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authorTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>2006-06-20 08:59:45 -0400
committerTrond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>2006-06-20 08:59:45 -0400
commitd59bf96cdde5b874a57bfd1425faa45da915d0b7 (patch)
tree351a40b72514d620e5bebea2de38c26f23277ffc /security
parent28df955a2ad484d602314b30183ea8496a9aa34a (diff)
parent25f42b6af09e34c3f92107b36b5aa6edc2fdba2f (diff)
downloadlinux-d59bf96cdde5b874a57bfd1425faa45da915d0b7.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'master' of /home/trondmy/kernel/linux-2.6/
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c12
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Kconfig29
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c22
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c246
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h26
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/flask.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c66
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c51
12 files changed, 341 insertions, 123 deletions
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 8ccccccc12ac..64f6da0f422e 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -810,6 +810,11 @@ static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
}
+static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
{
return 0;
@@ -819,6 +824,11 @@ static void dummy_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
}
+static int dummy_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
{
return 0;
@@ -1024,8 +1034,10 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index f636f53ca544..814ddc42f1f4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
config SECURITY_SELINUX
bool "NSA SELinux Support"
depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+ select NETWORK_SECMARK
default n
help
This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
@@ -95,3 +96,31 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
+ bool "NSA SELinux enable new secmark network controls by default"
+ depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+ default n
+ help
+ This option determines whether the new secmark-based network
+ controls will be enabled by default. If not, the old internal
+ per-packet controls will be enabled by default, preserving
+ old behavior.
+
+ If you enable the new controls, you will need updated
+ SELinux userspace libraries, tools and policy. Typically,
+ your distribution will provide these and enable the new controls
+ in the kernel they also distribute.
+
+ Note that this option can be overriden at boot with the
+ selinux_compat_net parameter, and after boot via
+ /selinux/compat_net. See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+ for details on this parameter.
+
+ If you enable the new network controls, you will likely
+ also require the SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, as
+ well as any conntrack helpers for protocols which you
+ wish to control.
+
+ If you are unsure what do do here, select N.
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index ae4c73eb3085..9d7737db5e51 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -72,3 +72,25 @@ void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
*sid = 0;
}
+int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
+{
+ if (selinux_enabled)
+ return security_context_to_sid(str, strlen(str), sid);
+ else {
+ *sid = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_string_to_sid);
+
+int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u32 sid)
+{
+ if (selinux_enabled) {
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_relabel_packet_permission);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 90b4cdc0c948..54adc9d31e92 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+extern int selinux_compat_net;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
int selinux_enforcing = 0;
@@ -696,6 +697,8 @@ static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protoc
return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
case PF_KEY:
return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+ case PF_APPLETALK:
+ return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
}
return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
@@ -3214,47 +3217,17 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad, u32 sock_sid, u16 sock_class,
+ u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
{
- u16 family;
- char *addrp;
- int len, err = 0;
+ int err = 0;
u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
- u32 sock_sid = 0;
- u16 sock_class = 0;
- struct socket *sock;
- struct net_device *dev;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
-
- family = sk->sk_family;
- if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
- goto out;
-
- /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
- if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
- family = PF_INET;
-
- read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- sock = sk->sk_socket;
- if (sock) {
- struct inode *inode;
- inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
- if (inode) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- isec = inode->i_security;
- sock_sid = isec->sid;
- sock_class = isec->sclass;
- }
- }
- read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- if (!sock_sid)
- goto out;
- dev = skb->dev;
- if (!dev)
+ if (!skb->dev)
goto out;
- err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+ err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
@@ -3277,44 +3250,88 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
break;
}
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
- ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
- ad.u.net.family = family;
-
- err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
if (err)
goto out;
- /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
if (err)
goto out;
- err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
if (err)
goto out;
if (recv_perm) {
u32 port_sid;
- /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
- sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
+ sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
&port_sid);
if (err)
goto out;
err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
- sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
+ sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
}
- if (!err)
- err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ u16 family;
+ u16 sock_class = 0;
+ char *addrp;
+ int len, err = 0;
+ u32 sock_sid = 0;
+ struct socket *sock;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ family = sk->sk_family;
+ if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ if (sock) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+ if (inode) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+ sock_sid = isec->sid;
+ sock_class = isec->sclass;
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ if (!sock_sid)
+ goto out;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+ err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (selinux_compat_net)
+ err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, sock_sid,
+ sock_class, family,
+ addrp, len);
+ else
+ err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
out:
return err;
}
@@ -3454,42 +3471,18 @@ out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
- struct sk_buff **pskb,
- const struct net_device *in,
- const struct net_device *out,
- int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
- u16 family)
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+ u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
{
- char *addrp;
- int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
+ int err;
u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
- struct sock *sk;
- struct socket *sock;
- struct inode *inode;
- struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- struct avc_audit_data ad;
- struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
- sk = skb->sk;
- if (!sk)
- goto out;
-
- sock = sk->sk_socket;
- if (!sock)
- goto out;
-
- inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
- if (!inode)
- goto out;
-
err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
if (err)
goto out;
- isec = inode->i_security;
-
switch (isec->sclass) {
case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
@@ -3509,55 +3502,88 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
break;
}
-
- AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
- ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
- ad.u.net.family = family;
-
- err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
- &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
- if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
- goto out;
-
- err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
- netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
- if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
+ if (err)
goto out;
- /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
- err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
- &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
- if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
+ if (err)
goto out;
- err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
- node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
- if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
+ if (err)
goto out;
if (send_perm) {
u32 port_sid;
- /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
sk->sk_type,
sk->sk_protocol,
- ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
- &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
- if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
+ &port_sid);
+ if (err)
goto out;
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
- send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+ send_perm, ad);
}
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+ struct sk_buff **pskb,
+ const struct net_device *in,
+ const struct net_device *out,
+ int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
+ u16 family)
+{
+ char *addrp;
+ int len, err = 0;
+ struct sock *sk;
+ struct socket *sock;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
- if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (!sk)
goto out;
- err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
+ sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ if (!sock)
+ goto out;
+
+ inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
+
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+ err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (selinux_compat_net)
+ err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, isec, &ad,
+ family, addrp, len);
+ else
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__SEND, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
out:
- return err;
+ return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
}
static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
@@ -4374,8 +4400,10 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
.xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
.xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
+ .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
.xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
.xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
+ .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
.xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
#endif
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index b0e6b12931c9..a68fdd55597f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+ S_(SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 591e98d9315a..70ee65a58817 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -239,3 +239,6 @@
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, "recvfrom")
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, "setcontext")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d7f02edf3930..1d9cf3d306bc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -933,3 +933,29 @@
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
+#define APPLETALK_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
+
+#define PACKET__SEND 0x00000001UL
+#define PACKET__RECV 0x00000002UL
+#define PACKET__RELABELTO 0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 77b2c5996f35..3aec75fee4f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -58,3 +58,5 @@
S_("nscd")
S_("association")
S_("netlink_kobject_uevent_socket")
+ S_("appletalk_socket")
+ S_("packet")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index eb9f50823f6e..a0eb9e281d18 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@
#define SECCLASS_NSCD 53
#define SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION 54
#define SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET 55
+#define SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET 56
+#define SECCLASS_PACKET 57
/*
* Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index c10f1fc41502..c96498a10eb8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@
int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
/*
@@ -49,7 +51,7 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return NF_ACCEPT;
+ return 0;
}
static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index a4efc966f065..2e73d3279f2d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -38,6 +38,14 @@
unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
+#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 0
+#else
+#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 1
+#endif
+
+int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE;
+
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
selinux_checkreqprot = simple_strtoul(str,NULL,0) ? 1 : 0;
@@ -45,6 +53,13 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+static int __init selinux_compat_net_setup(char *str)
+{
+ selinux_compat_net = simple_strtoul(str,NULL,0) ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux_compat_net=", selinux_compat_net_setup);
+
static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
@@ -85,6 +100,7 @@ enum sel_inos {
SEL_AVC, /* AVC management directory */
SEL_MEMBER, /* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
+ SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
};
#define TMPBUFLEN 12
@@ -364,6 +380,55 @@ static struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = {
.write = sel_write_checkreqprot,
};
+static ssize_t sel_read_compat_net(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_compat_net);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *page;
+ ssize_t length;
+ int new_value;
+
+ length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
+ if (length)
+ return length;
+
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (*ppos != 0) {
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ page = (char*)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ length = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+ goto out;
+
+ length = -EINVAL;
+ if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+ goto out;
+
+ selinux_compat_net = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+ length = count;
+out:
+ free_page((unsigned long) page);
+ return length;
+}
+static struct file_operations sel_compat_net_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_compat_net,
+ .write = sel_write_compat_net,
+};
+
/*
* Remaining nodes use transaction based IO methods like nfsd/nfsctl.c
*/
@@ -1219,6 +1284,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
[SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_COMPAT_NET] = {"compat_net", &sel_compat_net_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
/* last one */ {""}
};
ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index abe99d881376..6633fb059313 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -132,10 +132,7 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_us
goto out;
/*
- * Does the subject have permission to set security or permission to
- * do the relabel?
- * Must be permitted to relabel from default socket type (process type)
- * to specified context
+ * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
*/
rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
@@ -201,6 +198,23 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
}
/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (ctx)
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
* xfrm_state.
*/
@@ -292,6 +306,23 @@ u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
return SECSID_NULL;
}
+ /*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (ctx)
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+ SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets. If
* a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
@@ -356,18 +387,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
- goto accept;
+ goto out;
}
}
rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto drop;
-
-accept:
- return NF_ACCEPT;
-
-drop:
- return NF_DROP;
+out:
+ return rc;
}