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| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2013-07-02 10:04:54 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2013-08-30 17:30:39 -0700 |
| commit | 160da84dbb39443fdade7151bc63a88f8e953077 (patch) | |
| tree | ddc0f7993f773a610b888a75b2a00a2520c053f9 /security/commoncap.c | |
| parent | dbef0c1c4c5f8ce5d1f5bd8cee092a7afb4ac21b (diff) | |
| download | linux-160da84dbb39443fdade7151bc63a88f8e953077.tar.bz2 | |
userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.
As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
permission in the user namespace.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index c44b6fe6648e..9fccf71b2b62 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) */ static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap) { - if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) + if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP)) return -EPERM; if (!cap_valid(cap)) return -EINVAL; |