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authorRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>2017-10-11 20:57:07 -0400
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-10-20 15:22:44 +1100
commitfc7eadf768a3e2c062e52eea89b52a0076d53b0c (patch)
tree1e8fc73f8d0ab14eda333285b40ee657e498eb7e /security
parent4c7e715fc87b6f8b652363b3515b48b3822c5b5f (diff)
downloadlinux-fc7eadf768a3e2c062e52eea89b52a0076d53b0c.tar.bz2
capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap
Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities since the entire source file is about capabilities. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c20
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 4c9af6ef24b6..13661d34f842 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
bool *effective,
- bool *has_cap)
+ bool *has_fcap)
{
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
unsigned i;
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
*effective = true;
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
- *has_cap = true;
+ *has_fcap = true;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
* constructed by execve().
*/
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
goto out;
}
- rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+ rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
if (rc == -EINVAL)
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ out:
* set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is
* updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
*/
-static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+ if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
return;
}
@@ -759,20 +759,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+ ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
- if (has_cap || is_setid)
+ if (has_fcap || is_setid)
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
/*