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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2016-06-07 11:05:33 -0700
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2016-07-26 14:41:47 -0700
commitf5509cc18daa7f82bcc553be70df2117c8eedc16 (patch)
tree648605cc96e4ac412a9f5201468795574997d9bb /security
parent0f60a8efe4005ab5e65ce000724b04d4ca04a199 (diff)
downloadlinux-f5509cc18daa7f82bcc553be70df2117c8eedc16.tar.bz2
mm: Hardened usercopy
This is the start of porting PAX_USERCOPY into the mainline kernel. This is the first set of features, controlled by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. The work is based on code by PaX Team and Brad Spengler, and an earlier port from Casey Schaufler. Additional non-slab page tests are from Rik van Riel. This patch contains the logic for validating several conditions when performing copy_to_user() and copy_from_user() on the kernel object being copied to/from: - address range doesn't wrap around - address range isn't NULL or zero-allocated (with a non-zero copy size) - if on the slab allocator: - object size must be less than or equal to copy size (when check is implemented in the allocator, which appear in subsequent patches) - otherwise, object must not span page allocations (excepting Reserved and CMA ranges) - if on the stack - object must not extend before/after the current process stack - object must be contained by a valid stack frame (when there is arch/build support for identifying stack frames) - object must not overlap with kernel text Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig28
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 176758cdfa57..df28f2b6f3e1 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -118,6 +118,34 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
this low address space will need the permission specific to the
systems running LSM.
+config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+ bool
+ help
+ The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
+ validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
+ support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ bool
+ help
+ The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by
+ calling check_object_size() just before performing the
+ userspace copies in the low level implementation of
+ copy_to_user() and copy_from_user().
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
+ depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+ select BUG
+ help
+ This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+ copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+ copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
+ are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
+ separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
+ or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
+ of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
+
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
source security/tomoyo/Kconfig