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authorDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-10-22 13:36:53 +0100
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-10-22 13:39:14 +0100
commitf8ddadc4db6c7b7029b6d0e0d9af24f74ad27ca2 (patch)
tree0a6432aba336bae42313613f4c891bcfce02bd4e /security
parentbdd091bab8c631bd2801af838e344fad34566410 (diff)
parentb5ac3beb5a9f0ef0ea64cd85faf94c0dc4de0e42 (diff)
downloadlinux-f8ddadc4db6c7b7029b6d0e0d9af24f74ad27ca2.tar.bz2
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
There were quite a few overlapping sets of changes here. Daniel's bug fix for off-by-ones in the new BPF branch instructions, along with the added allowances for "data_end > ptr + x" forms collided with the metadata additions. Along with those three changes came veritifer test cases, which in their final form I tried to group together properly. If I had just trimmed GIT's conflict tags as-is, this would have split up the meta tests unnecessarily. In the socketmap code, a set of preemption disabling changes overlapped with the rename of bpf_compute_data_end() to bpf_compute_data_pointers(). Changes were made to the mv88e6060.c driver set addr method which got removed in net-next. The hyperv transport socket layer had a locking change in 'net' which overlapped with a change of socket state macro usage in 'net-next'. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c3
-rw-r--r--security/keys/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c9
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c41
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c9
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c14
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c31
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c4
15 files changed, 90 insertions, 54 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c25e0d27537f..fc46f5b85251 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -585,13 +585,14 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
kuid_t rootkuid;
- struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
if (!inode)
return -ENODATA;
+ fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 91eafada3164..6462e6654ccf 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ config BIG_KEYS
bool "Large payload keys"
depends on KEYS
depends on TMPFS
+ select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_AES
select CRYPTO_GCM
help
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index e607830b6154..929e14978c42 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
- if (key_is_instantiated(key) &&
+ if (key_is_positive(key) &&
(size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
vfs_truncate(path, 0);
}
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
seq_puts(m, key->description);
- if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+ if (key_is_positive(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
datalen,
datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 69855ba0d3b3..d92cbf9687c3 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -309,6 +309,13 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_k
down_read(&ukey->sem);
upayload = user_key_payload_locked(ukey);
+ if (!upayload) {
+ /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+ up_read(&ukey->sem);
+ key_put(ukey);
+ ukey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
+ goto error;
+ }
*master_key = upayload->data;
*master_keylen = upayload->datalen;
error:
@@ -847,7 +854,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret = 0;
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+ if (key_is_negative(key))
return -ENOKEY;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index 87cb260e4890..f01d48cb3de1 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -129,15 +129,15 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
while (!list_empty(keys)) {
struct key *key =
list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link);
+ short state = key->state;
+
list_del(&key->graveyard_link);
kdebug("- %u", key->serial);
key_check(key);
/* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) &&
- !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) &&
- key->type->destroy)
+ if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy)
key->type->destroy(key);
security_key_free(key);
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys)
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+ if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
key_user_put(key->user);
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index eb914a838840..83bf4b4afd49 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -402,6 +402,18 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve);
/*
+ * Change the key state to being instantiated.
+ */
+static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error)
+{
+ /* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus
+ * key_read_state().
+ */
+ smp_store_release(&key->state,
+ (reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE);
+}
+
+/*
* Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be
* called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's
* semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by
@@ -424,14 +436,14 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
/* can't instantiate twice */
- if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
+ if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
/* instantiate the key */
ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep);
if (ret == 0) {
/* mark the key as being instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
@@ -577,13 +589,10 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
/* can't instantiate twice */
- if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
+ if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
- key->reject_error = -error;
- smp_wmb();
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
- set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
now = current_kernel_time();
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -752,8 +761,8 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
ret = key->type->update(key, prep);
if (ret == 0)
- /* updating a negative key instantiates it */
- clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+ /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
up_write(&key->sem);
@@ -936,6 +945,16 @@ error:
*/
__key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit);
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) {
+ ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ key_ref_put(key_ref);
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto error_free_prep;
+ }
+ }
+
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep);
goto error_free_prep;
}
@@ -986,8 +1005,8 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
ret = key->type->update(key, &prep);
if (ret == 0)
- /* updating a negative key instantiates it */
- clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
+ /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */
+ mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
up_write(&key->sem);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 365ff85d7e27..76d22f726ae4 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -766,10 +766,9 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
- ret = -ENOKEY;
- goto error2;
- }
+ ret = key_read_state(key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */
/* see if we can read it directly */
ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
@@ -901,7 +900,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
+ if (key->state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 4fa82a8a9c0e..a7e51f793867 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m)
else
seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
- if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) {
+ if (key_is_positive(keyring)) {
if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0)
seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree);
else
@@ -553,7 +553,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
{
struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data;
const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
- unsigned long kflags = key->flags;
+ unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
+ short state = READ_ONCE(key->state);
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
@@ -565,6 +566,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
+ time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
+
if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
(1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
@@ -572,7 +575,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
goto skipped;
}
- if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
+ if (expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= expiry) {
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED))
ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED);
kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret);
@@ -597,9 +600,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
- if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
- smp_rmb();
- ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error);
+ if (state < 0) {
+ ctx->result = ERR_PTR(state);
kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
goto skipped;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 732cc0beffdf..a72b4dd70c8a 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);
*/
int key_validate(const struct key *key)
{
- unsigned long flags = key->flags;
+ unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
+ time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED))
return -ENOKEY;
@@ -99,9 +100,9 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key)
return -EKEYREVOKED;
/* check it hasn't expired */
- if (key->expiry) {
+ if (expiry) {
struct timespec now = current_kernel_time();
- if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry)
+ if (now.tv_sec >= expiry)
return -EKEYEXPIRED;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index de834309d100..6d1fcbba1e09 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -179,9 +179,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
struct timespec now;
+ time_t expiry;
unsigned long timo;
+ unsigned long flags;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
char xbuf[16];
+ short state;
int rc;
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
@@ -217,12 +220,13 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
rcu_read_lock();
/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
- if (key->expiry == 0) {
+ expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
+ if (expiry == 0) {
memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
- } else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
+ } else if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) {
memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
} else {
- timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
+ timo = expiry - now.tv_sec;
if (timo < 60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo);
@@ -236,18 +240,21 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7));
}
-#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \
- (test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')
+ state = key_read_state(key);
+#define showflag(FLAGS, LETTER, FLAG) \
+ ((FLAGS & (1 << FLAG)) ? LETTER : '-')
+
+ flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
key->serial,
- showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),
- showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
- showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
- showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
- showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
- showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
- showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
+ state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-',
+ showflag(flags, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
+ showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
+ showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
+ showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
+ state < 0 ? 'N' : '-',
+ showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
refcount_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
key->perm,
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 293d3598153b..740affd65ee9 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ try_again:
ret = -EIO;
if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
- !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+ key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED)
goto invalid_key;
/* check the permissions */
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 63e63a42db3c..e8036cd0ad54 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -595,10 +595,9 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
- smp_rmb();
- return key->reject_error;
- }
+ ret = key_read_state(key);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
return key_validate(key);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction);
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 6ebf1af8fce9..424e1d90412e 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
seq_puts(m, "key:");
seq_puts(m, key->description);
- if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+ if (key_is_positive(key))
seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index ddfaebf60fc8..bd85315cbfeb 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
char *datablob;
int ret = 0;
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+ if (key_is_negative(key))
return -ENOKEY;
p = key->payload.data[0];
if (!p->migratable)
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 3d8c68eba516..9f558bedba23 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
key->expiry = prep->expiry;
- if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags))
+ if (key_is_positive(key))
zap = dereference_key_locked(key);
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy);
void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
seq_puts(m, key->description);
- if (key_is_instantiated(key))
+ if (key_is_positive(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
}