diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 122 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/fs.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sysctl.c | 18 |
4 files changed, 184 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt index 13d6166d7a27..d4a372e75750 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs: - nr_open - overflowuid - overflowgid +- protected_hardlinks +- protected_symlinks - suid_dumpable - super-max - super-nr @@ -157,6 +159,46 @@ The default is 65534. ============================================================== +protected_hardlinks: + +A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based +time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable +directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw +is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a +root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, +on systems without separated partitions, this stops unauthorized users +from "pinning" vulnerable setuid/setgid files against being upgraded by +the administrator, or linking to special files. + +When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" hardlinks cannot be created by users if they do not +already own the source file, or do not have read/write access to it. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + +============================================================== + +protected_symlinks: + +A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based +time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable +directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw +is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a +root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely +incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp + +When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside +a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and +follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + +============================================================== + suid_dumpable: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index afa087649ddb..3861d85f8488 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -650,6 +650,119 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link, void *cooki path_put(link); } +int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1; +int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1; + +/** + * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations + * @link: The path of the symlink + * + * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled, + * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is + * in a sticky world-writable directory. This is to protect privileged + * processes from failing races against path names that may change out + * from under them by way of other users creating malicious symlinks. + * It will permit symlinks to be followed only when outside a sticky + * world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower + * match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. + * + * Returns 0 if following the symlink is allowed, -ve on error. + */ +static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd) +{ + const struct inode *inode; + const struct inode *parent; + + if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks) + return 0; + + /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */ + inode = link->dentry->d_inode; + if (current_cred()->fsuid == inode->i_uid) + return 0; + + /* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */ + parent = nd->path.dentry->d_inode; + if ((parent->i_mode & (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) != (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) + return 0; + + /* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */ + if (parent->i_uid == inode->i_uid) + return 0; + + path_put_conditional(link, nd); + path_put(&nd->path); + return -EACCES; +} + +/** + * safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions + * @inode: the source inode to hardlink from + * + * Return false if at least one of the following conditions: + * - inode is not a regular file + * - inode is setuid + * - inode is setgid and group-exec + * - access failure for read and write + * + * Otherwise returns true. + */ +static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode) +{ + umode_t mode = inode->i_mode; + + /* Special files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ + if (!S_ISREG(mode)) + return false; + + /* Setuid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ + if (mode & S_ISUID) + return false; + + /* Executable setgid files should not get pinned to the filesystem. */ + if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) + return false; + + /* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */ + if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +/** + * may_linkat - Check permissions for creating a hardlink + * @link: the source to hardlink from + * + * Block hardlink when all of: + * - sysctl_protected_hardlinks enabled + * - fsuid does not match inode + * - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above) + * - not CAP_FOWNER + * + * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. + */ +static int may_linkat(struct path *link) +{ + const struct cred *cred; + struct inode *inode; + + if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks) + return 0; + + cred = current_cred(); + inode = link->dentry->d_inode; + + /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like, + * otherwise, it must be a safe source. + */ + if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid || safe_hardlink_source(inode) || + capable(CAP_FOWNER)) + return 0; + + return -EPERM; +} + static __always_inline int follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p) { @@ -1818,6 +1931,9 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name, while (err > 0) { void *cookie; struct path link = path; + err = may_follow_link(&link, nd); + if (unlikely(err)) + break; nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT; err = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie); if (err) @@ -2778,6 +2894,9 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, const char *pathname, error = -ELOOP; break; } + error = may_follow_link(&link, nd); + if (unlikely(error)) + break; nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT; nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL); error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie); @@ -3421,6 +3540,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(linkat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname, error = -EXDEV; if (old_path.mnt != new_path.mnt) goto out_dput; + error = may_linkat(&old_path); + if (unlikely(error)) + goto out_dput; error = security_path_link(old_path.dentry, &new_path, new_dentry); if (error) goto out_dput; diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index 478237844648..80c819cbe272 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -437,6 +437,8 @@ extern unsigned long get_max_files(void); extern int sysctl_nr_open; extern struct inodes_stat_t inodes_stat; extern int leases_enable, lease_break_time; +extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks; +extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks; struct buffer_head; typedef int (get_block_t)(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock, diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 4ab11879aeb4..5d9a1d2b27b4 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1494,6 +1494,24 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = { #endif #endif { + .procname = "protected_symlinks", + .data = &sysctl_protected_symlinks, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, + { + .procname = "protected_hardlinks", + .data = &sysctl_protected_hardlinks, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = &zero, + .extra2 = &one, + }, + { .procname = "suid_dumpable", .data = &suid_dumpable, .maxlen = sizeof(int), |