_debug("i=%d #%d\n", i, rtinfo->addrnr); if (i == rtinfo->addrnr) return ret; else return false; } } else { - pr_debug("Strict "); if (rtinfo->addrnr > (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16)) { - pr_debug("There isn't enough space\n"); return false; } else { - pr_debug("#%d ", rtinfo->addrnr); for (temp = 0; temp < rtinfo->addrnr; temp++) { ap = skb_header_pointer(skb, ptr @@ -173,7 +138,6 @@ static bool rt_mt6(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) if (!ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[temp])) break; } - pr_debug("temp=%d #%d\n", temp, rtinfo->addrnr); if (temp == rtinfo->addrnr && temp == (unsigned int)((hdrlen - 8) / 16)) return ret; diff --git a/net/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/netfilter/Kconfig index 54395266339d..92a747896f80 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ config NF_CONNTRACK_MARK config NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK bool 'Connection tracking security mark support' depends on NETWORK_SECMARK - default m if NETFILTER_ADVANCED=n + default y if NETFILTER_ADVANCED=n help This option enables security markings to be applied to connections. Typically they are copied to connections from diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c index c25097092a06..29ec3ef63edc 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c @@ -4090,6 +4090,11 @@ static int __net_init ip_vs_control_net_init_sysctl(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs) tbl[idx++].data = &ipvs->sysctl_conn_reuse_mode; tbl[idx++].data = &ipvs->sysctl_schedule_icmp; tbl[idx++].data = &ipvs->sysctl_ignore_tunneled; +#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_DEBUG + /* Global sysctls must be ro in non-init netns */ + if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) + tbl[idx++].mode = 0444; +#endif ipvs->sysctl_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/ipv4/vs", tbl); if (ipvs->sysctl_hdr == NULL) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c b/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c index 5b02408a920b..3ced0eb6b7c3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c @@ -342,12 +342,6 @@ static void nft_netdev_event(unsigned long event, struct net_device *dev, return; } - /* UNREGISTER events are also happening on netns exit. - * - * Although nf_tables core releases all tables/chains, only this event - * handler provides guarantee that hook->ops.dev is still accessible, - * so we cannot skip exiting net namespaces. - */ __nft_release_basechain(ctx); } @@ -366,6 +360,9 @@ static int nf_tables_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this, event != NETDEV_CHANGENAME) return NOTIFY_DONE; + if (!check_net(ctx.net)) + return NOTIFY_DONE; + nft_net = nft_pernet(ctx.net); mutex_lock(&nft_net->commit_mutex); list_for_each_entry(table, &nft_net->tables, list) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c index 7b2f359bfce4..2f7cf5ecebf4 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int idletimer_tg_create(struct idletimer_tg_info *info) { int ret; - info->timer = kmalloc(sizeof(*info->timer), GFP_KERNEL); + info->timer = kzalloc(sizeof(*info->timer), GFP_KERNEL); if (!info->timer) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_flowtable.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_flowtable.sh index 427d94816f2d..d4ffebb989f8 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_flowtable.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_flowtable.sh @@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ fi # test basic connectivity if ! ip netns exec ns1 ping -c 1 -q 10.0.2.99 > /dev/null; then echo "ERROR: ns1 cannot reach ns2" 1>&2 - bash exit 1 fi diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh index d7e07f4c3d7f..da1c1e4b6c86 100755 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh @@ -741,6 +741,149 @@ EOF return $lret } +# test port shadowing. +# create two listening services, one on router (ns0), one +# on client (ns2), which is masqueraded from ns1 point of view. +# ns2 sends udp packet coming from service port to ns1, on a highport. +# Later, if n1 uses same highport to connect to ns0:service, packet +# might be port-forwarded to ns2 instead. + +# second argument tells if we expect the 'fake-entry' to take effect +# (CLIENT) or not (ROUTER). +test_port_shadow() +{ + local test=$1 + local expect=$2 + local daddrc="10.0.1.99" + local daddrs="10.0.1.1" + local result="" + local logmsg="" + + echo ROUTER | ip netns exec "$ns0" nc -w 5 -u -l -p 1405 >/dev/null 2>&1 & + nc_r=$! + + echo CLIENT | ip netns exec "$ns2" nc -w 5 -u -l -p 1405 >/dev/null 2>&1 & + nc_c=$! + + # make shadow entry, from client (ns2), going to (ns1), port 41404, sport 1405. + echo "fake-entry" | ip netns exec "$ns2" nc -w 1 -p 1405 -u "$daddrc" 41404 > /dev/null + + # ns1 tries to connect to ns0:1405. With default settings this should connect + # to client, it matches the conntrack entry created above. + + result=$(echo "" | ip netns exec "$ns1" nc -w 1 -p 41404 -u "$daddrs" 1405) + + if [ "$result" = "$expect" ] ;then + echo "PASS: portshadow test $test: got reply from ${expect}${logmsg}" + else + echo "ERROR: portshadow test $test: got reply from \"$result\", not $expect as intended" + ret=1 + fi + + kill $nc_r $nc_c 2>/dev/null + + # flush udp entries for next test round, if any + ip netns exec "$ns0" conntrack -F >/dev/null 2>&1 +} + +# This prevents port shadow of router service via packet filter, +# packets claiming to originate from service port from internal +# network are dropped. +test_port_shadow_filter() +{ + local family=$1 + +ip netns exec "$ns0" nft -f /dev/stdin <<EOF +table $family filter { + chain forward { + type filter hook forward priority 0; policy accept; + meta iif veth1 udp sport 1405 drop + } +} +EOF + test_port_shadow "port-filter" "ROUTER" + + ip netns exec "$ns0" nft delete table $family filter +} + +# This prevents port shadow of router service via notrack. +test_port_shadow_notrack() +{ + local family=$1 + +ip netns exec "$ns0" nft -f /dev/stdin <<EOF +table $family raw { + chain prerouting { + type filter hook prerouting priority -300; policy accept; + meta iif veth0 udp dport 1405 notrack + udp dport 1405 notrack + } + chain output { + type filter hook output priority -300; policy accept; + udp sport 1405 notrack + } +} +EOF + test_port_shadow "port-notrack" "ROUTER" + + ip netns exec "$ns0" nft delete table $family raw +} + +# This prevents port shadow of router service via sport remap. +test_port_shadow_pat() +{ + local family=$1 + +ip netns exec "$ns0" nft -f /dev/stdin <<EOF +table $family pat { + chain postrouting { + type nat hook postrouting priority -1; policy accept; + meta iif veth1 udp sport <= 1405 masquerade to : 1406-65535 random + } +} +EOF + test_port_shadow "pat" "ROUTER" + + ip netns exec "$ns0" nft delete table $family pat +} + +test_port_shadowing() +{ + local family="ip" + + ip netns exec "$ns0" sysctl net.ipv4.conf.veth0.forwarding=1 > /dev/null + ip netns exec "$ns0" sysctl net.ipv4.conf.veth1.forwarding=1 > /dev/null + + ip netns exec "$ns0" nft -f /dev/stdin <<EOF +table $family nat { + chain postrouting { + type nat hook postrouting priority 0; policy accept; + meta oif veth0 masquerade + } +} +EOF + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + echo "SKIP: Could not add add $family masquerade hook" + return $ksft_skip + fi + + # test default behaviour. Packet from ns1 to ns0 is redirected to ns2. + test_port_shadow "default" "CLIENT" + + # test packet filter based mitigation: prevent forwarding of + # packets claiming to come from the service port. + test_port_shadow_filter "$family" + + # test conntrack based mitigation: connections going or coming + # from router:service bypass connection tracking. + test_port_shadow_notrack "$family" + + # test nat based mitigation: fowarded packets coming from service port + # are masqueraded with random highport. + test_port_shadow_pat "$family" + + ip netns exec "$ns0" nft delete table $family nat +} # ip netns exec "$ns0" ping -c 1 -q 10.0.$i.99 for i in 0 1 2; do @@ -861,6 +1004,8 @@ reset_counters $test_inet_nat && test_redirect inet $test_inet_nat && test_redirect6 inet +test_port_shadowing + if [ $ret -ne 0 ];then echo -n "FAIL: " nft --version |