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author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-12-12 11:20:49 -0600 |
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committer | Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | 2018-12-13 09:13:04 +0100 |
commit | 4aea96f4237cea0c51a8bc87c0db31f0f932f1f0 (patch) | |
tree | c10f89ad1d9ca4155a16fe6cb11296a9f0f23f34 /sound/core | |
parent | c7072f5f2aa1124d57042d1d7f17521532657dc6 (diff) | |
download | linux-4aea96f4237cea0c51a8bc87c0db31f0f932f1f0.tar.bz2 |
ALSA: emux: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.
These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them
to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and
emu->portptrs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'sound/core')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions