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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2014-02-25 10:28:04 -0800
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2014-07-25 11:47:45 -0700
commit13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05 (patch)
treeee922f8fbd1dd96c0aee0fd6274d94271f55217c /security/security.c
parent7d8b6c63751cfbbe5eef81a48c22978b3407a3ad (diff)
downloadlinux-13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05.tar.bz2
security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c6
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 31614e9e96e5..35d37d0f0d49 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -845,6 +845,12 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
+int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ return security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_fw_from_file);
+
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);