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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-11-01 21:06:18 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-11-01 21:06:18 -0700 |
commit | cdab10bf3285ee354e8f50254aa799631b7a95e0 (patch) | |
tree | e0b622a649d301346132b4e5ae91966856449fad /security/smack | |
parent | 6fedc28076bbbb32edb722e80f9406a3d1d668a8 (diff) | |
parent | 15bf32398ad488c0df1cbaf16431422c87e4feea (diff) | |
download | linux-cdab10bf3285ee354e8f50254aa799631b7a95e0.tar.bz2 |
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring.
As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we
were basically missing two things which we're adding here:
+ establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of
io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with
some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls)
+ additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of
the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides.
The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction
with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches
earlier in the year.
- Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials
are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code
comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand
the background and why this is the proper fix.
- Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing
improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make
use of securityfs, e.g. IMA.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()
selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()
binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid
binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks
binder: use euid from cred instead of using task
LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables
selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings
selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks
selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs
selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers
selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs
Smack: Brutalist io_uring support
selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls
lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring
io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface
fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure()
audit: add filtering for io_uring records
audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring
audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack')
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 46 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 0622e67c73e9..efd35b07c7f8 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4700,6 +4700,48 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING +/** + * smack_uring_override_creds - Is io_uring cred override allowed? + * @new: the target creds + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials + * to service an io_uring operation. + */ +static int smack_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred()); + struct task_smack *nsp = smack_cred(new); + + /* + * Allow the degenerate case where the new Smack value is + * the same as the current Smack value. + */ + if (tsp->smk_task == nsp->smk_task) + return 0; + + if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred())) + return 0; + + return -EPERM; +} + +/** + * smack_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created + * + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring + * kernel polling thread. + */ +static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void) +{ + if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, current_cred())) + return 0; + + return -EPERM; +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */ + struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *), @@ -4852,6 +4894,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as), +#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll), +#endif }; |