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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S117
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h17
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c58
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/traps.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c36
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pti.c33
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/tlb.c31
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S8
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ptrace.h21
-rw-r--r--kernel/cpu.c11
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c10
19 files changed, 222 insertions, 176 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 7c5ce0a6c4d2..4d7a2d9d44cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -142,67 +142,6 @@ END(native_usergs_sysret64)
* with them due to bugs in both AMD and Intel CPUs.
*/
- .pushsection .entry_trampoline, "ax"
-
-/*
- * The code in here gets remapped into cpu_entry_area's trampoline. This means
- * that the assembler and linker have the wrong idea as to where this code
- * lives (and, in fact, it's mapped more than once, so it's not even at a
- * fixed address). So we can't reference any symbols outside the entry
- * trampoline and expect it to work.
- *
- * Instead, we carefully abuse %rip-relative addressing.
- * _entry_trampoline(%rip) refers to the start of the remapped) entry
- * trampoline. We can thus find cpu_entry_area with this macro:
- */
-
-#define CPU_ENTRY_AREA \
- _entry_trampoline - CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_trampoline(%rip)
-
-/* The top word of the SYSENTER stack is hot and is usable as scratch space. */
-#define RSP_SCRATCH CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack + \
- SIZEOF_entry_stack - 8 + CPU_ENTRY_AREA
-
-ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
- swapgs
-
- /* Stash the user RSP. */
- movq %rsp, RSP_SCRATCH
-
- /* Note: using %rsp as a scratch reg. */
- SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
-
- /* Load the top of the task stack into RSP */
- movq CPU_ENTRY_AREA_tss + TSS_sp1 + CPU_ENTRY_AREA, %rsp
-
- /* Start building the simulated IRET frame. */
- pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
- pushq RSP_SCRATCH /* pt_regs->sp */
- pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->flags */
- pushq $__USER_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
- pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->ip */
-
- /*
- * x86 lacks a near absolute jump, and we can't jump to the real
- * entry text with a relative jump. We could push the target
- * address and then use retq, but this destroys the pipeline on
- * many CPUs (wasting over 20 cycles on Sandy Bridge). Instead,
- * spill RDI and restore it in a second-stage trampoline.
- */
- pushq %rdi
- movq $entry_SYSCALL_64_stage2, %rdi
- JMP_NOSPEC %rdi
-END(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline)
-
- .popsection
-
-ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64_stage2)
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
- popq %rdi
- jmp entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
-END(entry_SYSCALL_64_stage2)
-
ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64)
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
/*
@@ -212,21 +151,19 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64)
*/
swapgs
- /*
- * This path is only taken when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is disabled so it
- * is not required to switch CR3.
- */
- movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)
+ /* tss.sp2 is scratch space. */
+ movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
+ SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rsp
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
- pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
- pushq PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch) /* pt_regs->sp */
- pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->flags */
- pushq $__USER_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
- pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->ip */
+ pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
+ pushq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2) /* pt_regs->sp */
+ pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->flags */
+ pushq $__USER_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
+ pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->ip */
GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe)
- pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
+ pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS rax=$-ENOSYS
@@ -900,6 +837,42 @@ apicinterrupt IRQ_WORK_VECTOR irq_work_interrupt smp_irq_work_interrupt
*/
#define CPU_TSS_IST(x) PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw) + (TSS_ist + ((x) - 1) * 8)
+/**
+ * idtentry - Generate an IDT entry stub
+ * @sym: Name of the generated entry point
+ * @do_sym: C function to be called
+ * @has_error_code: True if this IDT vector has an error code on the stack
+ * @paranoid: non-zero means that this vector may be invoked from
+ * kernel mode with user GSBASE and/or user CR3.
+ * 2 is special -- see below.
+ * @shift_ist: Set to an IST index if entries from kernel mode should
+ * decrement the IST stack so that nested entries get a
+ * fresh stack. (This is for #DB, which has a nasty habit
+ * of recursing.)
+ *
+ * idtentry generates an IDT stub that sets up a usable kernel context,
+ * creates struct pt_regs, and calls @do_sym. The stub has the following
+ * special behaviors:
+ *
+ * On an entry from user mode, the stub switches from the trampoline or
+ * IST stack to the normal thread stack. On an exit to user mode, the
+ * normal exit-to-usermode path is invoked.
+ *
+ * On an exit to kernel mode, if @paranoid == 0, we check for preemption,
+ * whereas we omit the preemption check if @paranoid != 0. This is purely
+ * because the implementation is simpler this way. The kernel only needs
+ * to check for asynchronous kernel preemption when IRQ handlers return.
+ *
+ * If @paranoid == 0, then the stub will handle IRET faults by pretending
+ * that the fault came from user mode. It will handle gs_change faults by
+ * pretending that the fault happened with kernel GSBASE. Since this handling
+ * is omitted for @paranoid != 0, the #GP, #SS, and #NP stubs must have
+ * @paranoid == 0. This special handling will do the wrong thing for
+ * espfix-induced #DF on IRET, so #DF must not use @paranoid == 0.
+ *
+ * @paranoid == 2 is special: the stub will never switch stacks. This is for
+ * #DF: if the thread stack is somehow unusable, we'll still get a useful OOPS.
+ */
.macro idtentry sym do_sym has_error_code:req paranoid=0 shift_ist=-1
ENTRY(\sym)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS offset=\has_error_code*8
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index 4a7884b8dca5..29c706415443 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ struct cpu_entry_area {
*/
struct tss_struct tss;
- char entry_trampoline[PAGE_SIZE];
-
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Exception stacks used for IST entries.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index fd2a8c1b88bc..80dc14422495 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -170,11 +170,15 @@
*/
# define CALL_NOSPEC \
ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
- ALTERNATIVE( \
+ ALTERNATIVE_2( \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
"call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
- X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
+ "lfence;\n" \
+ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
+ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
@@ -184,7 +188,8 @@
* here, anyway.
*/
# define CALL_NOSPEC \
- ALTERNATIVE( \
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
+ ALTERNATIVE_2( \
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
"call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
" jmp 904f;\n" \
@@ -199,7 +204,11 @@
" ret;\n" \
" .align 16\n" \
"904: call 901b;\n", \
- X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
+ "lfence;\n" \
+ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
+ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index c7a4e2a174b9..617805981cce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -316,7 +316,13 @@ struct x86_hw_tss {
*/
u64 sp1;
+ /*
+ * Since Linux does not use ring 2, the 'sp2' slot is unused by
+ * hardware. entry_SYSCALL_64 uses it as scratch space to stash
+ * the user RSP value.
+ */
u64 sp2;
+
u64 reserved2;
u64 ist[7];
u32 reserved3;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
index 4a911a382ade..8ea1cfdbeabc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sections.h
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ extern char __end_rodata_aligned[];
#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
extern char __end_rodata_hpage_align[];
-extern char __entry_trampoline_start[], __entry_trampoline_end[];
#endif
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SECTIONS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index fc02c3cf238f..72adf6c335dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -96,13 +96,12 @@ void common(void) {
OFFSET(TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask, tlb_state, user_pcid_flush_mask);
/* Layout info for cpu_entry_area */
- OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_tss, cpu_entry_area, tss);
- OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_trampoline, cpu_entry_area, entry_trampoline);
OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack, cpu_entry_area, entry_stack_page);
DEFINE(SIZEOF_entry_stack, sizeof(struct entry_stack));
DEFINE(MASK_entry_stack, (~(sizeof(struct entry_stack) - 1)));
- /* Offset for sp0 and sp1 into the tss_struct */
+ /* Offset for fields in tss_struct */
OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0);
OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1);
+ OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b810cc239375..c37e66e493bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -35,12 +35,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
-/*
- * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
- * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
- */
-u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
/*
* The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
@@ -326,6 +324,46 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
return cmd;
}
+static bool stibp_needed(void)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void update_stibp_msr(void *info)
+{
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+}
+
+void arch_smt_update(void)
+{
+ u64 mask;
+
+ if (!stibp_needed())
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+ mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+ if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+ mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+ else
+ mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+ if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) {
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n",
+ cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ?
+ "Enabling" : "Disabling");
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
+ on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+}
+
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -426,6 +464,9 @@ specv2_set_mode:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
+
+ /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
+ arch_smt_update();
}
#undef pr_fmt
@@ -816,6 +857,8 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
+ int ret;
+
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
@@ -833,10 +876,13 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
- return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+ (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
spectre_v2_module_string());
+ return ret;
case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 9315a1660668..660d0b22e962 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1534,19 +1534,8 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count);
/* May not be marked __init: used by software suspend */
void syscall_init(void)
{
- extern char _entry_trampoline[];
- extern char entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline[];
-
- int cpu = smp_processor_id();
- unsigned long SYSCALL64_entry_trampoline =
- (unsigned long)get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_trampoline +
- (entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline - _entry_trampoline);
-
wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS);
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
- wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, SYSCALL64_entry_trampoline);
- else
- wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64);
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat);
@@ -1557,7 +1546,8 @@ void syscall_init(void)
* AMD doesn't allow SYSENTER in long mode (either 32- or 64-bit).
*/
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)__KERNEL_CS);
- wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
+ (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id()) + 1));
wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (u64)entry_SYSENTER_compat);
#else
wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, (unsigned long)ignore_sysret);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index f72a47b602e2..c33b06f5faa4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -1028,18 +1028,10 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_fault_handler);
bool arch_within_kprobe_blacklist(unsigned long addr)
{
- bool is_in_entry_trampoline_section = false;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- is_in_entry_trampoline_section =
- (addr >= (unsigned long)__entry_trampoline_start &&
- addr < (unsigned long)__entry_trampoline_end);
-#endif
return (addr >= (unsigned long)__kprobes_text_start &&
addr < (unsigned long)__kprobes_text_end) ||
(addr >= (unsigned long)__entry_text_start &&
- addr < (unsigned long)__entry_text_end) ||
- is_in_entry_trampoline_section;
+ addr < (unsigned long)__entry_text_end);
}
int __init arch_init_kprobes(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index d6674a425714..31b4755369f0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -60,8 +60,6 @@
#include <asm/unistd_32_ia32.h>
#endif
-__visible DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, rsp_scratch);
-
/* Prints also some state that isn't saved in the pt_regs */
void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, enum show_regs_mode mode)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 16c95cb90496..5bd0a997d81e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
* we won't enable interupts or schedule before we invoke
* general_protection, so nothing will clobber the stack
* frame we just set up.
+ *
+ * We will enter general_protection with kernel GSBASE,
+ * which is what the stub expects, given that the faulting
+ * RIP will be the IRET instruction.
*/
regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 5dd3317d761f..0d618ee634ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -136,16 +136,6 @@ SECTIONS
*(.fixup)
*(.gnu.warning)
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
- __entry_trampoline_start = .;
- _entry_trampoline = .;
- *(.entry_trampoline)
- . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
- __entry_trampoline_end = .;
- ASSERT(. - _entry_trampoline == PAGE_SIZE, "entry trampoline is too big");
-#endif
-
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
__indirect_thunk_start = .;
*(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 076ebdce9bd4..12d7e7fb4efd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(char, exception_stacks
[(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS - 1) * EXCEPTION_STKSZ + DEBUG_STKSZ]);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct kcore_list, kcore_entry_trampoline);
#endif
struct cpu_entry_area *get_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
@@ -83,8 +82,6 @@ static void percpu_setup_debug_store(int cpu)
static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- extern char _entry_trampoline[];
-
/* On 64-bit systems, we use a read-only fixmap GDT and TSS. */
pgprot_t gdt_prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO;
pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO;
@@ -146,43 +143,10 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
cea_map_percpu_pages(&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->exception_stacks,
&per_cpu(exception_stacks, cpu),
sizeof(exception_stacks) / PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL);
-
- cea_set_pte(&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_trampoline,
- __pa_symbol(_entry_trampoline), PAGE_KERNEL_RX);
- /*
- * The cpu_entry_area alias addresses are not in the kernel binary
- * so they do not show up in /proc/kcore normally. This adds entries
- * for them manually.
- */
- kclist_add_remap(&per_cpu(kcore_entry_trampoline, cpu),
- _entry_trampoline,
- &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_trampoline, PAGE_SIZE);
#endif
percpu_setup_debug_store(cpu);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-int arch_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum, unsigned long *value, char *type,
- char *name)
-{
- unsigned int cpu, ncpu = 0;
-
- if (symnum >= num_possible_cpus())
- return -EINVAL;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- if (ncpu++ >= symnum)
- break;
- }
-
- *value = (unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_trampoline;
- *type = 't';
- strlcpy(name, "__entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline", KSYM_NAME_LEN);
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
static __init void setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index c1fc1ae6b429..4fee5c3003ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -434,11 +434,42 @@ static void __init pti_clone_p4d(unsigned long addr)
}
/*
- * Clone the CPU_ENTRY_AREA into the user space visible page table.
+ * Clone the CPU_ENTRY_AREA and associated data into the user space visible
+ * page table.
*/
static void __init pti_clone_user_shared(void)
{
+ unsigned int cpu;
+
pti_clone_p4d(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE);
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ /*
+ * The SYSCALL64 entry code needs to be able to find the
+ * thread stack and needs one word of scratch space in which
+ * to spill a register. All of this lives in the TSS, in
+ * the sp1 and sp2 slots.
+ *
+ * This is done for all possible CPUs during boot to ensure
+ * that it's propagated to all mms. If we were to add one of
+ * these mappings during CPU hotplug, we would need to take
+ * some measure to make sure that every mm that subsequently
+ * ran on that CPU would have the relevant PGD entry in its
+ * pagetables. The usual vmalloc_fault() mechanism would not
+ * work for page faults taken in entry_SYSCALL_64 before RSP
+ * is set up.
+ */
+
+ unsigned long va = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
+ phys_addr_t pa = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys((void *)va);
+ pte_t *target_pte;
+
+ target_pte = pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(va);
+ if (WARN_ON(!target_pte))
+ return;
+
+ *target_pte = pfn_pte(pa >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL);
+ }
}
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 7d68489cfdb1..bddd6b3cee1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -180,6 +181,19 @@ static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
}
}
+static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id)
+{
+ /*
+ * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory
+ * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to
+ * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks.
+ *
+ * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO.
+ */
+ return (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id &&
+ ptrace_may_access_sched(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB));
+}
+
void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
@@ -286,18 +300,13 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
* one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
*
* As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when
- * switching into processes that disable dumping. This
- * protects high value processes like gpg, without having
- * too high performance overhead. IBPB is *expensive*!
- *
- * This will not flush branches when switching into kernel
- * threads. It will also not flush if we switch to idle
- * thread and back to the same process. It will flush if we
- * switch to a different non-dumpable process.
+ * switching into a processes that can't be ptrace by the
+ * current one (as in such case, attacker has much more
+ * convenient way how to tamper with the next process than
+ * branch buffer poisoning).
*/
- if (tsk && tsk->mm &&
- tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id &&
- get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) &&
+ ibpb_needed(tsk, last_ctx_id))
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S
index 417b339e5c8e..bb1c2da0381d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S
@@ -91,13 +91,15 @@ ENTRY(xen_iret)
ENTRY(xen_sysret64)
/*
* We're already on the usermode stack at this point, but
- * still with the kernel gs, so we can easily switch back
+ * still with the kernel gs, so we can easily switch back.
+ *
+ * tss.sp2 is scratch space.
*/
- movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)
+ movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
pushq $__USER_DS
- pushq PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)
+ pushq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp2)
pushq %r11
pushq $__USER_CS
pushq %rcx
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index 4f36431c380b..e5e5ef513df3 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -62,14 +62,17 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02
#define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04
-#define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08
-#define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10
+#define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08
+#define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10
+#define PTRACE_MODE_SCHED 0x20
+#define PTRACE_MODE_IBPB 0x40
/* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
#define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
#define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
+#define PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_IBPB)
/**
* ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access
@@ -87,6 +90,20 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead);
*/
extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
+/**
+ * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access
+ * a target task.
+ * @task: target task
+ * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false on denial.
+ *
+ * Similar to ptrace_may_access(). Only to be called from context switch
+ * code. Does not call into audit and the regular LSM hooks due to locking
+ * constraints.
+ */
+extern bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode);
+
static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child)
{
return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent);
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index e82920b8bee1..3c7f3b4c453c 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2055,6 +2055,12 @@ static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu)
kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE);
}
+/*
+ * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug
+ * should override this.
+ */
+void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { };
+
static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
{
int cpu, ret = 0;
@@ -2081,8 +2087,10 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
*/
cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu);
}
- if (!ret)
+ if (!ret) {
cpu_smt_control = ctrlval;
+ arch_smt_update();
+ }
cpu_maps_update_done();
return ret;
}
@@ -2093,6 +2101,7 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
cpu_maps_update_begin();
cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+ arch_smt_update();
for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
/* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */
if (cpu_online(cpu) || !node_online(cpu_to_node(cpu)))
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 21fec73d45d4..99cfddde6a55 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -261,6 +261,9 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
{
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
+ return false;
+
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
else
@@ -328,9 +331,16 @@ ok:
!ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)
+ return 0;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
+bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ return __ptrace_may_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_SCHED);
+}
+
bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
int err;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-17 21:15:54 +0000