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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-06-06 16:15:56 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-06-06 16:15:56 -0700
commit10b1eb7d8ce5635a7deb273f8291d8a0a7681de1 (patch)
tree946b7d496a4e24db5120be376e075b52982fae83 /security
parentd75ae5bdf2353e5c6a1f83da5f6f2d31582f09a3 (diff)
parent890e2abe1028c39e5399101a2c277219cd637aaa (diff)
downloadlinux-10b1eb7d8ce5635a7deb273f8291d8a0a7681de1.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security system updates from James Morris: - incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux and Smack modules. From David Herrmann: "The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket. Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating process." - remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon). - remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho Andersen) * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes dh key: get rid of stack allocated array big key: get rid of stack array allocation smack: provide socketpair callback selinux: provide socketpair callback net: hook socketpair() into LSM security: add hook for socketpair() security: remove security_settime
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c11
-rw-r--r--security/keys/dh.c35
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c13
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c22
5 files changed, 64 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 933623784ccd..2806e70d7f8f 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/gcm.h>
struct big_key_buf {
unsigned int nr_pages;
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
* Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption
*/
static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)";
+#define BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE GCM_AES_IV_SIZE
/*
* Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption
@@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t dat
* an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
* key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
*/
- u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)];
+ u8 zero_nonce[BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE];
aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!aead_req)
@@ -425,6 +427,13 @@ static int __init big_key_init(void)
pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
+
+ if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE)) {
+ WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_aead;
+ }
+
ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index d1ea9f325f94..f7403821db7f 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
goto err;
if (zlen && h) {
- u8 tmpbuffer[h];
- size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
+ u8 tmpbuffer[32];
+ size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer));
memset(tmpbuffer, 0, chunk);
do {
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
goto err;
zlen -= chunk;
- chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h);
+ chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer));
} while (zlen);
}
@@ -183,24 +183,13 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
goto err;
}
- if (dlen < h) {
- u8 tmpbuffer[h];
-
- err = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmpbuffer);
- if (err)
- goto err;
- memcpy(dst, tmpbuffer, dlen);
- memzero_explicit(tmpbuffer, h);
- return 0;
- } else {
- err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
- if (err)
- goto err;
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst);
+ if (err)
+ goto err;
- dlen -= h;
- dst += h;
- counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1);
- }
+ dlen -= h;
+ dst += h;
+ counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1);
}
return 0;
@@ -216,14 +205,16 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc,
{
uint8_t *outbuf = NULL;
int ret;
+ size_t outbuf_len = round_up(buflen,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm));
- outbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!outbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
- ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen, lzero);
+ ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, outbuf_len, lzero);
if (ret)
goto err;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7bc2fde023a7..68f46d849abe 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1358,6 +1358,12 @@ int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
protocol, kern);
}
+int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
+
int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 99c4675952f7..7df0f2ee1e88 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4580,6 +4580,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
return err;
}
+static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+ struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+
+ sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
+ sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
permission check between the socket and the port number. */
@@ -7016,6 +7028,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0b414836bebd..dcb976f98df2 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2842,6 +2842,27 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
}
+/**
+ * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
+ * @socka: one socket
+ * @sockb: another socket
+ *
+ * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+ struct socket *sockb)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+
+ asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
+ bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
/**
* smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
@@ -4724,6 +4745,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
#endif