diff options
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/signal.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 9 |
3 files changed, 14 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index f9a52c721274..91d57f89f5a5 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -533,22 +533,23 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long mask, struct sigpending *s) static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t) { - int error = -EINVAL; + int error; + if (!valid_signal(sig)) - return error; + return -EINVAL; - if (info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info))) { - error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */ - if (error) - return error; - error = -EPERM; - if (((sig != SIGCONT) || - (task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t))) - && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) - && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) - && !capable(CAP_KILL)) + if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) + return 0; + + error = audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */ + if (error) return error; - } + + if (((sig != SIGCONT) || (task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t))) + && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) + && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) + && !capable(CAP_KILL)) + return -EPERM; return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0); } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 85a220465a8f..1b50a6ebc55f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3286,9 +3286,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, if (rc) return rc; - if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) - return 0; - if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index fe0ae1bf1650..b5c8f9237008 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1131,15 +1131,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid) { /* - * Special cases where signals really ought to go through - * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may - * make sense to change the caller so that it doesn't - * bother with the LSM hook in these cases. - */ - if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && - (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info))) - return 0; - /* * Sending a signal requires that the sender * can write the receiver. */ |