diff options
author | Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> | 2017-06-30 11:52:13 +0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-07-01 09:08:41 -0700 |
commit | 922dbc5be2186659d2c453a53f2ae569e55b6101 (patch) | |
tree | 5d86f92e1e86d0e3da98255617ecafc3db969d89 /net | |
parent | ae146d9b76589d636d11c5e4382bbba2fe8bdb9b (diff) | |
download | linux-922dbc5be2186659d2c453a53f2ae569e55b6101.tar.bz2 |
sctp: remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t, and replace
with struct sctp_chunkhdr in the places where it's using this
typedef.
It is also to fix some indents and use sizeof(variable) instead
of sizeof(type)., especially in sctp_new.
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_sctp.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 29 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/input.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/inqueue.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 67 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/ulpevent.c | 2 |
10 files changed, 84 insertions, 85 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c index 6f39af9fd6df..e31956b58aba 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c @@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ static int ip_vs_out_icmp_v6(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, struct sk_buff *skb, */ static inline int is_sctp_abort(const struct sk_buff *skb, int nh_len) { - sctp_chunkhdr_t *sch, schunk; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch, schunk; sch = skb_header_pointer(skb, nh_len + sizeof(struct sctphdr), sizeof(schunk), &schunk); if (sch == NULL) @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static inline bool is_new_conn(const struct sk_buff *skb, return th->syn; } case IPPROTO_SCTP: { - sctp_chunkhdr_t *sch, schunk; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch, schunk; sch = skb_header_pointer(skb, iph->len + sizeof(struct sctphdr), sizeof(schunk), &schunk); diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_sctp.c index 6b38cadab822..3ffad4adaddf 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_proto_sctp.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ sctp_conn_schedule(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, struct sk_buff *skb, struct ip_vs_iphdr *iph) { struct ip_vs_service *svc; - sctp_chunkhdr_t _schunkh, *sch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr _schunkh, *sch; struct sctphdr *sh, _sctph; __be16 _ports[2], *ports = NULL; @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static inline void set_sctp_state(struct ip_vs_proto_data *pd, struct ip_vs_conn *cp, int direction, const struct sk_buff *skb) { - sctp_chunkhdr_t _sctpch, *sch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr _sctpch, *sch; unsigned char chunk_type; int event, next_state; int ihl, cofs; @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ set_sctp_state(struct ip_vs_proto_data *pd, struct ip_vs_conn *cp, (sch->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ACK)) { int clen = ntohs(sch->length); - if (clen >= sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) { + if (clen >= sizeof(_sctpch)) { sch = skb_header_pointer(skb, cofs + ALIGN(clen, 4), sizeof(_sctpch), &_sctpch); if (sch && sch->type == SCTP_CID_ABORT) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c index db87af41c342..b841a8aeee7c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int do_basic_checks(struct nf_conn *ct, unsigned long *map) { u_int32_t offset, count; - sctp_chunkhdr_t _sch, *sch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch, *sch; int flag; flag = 0; @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ static int sctp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, sch->type == SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK) { sctp_inithdr_t _inithdr, *ih; - ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), + ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset + sizeof(_sch), sizeof(_inithdr), &_inithdr); if (ih == NULL) goto out_unlock; @@ -471,23 +471,20 @@ static bool sctp_new(struct nf_conn *ct, const struct sk_buff *skb, /* Copy the vtag into the state info */ if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_INIT) { - if (sh->vtag == 0) { - sctp_inithdr_t _inithdr, *ih; + sctp_inithdr_t _inithdr, *ih; + /* Sec 8.5.1 (A) */ + if (sh->vtag) + return false; - ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), - sizeof(_inithdr), &_inithdr); - if (ih == NULL) - return false; + ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset + sizeof(_sch), + sizeof(_inithdr), &_inithdr); + if (!ih) + return false; - pr_debug("Setting vtag %x for new conn\n", - ih->init_tag); + pr_debug("Setting vtag %x for new conn\n", + ih->init_tag); - ct->proto.sctp.vtag[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY] = - ih->init_tag; - } else { - /* Sec 8.5.1 (A) */ - return false; - } + ct->proto.sctp.vtag[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY] = ih->init_tag; } else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT) { pr_debug("Setting vtag %x for secondary conntrack\n", sh->vtag); diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c index 0f20ea4f511e..2d2fa1d53ea6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c @@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ match_packet(const struct sk_buff *skb, bool *hotdrop) { u_int32_t chunkmapcopy[256 / sizeof (u_int32_t)]; - const sctp_chunkhdr_t *sch; - sctp_chunkhdr_t _sch; + const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch; int chunk_match_type = info->chunk_match_type; const struct xt_sctp_flag_info *flag_info = info->flag_info; int flag_count = info->flag_count; diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index ba9ad32fc447..a9994c4afc18 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -663,19 +663,19 @@ out_unlock: */ static int sctp_rcv_ootb(struct sk_buff *skb) { - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch, _ch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch, _ch; int ch_end, offset = 0; /* Scan through all the chunks in the packet. */ do { /* Make sure we have at least the header there */ - if (offset + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) > skb->len) + if (offset + sizeof(_ch) > skb->len) break; ch = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(*ch), &_ch); /* Break out if chunk length is less then minimal. */ - if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) + if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(_ch)) break; ch_end = offset + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_init_lookup(struct net *net, */ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( struct net *net, - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch, + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch, const union sctp_addr *laddr, __be16 peer_port, struct sctp_transport **transportp) @@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_walk_lookup(struct net *net, struct sctp_transport **transportp) { struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch; int have_auth = 0; unsigned int chunk_num = 1; __u8 *ch_end; @@ -1152,10 +1152,10 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_walk_lookup(struct net *net, /* Walk through the chunks looking for AUTH or ASCONF chunks * to help us find the association. */ - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) skb->data; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)skb->data; do { /* Break out if chunk length is less then minimal. */ - if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) + if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*ch)) break; ch_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); @@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_walk_lookup(struct net *net, if (asoc) break; - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)ch_end; chunk_num++; } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb)); @@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_lookup_harder(struct net *net, const union sctp_addr *laddr, struct sctp_transport **transportp) { - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch; /* We do not allow GSO frames here as we need to linearize and * then cannot guarantee frame boundaries. This shouldn't be an @@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_lookup_harder(struct net *net, if ((skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_SCTP) == SKB_GSO_SCTP) return NULL; - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) skb->data; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)skb->data; /* The code below will attempt to walk the chunk and extract * parameter information. Before we do that, we need to verify diff --git a/net/sctp/inqueue.c b/net/sctp/inqueue.c index f731de3e8428..48392552ee7c 100644 --- a/net/sctp/inqueue.c +++ b/net/sctp/inqueue.c @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ void sctp_inq_push(struct sctp_inq *q, struct sctp_chunk *chunk) struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue) { struct sctp_chunk *chunk; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch = NULL; chunk = queue->in_progress; /* If there is no more chunks in this packet, say so */ @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue) chunk->pdiscard) return NULL; - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)chunk->chunk_end; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_end; return ch; } @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct sctp_chunkhdr *sctp_inq_peek(struct sctp_inq *queue) struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue) { struct sctp_chunk *chunk; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch = NULL; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch = NULL; /* The assumption is that we are safe to process the chunks * at this time. @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_inq_pop(struct sctp_inq *queue) chunk = queue->in_progress = NULL; } else { /* Nothing to do. Next chunk in the packet, please. */ - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_end; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_end; /* Force chunk->skb->data to chunk->chunk_end. */ skb_pull(chunk->skb, chunk->chunk_end - chunk->skb->data); /* We are guaranteed to pull a SCTP header. */ @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ next_chunk: new_skb: /* This is the first chunk in the packet. */ - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->skb->data; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->skb->data; chunk->singleton = 1; chunk->data_accepted = 0; chunk->pdiscard = 0; @@ -214,11 +214,10 @@ new_skb: chunk->chunk_hdr = ch; chunk->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)ch) + SCTP_PAD4(ntohs(ch->length)); - skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + skb_pull(chunk->skb, sizeof(*ch)); chunk->subh.v = NULL; /* Subheader is no longer valid. */ - if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) < - skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) { + if (chunk->chunk_end + sizeof(*ch) < skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) { /* This is not a singleton */ chunk->singleton = 0; } else if (chunk->chunk_end > skb_tail_pointer(chunk->skb)) { diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index 4b1967997c16..7d4c5a870f0e 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1379,20 +1379,20 @@ static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc, gfp_t gfp) { struct sctp_chunk *retval; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *chunk_hdr; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *chunk_hdr; struct sk_buff *skb; struct sock *sk; /* No need to allocate LL here, as this is only a chunk. */ - skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + paylen), gfp); + skb = alloc_skb(SCTP_PAD4(sizeof(*chunk_hdr) + paylen), gfp); if (!skb) goto nodata; /* Make room for the chunk header. */ - chunk_hdr = skb_put(skb, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*chunk_hdr)); chunk_hdr->type = type; chunk_hdr->flags = flags; - chunk_hdr->length = htons(sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + chunk_hdr->length = htons(sizeof(*chunk_hdr)); sk = asoc ? asoc->base.sk : NULL; retval = sctp_chunkify(skb, asoc, sk, gfp); @@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ static struct sctp_chunk *_sctp_make_chunk(const struct sctp_association *asoc, } retval->chunk_hdr = chunk_hdr; - retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); + retval->chunk_end = ((__u8 *)chunk_hdr) + sizeof(*chunk_hdr); /* Determine if the chunk needs to be authenticated */ if (sctp_auth_send_cid(type, asoc)) @@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( /* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including * any padding. */ - headersize = sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + + headersize = sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) + (sizeof(struct sctp_signed_cookie) - sizeof(struct sctp_cookie)); bodysize = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - headersize; @@ -3218,7 +3218,8 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc, int chunk_len; __u32 serial; - chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + chunk_len = ntohs(asconf->chunk_hdr->length) - + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf->skb->data; serial = ntohl(hdr->serial); @@ -3364,7 +3365,7 @@ static __be16 sctp_get_asconf_response(struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack, err_code = SCTP_ERROR_REQ_REFUSED; asconf_ack_len = ntohs(asconf_ack->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); /* Skip the addiphdr from the asconf_ack chunk and store a pointer to * the first asconf_ack parameter. diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c index dfe1fcb520ba..b255339f22a3 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c @@ -955,9 +955,10 @@ static void sctp_cmd_process_operr(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds, switch (err_hdr->cause) { case SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CHUNK: { - sctp_chunkhdr_t *unk_chunk_hdr; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *unk_chunk_hdr; - unk_chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)err_hdr->variable; + unk_chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *) + err_hdr->variable; switch (unk_chunk_hdr->type) { /* ADDIP 4.1 A9) If the peer responds to an ASCONF with * an ERROR chunk reporting that it did not recognized diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 8feff96a5bef..2b7c07f19b08 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_4_C(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_violation_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -368,9 +368,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (err_chunk) { packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg, (__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr), ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk); @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, len = 0; if (err_chunk) len = ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); repl = sctp_make_init_ack(new_asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, len); if (!repl) @@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, */ unk_param = (sctp_unrecognized_param_t *) ((__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); /* Replace the cause code with the "Unrecognized parameter" * parameter type. */ @@ -540,9 +540,9 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, if (err_chunk) { packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg, (__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr), ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk); @@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, * chunk header. More detailed verification is done * in sctp_unpack_cookie(). */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, chunk->subh.cookie_hdr = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data; if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) goto nomem; /* 5.1 D) Upon reception of the COOKIE ECHO chunk, Endpoint @@ -770,9 +770,10 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk; auth.asoc = chunk->asoc; auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr; - auth.chunk_hdr = skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk, - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); - skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + auth.chunk_hdr = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *) + skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk, + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); + skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); auth.transport = chunk->transport; ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth); @@ -886,7 +887,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net, /* Verify that the chunk length for the COOKIE-ACK is OK. * If we don't do this, any bundled chunks may be junked. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -1099,7 +1100,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_beat_8_3(struct net *net, */ chunk->subh.hb_hdr = (sctp_heartbeathdr_t *) chunk->skb->data; param_hdr = (sctp_paramhdr_t *) chunk->subh.hb_hdr; - paylen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + paylen = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); if (ntohs(param_hdr->length) > paylen) return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, @@ -1164,7 +1165,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* Make sure that the HEARTBEAT-ACK chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t) + + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) + sizeof(sctp_sender_hb_info_t))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -1469,9 +1470,9 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( if (err_chunk) { packet = sctp_abort_pkt_new(net, ep, asoc, arg, (__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t), + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr), ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); if (packet) { sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_PKT, @@ -1535,7 +1536,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( len = 0; if (err_chunk) { len = ntohs(err_chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr); } repl = sctp_make_init_ack(new_asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, len); @@ -1556,7 +1557,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( */ unk_param = (sctp_unrecognized_param_t *) ((__u8 *)(err_chunk->chunk_hdr) + - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); /* Replace the cause code with the "Unrecognized parameter" * parameter type. */ @@ -2044,7 +2045,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net, * enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is * done later. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2053,7 +2054,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net, */ chunk->subh.cookie_hdr = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data; if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) goto nomem; /* In RFC 2960 5.2.4 3, if both Verification Tags in the State Cookie @@ -2806,7 +2807,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *reply; /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -3358,7 +3359,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* 10.2 H) SHUTDOWN COMPLETE notification @@ -3435,7 +3436,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *ch; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *ch; sctp_errhdr_t *err; __u8 *ch_end; int ootb_shut_ack = 0; @@ -3443,10 +3444,10 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES); - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) chunk->chunk_hdr; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_hdr; do { /* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */ - if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)) + if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*ch)) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -3487,7 +3488,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net, } } - ch = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *) ch_end; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)ch_end; } while (ch_end < skb_tail_pointer(skb)); if (ootb_shut_ack) @@ -3560,7 +3561,7 @@ static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(struct net *net, /* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process * the reset of the packet. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent @@ -3591,7 +3592,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4256,7 +4257,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *unk_chunk = arg; struct sctp_chunk *err_chunk; - sctp_chunkhdr_t *hdr; + struct sctp_chunkhdr *hdr; pr_debug("%s: processing unknown chunk id:%d\n", __func__, type.chunk); @@ -4267,7 +4268,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk(struct net *net, * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(unk_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(unk_chunk, sizeof(*hdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4340,7 +4341,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_discard_chunk(struct net *net, * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4405,7 +4406,7 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net, struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t))) + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); diff --git a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c index 17854fb0e512..5f86c5062a98 100644 --- a/net/sctp/ulpevent.c +++ b/net/sctp/ulpevent.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ struct sctp_ulpevent *sctp_ulpevent_make_assoc_change( /* Trim the buffer to the right length. */ skb_trim(skb, sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_change) + ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) - - sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)); + sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr)); } else { event = sctp_ulpevent_new(sizeof(struct sctp_assoc_change), MSG_NOTIFICATION, gfp); |