diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-06-06 16:15:56 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-06-06 16:15:56 -0700 |
commit | 10b1eb7d8ce5635a7deb273f8291d8a0a7681de1 (patch) | |
tree | 946b7d496a4e24db5120be376e075b52982fae83 /security | |
parent | d75ae5bdf2353e5c6a1f83da5f6f2d31582f09a3 (diff) | |
parent | 890e2abe1028c39e5399101a2c277219cd637aaa (diff) | |
download | linux-10b1eb7d8ce5635a7deb273f8291d8a0a7681de1.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security system updates from James Morris:
- incorporate new socketpair() hook into LSM and wire up the SELinux
and Smack modules. From David Herrmann:
"The idea is to allow SO_PEERSEC to be called on AF_UNIX sockets
created via socketpair(2), and return the same information as if
you emulated socketpair(2) via a temporary listener socket.
Right now SO_PEERSEC will return the unlabeled credentials for a
socketpair, rather than the actual credentials of the creating
process."
- remove the unused security_settime LSM hook (Sargun Dhillon).
- remove some stack allocated arrays from the keys code (Tycho
Andersen)
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array for zeroes
dh key: get rid of stack allocated array
big key: get rid of stack array allocation
smack: provide socketpair callback
selinux: provide socketpair callback
net: hook socketpair() into LSM
security: add hook for socketpair()
security: remove security_settime
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/big_key.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/dh.c | 35 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 22 |
5 files changed, 64 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 933623784ccd..2806e70d7f8f 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <keys/user-type.h> #include <keys/big_key-type.h> #include <crypto/aead.h> +#include <crypto/gcm.h> struct big_key_buf { unsigned int nr_pages; @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { * Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption */ static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)"; +#define BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE GCM_AES_IV_SIZE /* * Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption @@ -109,7 +111,7 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t dat * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption. */ - u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)]; + u8 zero_nonce[BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE]; aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL); if (!aead_req) @@ -425,6 +427,13 @@ static int __init big_key_init(void) pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret); return ret; } + + if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE)) { + WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free_aead; + } + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c index d1ea9f325f94..f7403821db7f 100644 --- a/security/keys/dh.c +++ b/security/keys/dh.c @@ -162,8 +162,8 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, goto err; if (zlen && h) { - u8 tmpbuffer[h]; - size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h); + u8 tmpbuffer[32]; + size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer)); memset(tmpbuffer, 0, chunk); do { @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, goto err; zlen -= chunk; - chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, h); + chunk = min_t(size_t, zlen, sizeof(tmpbuffer)); } while (zlen); } @@ -183,24 +183,13 @@ static int kdf_ctr(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, goto err; } - if (dlen < h) { - u8 tmpbuffer[h]; - - err = crypto_shash_final(desc, tmpbuffer); - if (err) - goto err; - memcpy(dst, tmpbuffer, dlen); - memzero_explicit(tmpbuffer, h); - return 0; - } else { - err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst); - if (err) - goto err; + err = crypto_shash_final(desc, dst); + if (err) + goto err; - dlen -= h; - dst += h; - counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1); - } + dlen -= h; + dst += h; + counter = cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(counter) + 1); } return 0; @@ -216,14 +205,16 @@ static int keyctl_dh_compute_kdf(struct kdf_sdesc *sdesc, { uint8_t *outbuf = NULL; int ret; + size_t outbuf_len = round_up(buflen, + crypto_shash_digestsize(sdesc->shash.tfm)); - outbuf = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + outbuf = kmalloc(outbuf_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!outbuf) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto err; } - ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, buflen, lzero); + ret = kdf_ctr(sdesc, kbuf, kbuflen, outbuf, outbuf_len, lzero); if (ret) goto err; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 7bc2fde023a7..68f46d849abe 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1358,6 +1358,12 @@ int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, protocol, kern); } +int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) +{ + return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); + int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 99c4675952f7..7df0f2ee1e88 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4580,6 +4580,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, return err; } +static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, + struct socket *sockb) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; + + sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; + sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid; + + return 0; +} + /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind permission check between the socket and the port number. */ @@ -7016,6 +7028,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 0b414836bebd..dcb976f98df2 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2842,6 +2842,27 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); } +/** + * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair + * @socka: one socket + * @sockb: another socket + * + * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC + * + * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise + */ +static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, + struct socket *sockb) +{ + struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security; + + asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out; + bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out; + + return 0; +} + #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING /** * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information. @@ -4724,6 +4745,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send), LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair), #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind), #endif |