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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-11-13 10:30:44 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-11-13 10:30:44 -0800
commit55b3a0cb5aeef0961ee18eac058e488f149a0053 (patch)
treeb8ac5161349f5e5dea8b2a29842fe43ee78f23a2 /security/smack
parentdee02770cdcd8bc06a48c917ce5df2fb56cf6059 (diff)
parent34d8751fd4ffa34e85ee7e85d34168b3f3f62b42 (diff)
downloadlinux-55b3a0cb5aeef0961ee18eac058e488f149a0053.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris: "TPM (from Jarkko): - essential clean up for tpm_crb so that ARM64 and x86 versions do not distract each other as much as before - /dev/tpm0 rejects now too short writes (shorter buffer than specified in the command header - use DMA-safe buffer in tpm_tis_spi - otherwise mostly minor fixes. Smack: - base support for overlafs Capabilities: - BPRM_FCAPS fixes, from Richard Guy Briggs: The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id. TOMOYO: - Y2038 timestamping fixes" * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits) MAINTAINERS: update the IMA, EVM, trusted-keys, encrypted-keys entries Smack: Base support for overlayfs MAINTAINERS: remove David Safford as maintainer for encrypted+trusted keys tomoyo: fix timestamping for y2038 capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root capabilities: invert logic for clarity capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic capabilities: move audit log decision to function capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root tpm, tpm_tis: use ARRAY_SIZE() to define TPM_HID_USR_IDX tpm: fix duplicate inline declaration specifier tpm: fix type of a local variables in tpm_tis_spi.c tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_map_command() tpm: fix type of a local variable in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl() tpm-dev-common: Reject too short writes ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack')
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c79
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 286171a16ed2..14cc7940b36d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4600,6 +4600,82 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
return 0;
}
+static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
+{
+
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+ if (new_creds == NULL) {
+ new_creds = prepare_creds();
+ if (new_creds == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tsp = new_creds->security;
+
+ /*
+ * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
+ */
+ isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+ skp = isp->smk_inode;
+ tsp->smk_task = skp;
+ *new = new_creds;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+ /*
+ * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct task_smack *otsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *ntsp = new->security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ int may;
+
+ /*
+ * Use the process credential unless all of
+ * the transmuting criteria are met
+ */
+ ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
+
+ /*
+ * the attribute of the containing directory
+ */
+ isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security;
+
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
+ isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
+ &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /*
+ * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
+ * providing access is transmuting use the containing
+ * directory label instead of the process label.
+ */
+ if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE))
+ ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4735,6 +4811,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
};