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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-05-01 15:32:18 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-05-01 15:32:18 -0700
commite6f0bf09f0669b3c2cd77fa906830123279a0a21 (patch)
tree57aed6ff25d40e31f129b934403c7fac7a8cc8c8 /security
parent10a3efd0fee5e881b1866cf45950808575cb0f24 (diff)
parent781a5739489949fd0f32432a9da17f7ddbccf1cc (diff)
downloadlinux-e6f0bf09f0669b3c2cd77fa906830123279a0a21.tar.bz2
Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well. Also six trivial changes and bug fixes" * tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments. ima: Fix function name error in comment. ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key keys: cleanup build time module signing keys ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c4
5 files changed, 15 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 250fb0836156..3b06a01bd0fd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
} else {
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+ if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
+ load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
}
return err;
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 0ba01847e836..fca8a9409e4a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
static void init_once(void *foo)
{
- struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = (struct integrity_iint_cache *) foo;
memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b85d9e429426..906c1d8e0b71 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
}
/**
- * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * ima_file_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured
* @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND
*
@@ -606,6 +606,9 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
int must_appraise;
+ if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return;
+
must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
FILE_CHECK);
if (!must_appraise)
@@ -636,6 +639,9 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int must_appraise;
+ if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return;
+
must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
FILE_CHECK);
if (!must_appraise)
@@ -780,6 +786,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
+ break;
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 4f8cb155e4fd..fd5d46e511f1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ break;
default:
break;
}
@@ -836,6 +837,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
add_rules(default_measurement_rules,
ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules),
IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);
+ break;
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index e22e510ae92d..4e081e650047 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf)
}
}
- entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) :
- le32_to_cpu(*(hdr[HDR_PCR].data));
+ entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) :
+ le32_to_cpu(*(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data));
ret = ima_restore_measurement_entry(entry);
if (ret < 0)
break;