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authorJohannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>2007-08-28 17:01:54 -0400
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>2007-10-10 16:48:51 -0700
commit8f20fc24986a083228823d9b68adca20714b254e (patch)
treeb5d7638b913649c7a181d6703ccd72e35ca06de9 /net
parent13262ffd4902805acad2618c12b41fcaa6c50791 (diff)
downloadlinux-8f20fc24986a083228823d9b68adca20714b254e.tar.bz2
[MAC80211]: embed key conf in key, fix driver interface
This patch embeds the struct ieee80211_key_conf into struct ieee80211_key and thus avoids allocations and having data present twice. This required some more changes: 1) The removal of the IEEE80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TX_KEY key flag. This flag isn't used by drivers nor should it be since we have a set_key_idx() callback. Maybe that callback needs to be extended to include the key conf, but only a driver that requires it will tell. 2) The removal of the IEEE80211_KEY_DEFAULT_WEP_ONLY key flag. This flag is global, so it shouldn't be passed in the key conf structure. Pass it to the function instead. Also, this patch removes the AID parameter to the set_key() callback because it is currently unused and the hardware currently cannot know about the AID anyway. I suspect this was used with some hardware that actually selected the AID itself, but that functionality was removed. Additionally, I've removed the ALG_NULL key algorithm since we have ALG_NONE. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c49
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211.c5
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h3
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211_iface.c3
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211_ioctl.c79
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211_key.h20
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/ieee80211_sta.c2
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/key.c28
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/rx.c22
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/sta_info.c17
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/tkip.c18
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/tx.c6
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wep.c18
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c61
14 files changed, 150 insertions, 181 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c b/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
index 077f907271cf..246938c32d4d 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/debugfs_key.c
@@ -14,17 +14,17 @@
#include "debugfs.h"
#include "debugfs_key.h"
-#define KEY_READ(name, buflen, format_string) \
+#define KEY_READ(name, prop, buflen, format_string) \
static ssize_t key_##name##_read(struct file *file, \
char __user *userbuf, \
size_t count, loff_t *ppos) \
{ \
char buf[buflen]; \
struct ieee80211_key *key = file->private_data; \
- int res = scnprintf(buf, buflen, format_string, key->name); \
+ int res = scnprintf(buf, buflen, format_string, key->prop); \
return simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, buf, res); \
}
-#define KEY_READ_D(name) KEY_READ(name, 20, "%d\n")
+#define KEY_READ_D(name) KEY_READ(name, name, 20, "%d\n")
#define KEY_OPS(name) \
static const struct file_operations key_ ##name## _ops = { \
@@ -36,10 +36,25 @@ static const struct file_operations key_ ##name## _ops = { \
KEY_READ_##format(name) \
KEY_OPS(name)
-KEY_FILE(keylen, D);
-KEY_FILE(force_sw_encrypt, D);
-KEY_FILE(keyidx, D);
-KEY_FILE(hw_key_idx, D);
+#define KEY_CONF_READ(name, buflen, format_string) \
+ KEY_READ(conf_##name, conf.name, buflen, format_string)
+#define KEY_CONF_READ_D(name) KEY_CONF_READ(name, 20, "%d\n")
+#define KEY_CONF_READ_X(name) KEY_CONF_READ(name, 20, "0x%x\n")
+
+#define KEY_CONF_OPS(name) \
+static const struct file_operations key_ ##name## _ops = { \
+ .read = key_conf_##name##_read, \
+ .open = mac80211_open_file_generic, \
+}
+
+#define KEY_CONF_FILE(name, format) \
+ KEY_CONF_READ_##format(name) \
+ KEY_CONF_OPS(name)
+
+KEY_CONF_FILE(keylen, D);
+KEY_CONF_FILE(keyidx, D);
+KEY_CONF_FILE(hw_key_idx, D);
+KEY_CONF_FILE(flags, X);
KEY_FILE(tx_rx_count, D);
static ssize_t key_algorithm_read(struct file *file,
@@ -49,7 +64,7 @@ static ssize_t key_algorithm_read(struct file *file,
char *alg;
struct ieee80211_key *key = file->private_data;
- switch (key->alg) {
+ switch (key->conf.alg) {
case ALG_WEP:
alg = "WEP\n";
break;
@@ -74,7 +89,7 @@ static ssize_t key_tx_spec_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
int len;
struct ieee80211_key *key = file->private_data;
- switch (key->alg) {
+ switch (key->conf.alg) {
case ALG_WEP:
len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "\n");
break;
@@ -103,7 +118,7 @@ static ssize_t key_rx_spec_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
int i, len;
const u8 *rpn;
- switch (key->alg) {
+ switch (key->conf.alg) {
case ALG_WEP:
len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "\n");
break;
@@ -139,7 +154,7 @@ static ssize_t key_replays_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
char buf[20];
int len;
- if (key->alg != ALG_CCMP)
+ if (key->conf.alg != ALG_CCMP)
return 0;
len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u\n", key->u.ccmp.replays);
return simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, buf, len);
@@ -150,12 +165,12 @@ static ssize_t key_key_read(struct file *file, char __user *userbuf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ieee80211_key *key = file->private_data;
- int i, res, bufsize = 2*key->keylen+2;
+ int i, res, bufsize = 2 * key->conf.keylen + 2;
char *buf = kmalloc(bufsize, GFP_KERNEL);
char *p = buf;
- for (i = 0; i < key->keylen; i++)
- p += scnprintf(p, bufsize+buf-p, "%02x", key->key[i]);
+ for (i = 0; i < key->conf.keylen; i++)
+ p += scnprintf(p, bufsize + buf - p, "%02x", key->conf.key[i]);
p += scnprintf(p, bufsize+buf-p, "\n");
res = simple_read_from_buffer(userbuf, count, ppos, buf, p - buf);
kfree(buf);
@@ -185,7 +200,7 @@ void ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(struct ieee80211_local *local,
return;
DEBUGFS_ADD(keylen);
- DEBUGFS_ADD(force_sw_encrypt);
+ DEBUGFS_ADD(flags);
DEBUGFS_ADD(keyidx);
DEBUGFS_ADD(hw_key_idx);
DEBUGFS_ADD(tx_rx_count);
@@ -205,7 +220,7 @@ void ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(struct ieee80211_key *key)
return;
DEBUGFS_DEL(keylen);
- DEBUGFS_DEL(force_sw_encrypt);
+ DEBUGFS_DEL(flags);
DEBUGFS_DEL(keyidx);
DEBUGFS_DEL(hw_key_idx);
DEBUGFS_DEL(tx_rx_count);
@@ -227,7 +242,7 @@ void ieee80211_debugfs_key_add_default(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
if (!sdata->debugfsdir)
return;
- sprintf(buf, "../keys/%d", sdata->default_key->keyidx);
+ sprintf(buf, "../keys/%d", sdata->default_key->conf.keyidx);
sdata->debugfs.default_key =
debugfs_create_symlink("default_key", sdata->debugfsdir, buf);
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211.c b/net/mac80211/ieee80211.c
index 50d7af3018ea..5d5034f36fde 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211.c
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ static void ieee80211_remove_tx_extra(struct ieee80211_local *local,
if (!key)
goto no_key;
- switch (key->alg) {
+ switch (key->conf.alg) {
case ALG_WEP:
iv_len = WEP_IV_LEN;
mic_len = WEP_ICV_LEN;
@@ -907,7 +907,8 @@ static void ieee80211_remove_tx_extra(struct ieee80211_local *local,
goto no_key;
}
- if (skb->len >= mic_len && key->force_sw_encrypt)
+ if (skb->len >= mic_len &&
+ (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT))
skb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len);
if (skb->len >= iv_len && skb->len > hdrlen) {
memmove(skb->data + iv_len, skb->data, hdrlen);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
index ef633a041dab..cc87e9d988f8 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_i.h
@@ -816,9 +816,6 @@ int ieee80211_subif_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev);
int ieee80211_mgmt_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev);
/* key handling */
-struct ieee80211_key_conf *
-ieee80211_key_data2conf(struct ieee80211_local *local,
- const struct ieee80211_key *data);
struct ieee80211_key *ieee80211_key_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
int idx, size_t key_len, gfp_t flags);
void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_iface.c b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_iface.c
index 61009176d51b..3e59afa23e4e 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_iface.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_iface.c
@@ -227,7 +227,8 @@ void ieee80211_if_reinit(struct net_device *dev)
memset(addr, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
if (local->ops->set_key)
local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local), DISABLE_KEY, addr,
- local->keys[i], 0);
+ local->keys[i],
+ local->default_wep_only);
#endif
ieee80211_key_free(sdata->keys[i]);
sdata->keys[i] = NULL;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_ioctl.c b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_ioctl.c
index 9964f057bcef..380670c7a0ca 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_ioctl.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_ioctl.c
@@ -31,29 +31,20 @@ static void ieee80211_set_hw_encryption(struct net_device *dev,
struct sta_info *sta, u8 addr[ETH_ALEN],
struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
- struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf = NULL;
struct ieee80211_local *local = wdev_priv(dev->ieee80211_ptr);
/* default to sw encryption; this will be cleared by low-level
* driver if the hw supports requested encryption */
if (key)
- key->force_sw_encrypt = 1;
+ key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT;
- if (key && local->ops->set_key &&
- (keyconf = ieee80211_key_data2conf(local, key))) {
+ if (key && local->ops->set_key) {
if (local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local), SET_KEY, addr,
- keyconf, sta ? sta->aid : 0)) {
- key->force_sw_encrypt = 1;
- key->hw_key_idx = HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID;
- } else {
- key->force_sw_encrypt =
- !!(keyconf->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT);
- key->hw_key_idx =
- keyconf->hw_key_idx;
-
+ &key->conf, local->default_wep_only)) {
+ key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT;
+ key->conf.hw_key_idx = HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID;
}
}
- kfree(keyconf);
}
@@ -66,7 +57,6 @@ static int ieee80211_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, u8 *sta_addr,
struct sta_info *sta;
struct ieee80211_key *key, *old_key;
int try_hwaccel = 1;
- struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
sdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev);
@@ -154,18 +144,16 @@ static int ieee80211_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, u8 *sta_addr,
}
if (alg == ALG_NONE) {
- keyconf = NULL;
if (try_hwaccel && key &&
- key->hw_key_idx != HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID &&
+ key->conf.hw_key_idx != HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID &&
local->ops->set_key &&
- (keyconf = ieee80211_key_data2conf(local, key)) != NULL &&
local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local), DISABLE_KEY,
- sta_addr, keyconf, sta ? sta->aid : 0)) {
+ sta_addr, &key->conf,
+ local->default_wep_only)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: set_encrypt - low-level disable"
" failed\n", dev->name);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
- kfree(keyconf);
if (set_tx_key || sdata->default_key == key) {
ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_default(sdata);
@@ -189,22 +177,20 @@ static int ieee80211_set_encryption(struct net_device *dev, u8 *sta_addr,
/* default to sw encryption; low-level driver sets these if the
* requested encryption is supported */
- key->hw_key_idx = HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID;
- key->force_sw_encrypt = 1;
+ key->conf.hw_key_idx = HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID;
+ key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT;
- key->alg = alg;
- key->keyidx = idx;
- key->keylen = key_len;
- memcpy(key->key, _key, key_len);
- if (set_tx_key)
- key->default_tx_key = 1;
+ key->conf.alg = alg;
+ key->conf.keyidx = idx;
+ key->conf.keylen = key_len;
+ memcpy(key->conf.key, _key, key_len);
if (alg == ALG_CCMP) {
/* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization
* so that it does not need to be initialized for every
* packet. */
key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
- key->key);
+ key->conf.key);
if (!key->u.ccmp.tfm) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free;
@@ -941,43 +927,38 @@ static int ieee80211_ioctl_giwretry(struct net_device *dev,
static void ieee80211_key_enable_hwaccel(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
- struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf;
u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
- if (!key || key->alg != ALG_WEP || !key->force_sw_encrypt ||
+ if (!key || key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP ||
+ !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT) ||
(local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP))
return;
memset(addr, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
- keyconf = ieee80211_key_data2conf(local, key);
- if (keyconf && local->ops->set_key &&
+
+ if (local->ops->set_key)
local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local),
- SET_KEY, addr, keyconf, 0) == 0) {
- key->force_sw_encrypt =
- !!(keyconf->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT);
- key->hw_key_idx = keyconf->hw_key_idx;
- }
- kfree(keyconf);
+ SET_KEY, addr, &key->conf,
+ local->default_wep_only);
}
static void ieee80211_key_disable_hwaccel(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct ieee80211_key *key)
{
- struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf;
u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
- if (!key || key->alg != ALG_WEP || key->force_sw_encrypt ||
+ if (!key || key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP ||
+ (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT) ||
(local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP))
return;
memset(addr, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
- keyconf = ieee80211_key_data2conf(local, key);
- if (keyconf && local->ops->set_key)
+ if (local->ops->set_key)
local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local), DISABLE_KEY,
- addr, keyconf, 0);
- kfree(keyconf);
- key->force_sw_encrypt = 1;
+ addr, &key->conf,
+ local->default_wep_only);
+ key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT;
}
@@ -1341,9 +1322,9 @@ static int ieee80211_ioctl_giwencode(struct net_device *dev,
return 0;
}
- memcpy(key, sdata->keys[idx]->key,
- min((int)erq->length, sdata->keys[idx]->keylen));
- erq->length = sdata->keys[idx]->keylen;
+ memcpy(key, sdata->keys[idx]->conf.key,
+ min((int)erq->length, sdata->keys[idx]->conf.keylen));
+ erq->length = sdata->keys[idx]->conf.keylen;
erq->flags |= IW_ENCODE_ENABLED;
return 0;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_key.h b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_key.h
index c33384912782..1b5e539c678f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_key.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_key.h
@@ -44,8 +44,6 @@
struct ieee80211_key {
struct kref kref;
- int hw_key_idx; /* filled and used by low-level driver */
- ieee80211_key_alg alg;
union {
struct {
/* last used TSC */
@@ -73,22 +71,16 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
u8 rx_crypto_buf[6 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
} ccmp;
} u;
- int tx_rx_count; /* number of times this key has been used */
- int keylen;
- /* if the low level driver can provide hardware acceleration it should
- * clear this flag */
- unsigned int force_sw_encrypt:1;
- unsigned int default_tx_key:1; /* This key is the new default TX key
- * (used only for broadcast keys). */
- s8 keyidx; /* WEP key index */
+ /* number of times this key has been used */
+ int tx_rx_count;
#ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUGFS
struct {
struct dentry *stalink;
struct dentry *dir;
struct dentry *keylen;
- struct dentry *force_sw_encrypt;
+ struct dentry *flags;
struct dentry *keyidx;
struct dentry *hw_key_idx;
struct dentry *tx_rx_count;
@@ -100,7 +92,11 @@ struct ieee80211_key {
} debugfs;
#endif
- u8 key[0];
+ /*
+ * key config, must be last because it contains key
+ * material as variable length member
+ */
+ struct ieee80211_key_conf conf;
};
#endif /* IEEE80211_KEY_H */
diff --git a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_sta.c b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_sta.c
index fe94ebfcb157..a2443271629a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/ieee80211_sta.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ieee80211_sta.c
@@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ static int ieee80211_sta_wep_configured(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev);
if (!sdata || !sdata->default_key ||
- sdata->default_key->alg != ALG_WEP)
+ sdata->default_key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP)
return 0;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/key.c b/net/mac80211/key.c
index b67558c24639..92d994f090b6 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/key.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/key.c
@@ -13,32 +13,6 @@
#include "debugfs_key.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
-struct ieee80211_key_conf *
-ieee80211_key_data2conf(struct ieee80211_local *local,
- const struct ieee80211_key *data)
-{
- struct ieee80211_key_conf *conf;
-
- conf = kmalloc(sizeof(*conf) + data->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!conf)
- return NULL;
-
- conf->hw_key_idx = data->hw_key_idx;
- conf->alg = data->alg;
- conf->keylen = data->keylen;
- conf->flags = 0;
- if (data->force_sw_encrypt)
- conf->flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT;
- conf->keyidx = data->keyidx;
- if (data->default_tx_key)
- conf->flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_DEFAULT_TX_KEY;
- if (local->default_wep_only)
- conf->flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_DEFAULT_WEP_ONLY;
- memcpy(conf->key, data->key, data->keylen);
-
- return conf;
-}
-
struct ieee80211_key *ieee80211_key_alloc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
int idx, size_t key_len, gfp_t flags)
{
@@ -56,7 +30,7 @@ static void ieee80211_key_release(struct kref *kref)
struct ieee80211_key *key;
key = container_of(kref, struct ieee80211_key, kref);
- if (key->alg == ALG_CCMP)
+ if (key->conf.alg == ALG_CCMP)
ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
kfree(key);
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index b52e3305a8f8..976b646a40de 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_load_key(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
* pairwise or station-to-station keys, but for WEP we allow
* using a key index as well.
*/
- if (rx->key && rx->key->alg != ALG_WEP &&
+ if (rx->key && rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP &&
!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1))
rx->key = NULL;
}
@@ -522,18 +522,15 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_wep_weak_iv_detection(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
{
if (!rx->sta || !(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) ||
(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA ||
- !rx->key || rx->key->alg != ALG_WEP ||
+ !rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP ||
!(rx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_RXRA_MATCH))
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
/* Check for weak IVs, if hwaccel did not remove IV from the frame */
if ((rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) ||
- rx->key->force_sw_encrypt) {
- u8 *iv = ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(rx->skb, rx->key);
- if (iv) {
+ (rx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT))
+ if (ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(rx->skb, rx->key))
rx->sta->wep_weak_iv_count++;
- }
- }
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -541,7 +538,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_wep_weak_iv_detection(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
static ieee80211_txrx_result
ieee80211_rx_h_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
{
- if ((rx->key && rx->key->alg != ALG_WEP) ||
+ if ((rx->key && rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP) ||
!(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) ||
((rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA &&
((rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_MGMT ||
@@ -556,7 +553,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
}
if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) ||
- rx->key->force_sw_encrypt) {
+ (rx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)) {
if (ieee80211_wep_decrypt(rx->local, rx->skb, rx->key)) {
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: RX WEP frame, decrypt "
@@ -680,7 +677,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
/* This is the first fragment of a new frame. */
entry = ieee80211_reassemble_add(rx->sdata, frag, seq,
rx->u.rx.queue, &(rx->skb));
- if (rx->key && rx->key->alg == ALG_CCMP &&
+ if (rx->key && rx->key->conf.alg == ALG_CCMP &&
(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED)) {
/* Store CCMP PN so that we can verify that the next
* fragment has a sequential PN value. */
@@ -707,7 +704,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
if (entry->ccmp) {
int i;
u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN], *rpn;
- if (!rx->key || rx->key->alg != ALG_CCMP)
+ if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_CCMP)
return TXRX_DROP;
memcpy(pn, entry->last_pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
for (i = CCMP_PN_LEN - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
@@ -900,7 +897,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_drop_unencrypted(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
* uploaded to the hardware.
*/
if ((rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_HIDES_WEP) &&
- (!rx->key || !rx->key->force_sw_encrypt))
+ (!rx->key ||
+ !(rx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)))
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
/* Drop unencrypted frames if key is set. */
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
index 34245b882c2b..7e10c692c4ad 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.c
@@ -228,23 +228,20 @@ void sta_info_free(struct sta_info *sta)
if (sta->key) {
if (local->ops->set_key) {
- struct ieee80211_key_conf *key;
- key = ieee80211_key_data2conf(local, sta->key);
- if (key) {
- local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local),
- DISABLE_KEY,
- sta->addr, key, sta->aid);
- kfree(key);
- }
+ local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local),
+ DISABLE_KEY, sta->addr,
+ &sta->key->conf,
+ local->default_wep_only);
}
} else if (sta->key_idx_compression != HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID) {
struct ieee80211_key_conf conf;
memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf));
conf.hw_key_idx = sta->key_idx_compression;
- conf.alg = ALG_NULL;
+ conf.alg = ALG_NONE;
conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT;
local->ops->set_key(local_to_hw(local), DISABLE_KEY,
- sta->addr, &conf, sta->aid);
+ sta->addr, &conf,
+ local->default_wep_only);
sta->key_idx_compression = HW_KEY_IDX_INVALID;
}
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tkip.c b/net/mac80211/tkip.c
index 41621720e560..b9c1d5405180 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tkip.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tkip.c
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ u8 * ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(u8 *pos, struct ieee80211_key *key,
*pos++ = iv0;
*pos++ = iv1;
*pos++ = iv2;
- *pos++ = (key->keyidx << 6) | (1 << 5) /* Ext IV */;
+ *pos++ = (key->conf.keyidx << 6) | (1 << 5) /* Ext IV */;
*pos++ = key->u.tkip.iv32 & 0xff;
*pos++ = (key->u.tkip.iv32 >> 8) & 0xff;
*pos++ = (key->u.tkip.iv32 >> 16) & 0xff;
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ u8 * ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(u8 *pos, struct ieee80211_key *key,
void ieee80211_tkip_gen_phase1key(struct ieee80211_key *key, u8 *ta,
u16 *phase1key)
{
- tkip_mixing_phase1(ta, &key->key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
+ tkip_mixing_phase1(ta, &key->conf.key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
key->u.tkip.iv32, phase1key);
}
@@ -204,12 +204,13 @@ void ieee80211_tkip_gen_rc4key(struct ieee80211_key *key, u8 *ta,
/* Calculate per-packet key */
if (key->u.tkip.iv16 == 0 || !key->u.tkip.tx_initialized) {
/* IV16 wrapped around - perform TKIP phase 1 */
- tkip_mixing_phase1(ta, &key->key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
+ tkip_mixing_phase1(ta, &key->conf.key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
key->u.tkip.iv32, key->u.tkip.p1k);
key->u.tkip.tx_initialized = 1;
}
- tkip_mixing_phase2(key->u.tkip.p1k, &key->key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
+ tkip_mixing_phase2(key->u.tkip.p1k,
+ &key->conf.key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
key->u.tkip.iv16, rc4key);
}
@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
if (!(keyid & (1 << 5)))
return TKIP_DECRYPT_NO_EXT_IV;
- if ((keyid >> 6) != key->keyidx)
+ if ((keyid >> 6) != key->conf.keyidx)
return TKIP_DECRYPT_INVALID_KEYIDX;
if (key->u.tkip.rx_initialized[queue] &&
@@ -293,7 +294,7 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
key->u.tkip.iv32_rx[queue] != iv32) {
key->u.tkip.rx_initialized[queue] = 1;
/* IV16 wrapped around - perform TKIP phase 1 */
- tkip_mixing_phase1(ta, &key->key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
+ tkip_mixing_phase1(ta, &key->conf.key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
iv32, key->u.tkip.p1k_rx[queue]);
#ifdef CONFIG_TKIP_DEBUG
{
@@ -302,7 +303,8 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
" TK=", MAC_ARG(ta));
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
printk("%02x ",
- key->key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY + i]);
+ key->conf.key[
+ ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY + i]);
printk("\n");
printk(KERN_DEBUG "TKIP decrypt: P1K=");
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
@@ -313,7 +315,7 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm,
}
tkip_mixing_phase2(key->u.tkip.p1k_rx[queue],
- &key->key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
+ &key->conf.key[ALG_TKIP_TEMP_ENCR_KEY],
iv16, rc4key);
#ifdef CONFIG_TKIP_DEBUG
{
diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c
index ddb104a70161..684f928def93 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c
@@ -539,11 +539,11 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_fragment(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- if (tx->key->force_sw_encrypt) {
+ if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT) {
if (ieee80211_wep_encrypt(tx->local, skb, tx->key))
return -1;
} else {
- tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->hw_key_idx;
+ tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx;
if (tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) {
if (ieee80211_wep_add_iv(tx->local, skb, tx->key) ==
NULL)
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control);
- if (!tx->key || tx->key->alg != ALG_WEP ||
+ if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP ||
((fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA &&
((fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_MGMT ||
(fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_STYPE) != IEEE80211_STYPE_AUTH)))
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wep.c b/net/mac80211/wep.c
index 1ad3d75281cc..0b19e89fcf6a 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wep.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wep.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void ieee80211_wep_get_iv(struct ieee80211_local *local,
struct ieee80211_key *key, u8 *iv)
{
local->wep_iv++;
- if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(local->wep_iv, key->keylen))
+ if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(local->wep_iv, key->conf.keylen))
local->wep_iv += 0x0100;
if (!iv)
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void ieee80211_wep_get_iv(struct ieee80211_local *local,
*iv++ = (local->wep_iv >> 16) & 0xff;
*iv++ = (local->wep_iv >> 8) & 0xff;
*iv++ = local->wep_iv & 0xff;
- *iv++ = key->keyidx << 6;
+ *iv++ = key->conf.keyidx << 6;
}
@@ -159,10 +159,10 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
u8 *rc4key, *iv;
size_t len;
- if (!key || key->alg != ALG_WEP)
+ if (!key || key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP)
return -1;
- klen = 3 + key->keylen;
+ klen = 3 + key->conf.keylen;
rc4key = kmalloc(klen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!rc4key)
return -1;
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
memcpy(rc4key, iv, 3);
/* Copy rest of the WEP key (the secret part) */
- memcpy(rc4key + 3, key->key, key->keylen);
+ memcpy(rc4key + 3, key->conf.key, key->conf.keylen);
/* Add room for ICV */
skb_put(skb, WEP_ICV_LEN);
@@ -251,10 +251,10 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
keyidx = skb->data[hdrlen + 3] >> 6;
- if (!key || keyidx != key->keyidx || key->alg != ALG_WEP)
+ if (!key || keyidx != key->conf.keyidx || key->conf.alg != ALG_WEP)
return -1;
- klen = 3 + key->keylen;
+ klen = 3 + key->conf.keylen;
rc4key = kmalloc(klen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!rc4key)
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb,
memcpy(rc4key, skb->data + hdrlen, 3);
/* Copy rest of the WEP key (the secret part) */
- memcpy(rc4key + 3, key->key, key->keylen);
+ memcpy(rc4key + 3, key->conf.key, key->conf.keylen);
if (ieee80211_wep_decrypt_data(local->wep_rx_tfm, rc4key, klen,
skb->data + hdrlen + WEP_IV_LEN,
@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ u8 * ieee80211_wep_is_weak_iv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ieee80211_key *key)
ivpos = skb->data + hdrlen;
iv = (ivpos[0] << 16) | (ivpos[1] << 8) | ivpos[2];
- if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->keylen))
+ if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(iv, key->conf.keylen))
return ivpos;
return NULL;
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index 1142b42b5fe9..4a2a9aa638b3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -82,14 +82,14 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
fc = tx->fc;
- if (!tx->key || tx->key->alg != ALG_TKIP || skb->len < 24 ||
+ if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP || skb->len < 24 ||
!WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc))
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
if (ieee80211_get_hdr_info(skb, &sa, &da, &qos_tid, &data, &data_len))
return TXRX_DROP;
- if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt &&
+ if (!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT) &&
!(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_FRAGMENTED) &&
!(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_TKIP_INCLUDE_MMIC) &&
!wpa_test) {
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
#else
authenticator = 1;
#endif
- key = &tx->key->key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY :
- ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY];
+ key = &tx->key->conf.key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY :
+ ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY];
mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
michael_mic(key, da, sa, qos_tid & 0x0f, data, data_len, mic);
@@ -141,12 +141,12 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
if (rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_DEVICE_STRIPS_MIC)
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
- if (!rx->key || rx->key->alg != ALG_TKIP ||
+ if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP ||
!(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc))
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
- !rx->key->force_sw_encrypt) {
+ !(rx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)) {
if (rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) {
if (skb->len < MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
return TXRX_DROP;
@@ -169,8 +169,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
#else
authenticator = 1;
#endif
- key = &rx->key->key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY :
- ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY];
+ key = &rx->key->conf.key[authenticator ? ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_RX_MIC_KEY :
+ ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY];
michael_mic(key, da, sa, qos_tid & 0x0f, data, data_len, mic);
if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0 || wpa_test) {
if (!(rx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_RXRA_MATCH))
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: invalid Michael MIC in data frame from "
MAC_FMT "\n", rx->dev->name, MAC_ARG(sa));
- mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->dev, rx->key->keyidx,
+ mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->dev, rx->key->conf.keyidx,
(void *) skb->data);
return TXRX_DROP;
}
@@ -205,7 +205,11 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx,
hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc);
len = skb->len - hdrlen;
- tailneed = !tx->key->force_sw_encrypt ? 0 : TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+ if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)
+ tailneed = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+ else
+ tailneed = 0;
+
if ((skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN ||
skb_tailroom(skb) < tailneed)) {
I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_expand_skb_head);
@@ -223,7 +227,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx,
if (key->u.tkip.iv16 == 0)
key->u.tkip.iv32++;
- if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt) {
+ if (!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)) {
u32 flags = tx->local->hw.flags;
hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
@@ -250,7 +254,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx,
~IEEE80211_TXCTL_TKIP_NEW_PHASE1_KEY;
}
- tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->hw_key_idx;
+ tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx;
return 0;
}
@@ -275,18 +279,18 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control);
- if (!key || key->alg != ALG_TKIP || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc))
+ if (!key || key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc))
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
tx->u.tx.control->icv_len = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
tx->u.tx.control->iv_len = TKIP_IV_LEN;
ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx);
- if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt &&
+ if (!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT) &&
!(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV) &&
!wpa_test) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for IV/ICV */
- tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->hw_key_idx;
+ tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx;
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -318,7 +322,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control);
hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc);
- if (!rx->key || rx->key->alg != ALG_TKIP ||
+ if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP ||
!(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) ||
(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA)
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
@@ -327,7 +331,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
return TXRX_DROP;
if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
- !rx->key->force_sw_encrypt) {
+ !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)) {
if (!(rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV)) {
/* Hardware takes care of all processing, including
* replay protection, so no need to continue here. */
@@ -471,7 +475,10 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx,
hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc);
len = skb->len - hdrlen;
- tailneed = !key->force_sw_encrypt ? 0 : CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+ if (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)
+ tailneed = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
+ else
+ tailneed = 0;
if ((skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN ||
skb_tailroom(skb) < tailneed)) {
@@ -495,11 +502,11 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx,
break;
}
- ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->keyidx);
+ ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
- if (!key->force_sw_encrypt) {
+ if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)) {
/* hwaccel - with preallocated room for CCMP header */
- tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = key->hw_key_idx;
+ tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = key->conf.hw_key_idx;
return 0;
}
@@ -523,18 +530,18 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx)
fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control);
- if (!key || key->alg != ALG_CCMP || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc))
+ if (!key || key->conf.alg != ALG_CCMP || !WLAN_FC_DATA_PRESENT(fc))
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
tx->u.tx.control->icv_len = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
tx->u.tx.control->iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN;
ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx);
- if (!tx->key->force_sw_encrypt &&
+ if (!(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT) &&
!(tx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV)) {
/* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP "
* header or MIC fields */
- tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->hw_key_idx;
+ tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx;
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
}
@@ -569,7 +576,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
fc = le16_to_cpu(hdr->frame_control);
hdrlen = ieee80211_get_hdrlen(fc);
- if (!key || key->alg != ALG_CCMP ||
+ if (!key || key->conf.alg != ALG_CCMP ||
!(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED) ||
(rx->fc & IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE) != IEEE80211_FTYPE_DATA)
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
@@ -579,7 +586,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
return TXRX_DROP;
if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
- !key->force_sw_encrypt &&
+ !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT) &&
!(rx->local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_WEP_INCLUDE_IV))
return TXRX_CONTINUE;
@@ -600,7 +607,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx)
}
if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) &&
- !key->force_sw_encrypt) {
+ !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FORCE_SW_ENCRYPT)) {
/* hwaccel has already decrypted frame and verified MIC */
} else {
u8 *scratch, *b_0, *aad;