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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-13 19:58:36 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-08-13 19:58:36 -0700 |
commit | a66b4cd1e7163adb327838a3c81faaf6a9330d5a (patch) | |
tree | 2b123a010bb0f1566ff6f34e529f01ddf10ee308 /security | |
parent | b16528466786a540cb00148acb124e0149d62710 (diff) | |
parent | 5f336e722cc961be94d264d96b90c92888fffae1 (diff) | |
download | linux-a66b4cd1e7163adb327838a3c81faaf6a9330d5a.tar.bz2 |
Merge branch 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs open-related updates from Al Viro:
- "do we need fput() or put_filp()" rules are gone - it's always fput()
now. We keep track of that state where it belongs - in ->f_mode.
- int *opened mess killed - in finish_open(), in ->atomic_open()
instances and in fs/namei.c code around do_last()/lookup_open()/atomic_open().
- alloc_file() wrappers with saner calling conventions are introduced
(alloc_file_clone() and alloc_file_pseudo()); callers converted, with
much simplification.
- while we are at it, saner calling conventions for path_init() and
link_path_walk(), simplifying things inside fs/namei.c (both on
open-related paths and elsewhere).
* 'work.open3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (40 commits)
few more cleanups of link_path_walk() callers
allow link_path_walk() to take ERR_PTR()
make path_init() unconditionally paired with terminate_walk()
document alloc_file() changes
make alloc_file() static
do_shmat(): grab shp->shm_file earlier, switch to alloc_file_clone()
new helper: alloc_file_clone()
create_pipe_files(): switch the first allocation to alloc_file_pseudo()
anon_inode_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
hugetlb_file_setup(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
ocxlflash_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
cxl_getfile(): switch to alloc_file_pseudo()
... and switch shmem_file_setup() to alloc_file_pseudo()
__shmem_file_setup(): reorder allocations
new wrapper: alloc_file_pseudo()
kill FILE_{CREATED,OPENED}
switch atomic_open() and lookup_open() to returning 0 in all success cases
document ->atomic_open() changes
->atomic_open(): return 0 in all success cases
get rid of 'opened' in path_openat() and the helpers downstream
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 |
8 files changed, 22 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 74f17376202b..8b8b70620bbe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR); } -static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file) { struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file); struct aa_label *label; @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) return 0; } - label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); + label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(file->f_cred); if (!unconfined(label)) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 354bb5716ce3..e4c1a236976c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened); + int xattr_len); int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8bd7a0733e51..deec1804a00a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, - int xattr_len, int opened) + int xattr_len) { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, cause = iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ? "IMA-signature-required" : "missing-hash"; status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; - if (opened & FILE_CREATED) + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED) iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) || diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index dca44cf7838e..b286f37712d5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func, int opened) + enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { inode_lock(inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, - xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); + xattr_value, xattr_len); inode_unlock(inode); } if (action & IMA_AUDIT) @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, 0); + 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -364,13 +364,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, 0); + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, 0); + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } /** @@ -383,14 +383,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES. */ -int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask, int opened) +int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, opened); + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func, 0); + MAY_READ, func); } static int __init init_ima(void) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 68f46d849abe..5dce67070cdf 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -970,11 +970,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file) return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); } -int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +int security_file_open(struct file *file) { int ret; - ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred); + ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2b5ee5fbd652..18006be15713 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3862,7 +3862,7 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); } -static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; @@ -3886,7 +3886,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) * new inode label or new policy. * This check is not redundant - do not remove. */ - return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); + return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); } /* task security operations */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 19de675d4504..9ab8097dab7c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1927,9 +1927,9 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) * * Returns 0 */ -static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +static int smack_file_open(struct file *file) { - struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct task_smack *tsp = file->f_cred->security; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc; @@ -1937,7 +1937,7 @@ static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); - rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); + rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); return rc; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 213b8c593668..9f932e2d6852 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) +static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f) { int flags = f->f_flags; /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ |