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author | Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com> | 2021-06-01 10:08:01 +0800 |
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committer | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2021-05-31 22:45:15 -0700 |
commit | 0c2c366e0ec55533decb00d0f1ea1cbc42247e7b (patch) | |
tree | a749e48c83383082d8511b92a01d8a7f5ab8bff2 /net/sctp | |
parent | 379aecbce08f7187feab9aa12609d049ce2675b4 (diff) | |
download | linux-0c2c366e0ec55533decb00d0f1ea1cbc42247e7b.tar.bz2 |
sctp: sm_statefuns: Fix spelling mistakes
Fix some spelling mistakes in comments:
genereate ==> generate
correclty ==> correctly
boundries ==> boundaries
failes ==> fails
isses ==> issues
assocition ==> association
signe ==> sign
assocaition ==> association
managemement ==> management
restransmissions ==> retransmission
sideffect ==> sideeffect
bomming ==> booming
chukns ==> chunks
SHUDOWN ==> SHUTDOWN
violationg ==> violating
explcitly ==> explicitly
CHunk ==> Chunk
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210601020801.3625358-1-zhengyongjun3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sctp')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 30 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index fd1e319eda00..4f30388a0dd0 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, /* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back * and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being - * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close(). + * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user issues close(). * Since the socket and all its associations are going away, we * can treat this OOTB */ @@ -608,8 +608,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack(struct net *net, sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE, SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_COOKIE_ECHOED)); - /* SCTP-AUTH: genereate the assocition shared keys so that - * we can potentially signe the COOKIE-ECHO. + /* SCTP-AUTH: generate the association shared keys so that + * we can potentially sign the COOKIE-ECHO. */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_SHKEY, SCTP_NULL()); @@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, goto nomem_init; /* SCTP-AUTH: Now that we've populate required fields in - * sctp_process_init, set up the assocaition shared keys as + * sctp_process_init, set up the association shared keys as * necessary so that we can potentially authenticate the ACK */ error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, /* Add all the state machine commands now since we've created * everything. This way we don't introduce memory corruptions - * during side-effect processing and correclty count established + * during side-effect processing and correctly count established * associations. */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc)); @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca(struct net *net, commands); /* Reset init error count upon receipt of COOKIE-ACK, - * to avoid problems with the managemement of this + * to avoid problems with the management of this * counter in stale cookie situations when a transition back * from the COOKIE-ECHOED state to the COOKIE-WAIT * state is performed. @@ -2950,7 +2950,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( commands); /* Since we are not going to really process this INIT, there - * is no point in verifying chunk boundries. Just generate + * is no point in verifying chunk boundaries. Just generate * the SHUTDOWN ACK. */ reply = sctp_make_shutdown_ack(asoc, chunk); @@ -3560,7 +3560,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(struct net *net, goto nomem_chunk; /* Do all the commands now (after allocation), so that we - * have consistent state if memory allocation failes + * have consistent state if memory allocation fails */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP, SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev)); @@ -3747,7 +3747,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5( return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent - * potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks. + * potential boomming attacks from additional bundled chunks. * This is documented in SCTP Threats ID. */ return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -4257,7 +4257,7 @@ gen_shutdown: } /* - * SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chukns + * SCTP-AUTH Section 6.3 Receiving authenticated chunks * * The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in the HMAC * Identifier field. If this algorithm was not specified by the @@ -4812,7 +4812,7 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation_ctsn( /* Handle protocol violation of an invalid chunk bundling. For example, * when we have an association and we receive bundled INIT-ACK, or - * SHUDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violationg the "MUST NOT bundle" + * SHUTDOWN-COMPLETE, our peer is clearly violating the "MUST NOT bundle" * statement from the specs. Additionally, there might be an attacker * on the path and we may not want to continue this communication. */ @@ -5208,7 +5208,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_shutdown( * Inputs * (endpoint, asoc) * - * The RFC does not explcitly address this issue, but is the route through the + * The RFC does not explicitly address this issue, but is the route through the * state table when someone issues a shutdown while in COOKIE_ECHOED state. * * Outputs @@ -5932,7 +5932,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t1_cookie_timer_expire( /* RFC2960 9.2 If the timer expires, the endpoint must re-send the SHUTDOWN * with the updated last sequential TSN received from its peer. * - * An endpoint should limit the number of retransmissions of the + * An endpoint should limit the number of retransmission of the * SHUTDOWN chunk to the protocol parameter 'Association.Max.Retrans'. * If this threshold is exceeded the endpoint should destroy the TCB and * MUST report the peer endpoint unreachable to the upper layer (and @@ -6010,7 +6010,7 @@ nomem: } /* - * ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF CHunk Procedures + * ADDIP Section 4.1 ASCONF Chunk Procedures * If the T4 RTO timer expires the endpoint should do B1 to B5 */ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire( @@ -6441,7 +6441,7 @@ static int sctp_eat_data(const struct sctp_association *asoc, chunk->ecn_ce_done = 1; if (af->is_ce(sctp_gso_headskb(chunk->skb))) { - /* Do real work as sideffect. */ + /* Do real work as side effect. */ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ECN_CE, SCTP_U32(tsn)); } |