Revert "SELinux: use SECINITSID_NETMSG instead of SECINITSID_UNLABELED for NetLabel"

This reverts commit 9faf65fb6ee2b4e08325ba2d69e5ccf0c46453d0.

It bit people like Michal Piotrowski:

  "My system is too secure, I can not login :)"

because it changed how CONFIG_NETLABEL worked, and broke older SElinux
policies.

As a result, quoth James Morris:

  "Can you please revert this patch?

   We thought it only affected people running MLS, but it will affect others.

   Sorry for the hassle."

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Michal Piotrowski <michal.k.k.piotrowski@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 8192e8bc9f5a..e64eca246f1a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 base_sid, u32 *sid)
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
-		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr, base_sid, sid);
+		rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
+						    base_sid,
+						    sid);
 	else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -196,7 +198,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *sock)
 	if (netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr) == 0 &&
 	    secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE &&
 	    security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&secattr,
-					   SECINITSID_NETMSG,
+					   SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
 					   &nlbl_peer_sid) == 0)
 		sksec->peer_sid = nlbl_peer_sid;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -293,32 +295,38 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct avc_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	int rc;
-	u32 nlbl_sid;
-	u32 perm;
+	u32 netlbl_sid;
+	u32 recv_perm;
 
-	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, SECINITSID_NETMSG, &nlbl_sid);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
+					  SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+					  &netlbl_sid);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
-	if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
-		nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+	if (netlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return 0;
 
 	switch (sksec->sclass) {
 	case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
-		perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
 	case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
-		perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 		break;
 	default:
-		perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
+		recv_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid,
+			  netlbl_sid,
+			  sksec->sclass,
+			  recv_perm,
+			  ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
-		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
+	netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc);
 	return rc;
 }