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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-06-01 10:34:35 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-06-01 10:34:35 -0700
commit1193755ac6328ad240ba987e6ec41d5e8baf0680 (patch)
tree40bf847d7e3ebaa57b107151d14e6cd1d280cc6d /security/security.c
parent4edebed86690eb8db9af3ab85baf4a34e73266cc (diff)
parent0ef97dcfce4179a2eba046b855ee2f91d6f1b414 (diff)
downloadlinux-1193755ac6328ad240ba987e6ec41d5e8baf0680.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs changes from Al Viro. "A lot of misc stuff. The obvious groups: * Miklos' atomic_open series; kills the damn abuse of ->d_revalidate() by NFS, which was the major stumbling block for all work in that area. * ripping security_file_mmap() and dealing with deadlocks in the area; sanitizing the neighborhood of vm_mmap()/vm_munmap() in general. * ->encode_fh() switched to saner API; insane fake dentry in mm/cleancache.c gone. * assorted annotations in fs (endianness, __user) * parts of Artem's ->s_dirty work (jff2 and reiserfs parts) * ->update_time() work from Josef. * other bits and pieces all over the place. Normally it would've been in two or three pull requests, but signal.git stuff had eaten a lot of time during this cycle ;-/" Fix up trivial conflicts in Documentation/filesystems/vfs.txt (the 'truncate_range' inode method was removed by the VM changes, the VFS update adds an 'update_time()' method), and in fs/btrfs/ulist.[ch] (due to sparse fix added twice, with other changes nearby). * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (95 commits) nfs: don't open in ->d_revalidate vfs: retry last component if opening stale dentry vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): don't throw away file on error vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): inline __dentry_open() vfs: do_dentry_open(): don't put filp vfs: split __dentry_open() vfs: do_last() common post lookup vfs: do_last(): add audit_inode before open vfs: do_last(): only return EISDIR for O_CREAT vfs: do_last(): check LOOKUP_DIRECTORY vfs: do_last(): make ENOENT exit RCU safe vfs: make follow_link check RCU safe vfs: do_last(): use inode variable vfs: do_last(): inline walk_component() vfs: do_last(): make exit RCU safe vfs: split do_lookup() Btrfs: move over to use ->update_time fs: introduce inode operation ->update_time reiserfs: get rid of resierfs_sync_super reiserfs: mark the superblock as dirty a bit later ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c51
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5497a57fba01..3efc9b12aef4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -657,18 +660,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
}
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- int ret;
+ /*
+ * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+ * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
+ */
+ if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+ return prot;
+ if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+ return prot;
+ /*
+ * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+ */
+ if (!file)
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ /*
+ * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+ * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+ */
+ if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+ unsigned long caps = 0;
+ struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+ if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
+ caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
+ if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
+ return prot;
+#endif
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ }
+ /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+ return prot;
+}
- ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+ mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
}
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{