diff options
| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2018-07-23 09:28:19 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-07-23 12:01:36 -0700 |
| commit | 3d4bf93ac12003f9b8e1e2de37fe27983deebdcf (patch) | |
| tree | f133ddfef1cad281067830449ce844e03cf15ba0 /net | |
| parent | f4a3313d8e2ca9fd8d8f45e40a2903ba782607e7 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3d4bf93ac12003f9b8e1e2de37fe27983deebdcf.tar.bz2 | |
tcp: detect malicious patterns in tcp_collapse_ofo_queue()
In case an attacker feeds tiny packets completely out of order,
tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() might scan the whole rb-tree, performing
expensive copies, but not changing socket memory usage at all.
1) Do not attempt to collapse tiny skbs.
2) Add logic to exit early when too many tiny skbs are detected.
We prefer not doing aggressive collapsing (which copies packets)
for pathological flows, and revert to tcp_prune_ofo_queue() which
will be less expensive.
In the future, we might add the possibility of terminating flows
that are proven to be malicious.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 53289911362a..78068b902e7b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4902,6 +4902,7 @@ end: static void tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + u32 range_truesize, sum_tiny = 0; struct sk_buff *skb, *head; u32 start, end; @@ -4913,6 +4914,7 @@ new_range: } start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; end = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq; + range_truesize = skb->truesize; for (head = skb;;) { skb = skb_rb_next(skb); @@ -4923,11 +4925,20 @@ new_range: if (!skb || after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end) || before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, start)) { - tcp_collapse(sk, NULL, &tp->out_of_order_queue, - head, skb, start, end); + /* Do not attempt collapsing tiny skbs */ + if (range_truesize != head->truesize || + end - start >= SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(SK_MEM_QUANTUM)) { + tcp_collapse(sk, NULL, &tp->out_of_order_queue, + head, skb, start, end); + } else { + sum_tiny += range_truesize; + if (sum_tiny > sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3) + return; + } goto new_range; } + range_truesize += skb->truesize; if (unlikely(before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, start))) start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; if (after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, end)) |