diff options
| author | Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> | 2012-02-14 05:18:48 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | 2012-02-15 14:58:15 +0100 |
| commit | 8866f405efd4171f9d9c91901d2dd02f01bacb60 (patch) | |
| tree | 414b07ed6d979f9aad804dc16b4f280247741eaf /sound/usb/quirks.c | |
| parent | 27c3afe6e1cf129faac90405121203962da08ff4 (diff) | |
| download | linux-8866f405efd4171f9d9c91901d2dd02f01bacb60.tar.bz2 | |
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid integer overflow in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
A malicious USB device could feed in a large nr_rates value. This would
cause the subsequent call to kmemdup() to allocate a smaller buffer than
expected, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This patch validates the nr_rates value and reuses the limit introduced
in commit 4fa0e81b ("ALSA: usb-audio: fix possible hang and overflow
in parse_uac2_sample_rate_range()").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'sound/usb/quirks.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sound/usb/quirks.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/sound/usb/quirks.c b/sound/usb/quirks.c index a3ddac0deffd..27817266867a 100644 --- a/sound/usb/quirks.c +++ b/sound/usb/quirks.c @@ -132,10 +132,14 @@ static int create_fixed_stream_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip, unsigned *rate_table = NULL; fp = kmemdup(quirk->data, sizeof(*fp), GFP_KERNEL); - if (! fp) { + if (!fp) { snd_printk(KERN_ERR "cannot memdup\n"); return -ENOMEM; } + if (fp->nr_rates > MAX_NR_RATES) { + kfree(fp); + return -EINVAL; + } if (fp->nr_rates > 0) { rate_table = kmemdup(fp->rate_table, sizeof(int) * fp->nr_rates, GFP_KERNEL); |