diff options
author | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | 2016-06-22 18:01:08 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | 2016-07-12 08:43:10 -0700 |
commit | 58acf9d911c8831156634a44d0b022d683e1e50c (patch) | |
tree | df76653f50579f989c36eab7139919523f50d561 /security/apparmor/lsm.c | |
parent | 5f20fdfed16bc599a325a145bf0123a8e1c9beea (diff) | |
download | linux-58acf9d911c8831156634a44d0b022d683e1e50c.tar.bz2 |
apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy
from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters
can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement.
split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check,
and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/lsm.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 656b97c2e1ea..300f8336fb8e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -730,51 +730,49 @@ __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; - if (aa_g_lock_policy) - return -EACCES; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_set_bool(val, kp); } static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); } static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_set_uint(val, kp); } static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); } static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_view_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) @@ -786,7 +784,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) @@ -807,7 +805,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) @@ -819,7 +817,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!policy_admin_capable()) return -EPERM; if (!apparmor_enabled) |