diff options
author | William Allen Simpson <william.allen.simpson@gmail.com> | 2009-12-02 18:23:05 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2009-12-02 22:07:26 -0800 |
commit | bd0388ae77075026d6a9f9eb6026dfd1d52ce0e9 (patch) | |
tree | b2262d2bf3f60e42f8c3573c89e6a47042b20122 /net/ipv4 | |
parent | e56fb50f2b7958b931c8a2fc0966061b3f3c8f3a (diff) | |
download | linux-bd0388ae77075026d6a9f9eb6026dfd1d52ce0e9.tar.bz2 |
TCPCT part 1f: Initiator Cookie => Responder
Calculate and format <SYN> TCP_COOKIE option.
This is a significantly revised implementation of an earlier (year-old)
patch that no longer applies cleanly, with permission of the original
author (Adam Langley):
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/102586
Requires:
TCPCT part 1c: sysctl_tcp_cookie_size, socket option TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS
TCPCT part 1d: define TCP cookie option, extend existing struct's
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 193 |
1 files changed, 163 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 307f318fe931..35dd983a8a99 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -365,15 +365,45 @@ static inline int tcp_urg_mode(const struct tcp_sock *tp) #define OPTION_TS (1 << 1) #define OPTION_MD5 (1 << 2) #define OPTION_WSCALE (1 << 3) +#define OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION (1 << 4) struct tcp_out_options { u8 options; /* bit field of OPTION_* */ u8 ws; /* window scale, 0 to disable */ u8 num_sack_blocks; /* number of SACK blocks to include */ + u8 hash_size; /* bytes in hash_location */ u16 mss; /* 0 to disable */ __u32 tsval, tsecr; /* need to include OPTION_TS */ + __u8 *hash_location; /* temporary pointer, overloaded */ }; +/* The sysctl int routines are generic, so check consistency here. + */ +static u8 tcp_cookie_size_check(u8 desired) +{ + if (desired > 0) { + /* previously specified */ + return desired; + } + if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size <= 0) { + /* no default specified */ + return 0; + } + if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size <= TCP_COOKIE_MIN) { + /* value too small, specify minimum */ + return TCP_COOKIE_MIN; + } + if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size >= TCP_COOKIE_MAX) { + /* value too large, specify maximum */ + return TCP_COOKIE_MAX; + } + if (0x1 & sysctl_tcp_cookie_size) { + /* 8-bit multiple, illegal, fix it */ + return (u8)(sysctl_tcp_cookie_size + 0x1); + } + return (u8)sysctl_tcp_cookie_size; +} + /* Write previously computed TCP options to the packet. * * Beware: Something in the Internet is very sensitive to the ordering of @@ -388,17 +418,34 @@ struct tcp_out_options { * (but it may well be that other scenarios fail similarly). */ static void tcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp, - const struct tcp_out_options *opts, - __u8 **md5_hash) { - if (unlikely(OPTION_MD5 & opts->options)) { - *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | - (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) | - (TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) | - TCPOLEN_MD5SIG); - *md5_hash = (__u8 *)ptr; + struct tcp_out_options *opts) +{ + u8 options = opts->options; /* mungable copy */ + + /* Having both authentication and cookies for security is redundant, + * and there's certainly not enough room. Instead, the cookie-less + * extension variant is proposed. + * + * Consider the pessimal case with authentication. The options + * could look like: + * COOKIE|MD5(20) + MSS(4) + SACK|TS(12) + WSCALE(4) == 40 + */ + if (unlikely(OPTION_MD5 & options)) { + if (unlikely(OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION & options)) { + *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_COOKIE << 24) | + (TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE << 16) | + (TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) | + TCPOLEN_MD5SIG); + } else { + *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | + (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) | + (TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) | + TCPOLEN_MD5SIG); + } + options &= ~OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION; + /* overload cookie hash location */ + opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)ptr; ptr += 4; - } else { - *md5_hash = NULL; } if (unlikely(opts->mss)) { @@ -407,12 +454,13 @@ static void tcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp, opts->mss); } - if (likely(OPTION_TS & opts->options)) { - if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & opts->options)) { + if (likely(OPTION_TS & options)) { + if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & options)) { *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_SACK_PERM << 24) | (TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM << 16) | (TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) | TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP); + options &= ~OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE; } else { *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) | @@ -423,15 +471,52 @@ static void tcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp, *ptr++ = htonl(opts->tsecr); } - if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & opts->options && - !(OPTION_TS & opts->options))) { + /* Specification requires after timestamp, so do it now. + * + * Consider the pessimal case without authentication. The options + * could look like: + * MSS(4) + SACK|TS(12) + COOKIE(20) + WSCALE(4) == 40 + */ + if (unlikely(OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION & options)) { + __u8 *cookie_copy = opts->hash_location; + u8 cookie_size = opts->hash_size; + + /* 8-bit multiple handled in tcp_cookie_size_check() above, + * and elsewhere. + */ + if (0x2 & cookie_size) { + __u8 *p = (__u8 *)ptr; + + /* 16-bit multiple */ + *p++ = TCPOPT_COOKIE; + *p++ = TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE + cookie_size; + *p++ = *cookie_copy++; + *p++ = *cookie_copy++; + ptr++; + cookie_size -= 2; + } else { + /* 32-bit multiple */ + *ptr++ = htonl(((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | + (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) | + (TCPOPT_COOKIE << 8) | + TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE) + + cookie_size); + } + + if (cookie_size > 0) { + memcpy(ptr, cookie_copy, cookie_size); + ptr += (cookie_size / 4); + } + } + + if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & options)) { *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) | (TCPOPT_SACK_PERM << 8) | TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM); } - if (unlikely(OPTION_WSCALE & opts->options)) { + if (unlikely(OPTION_WSCALE & options)) { *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_WINDOW << 16) | (TCPOLEN_WINDOW << 8) | @@ -466,14 +551,18 @@ static unsigned tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_out_options *opts, struct tcp_md5sig_key **md5) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); - unsigned size = 0; + struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values; struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk); + unsigned remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE; + u8 cookie_size = (!tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never && cvp != NULL) ? + tcp_cookie_size_check(cvp->cookie_desired) : + 0; #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG *md5 = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk); if (*md5) { opts->options |= OPTION_MD5; - size += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; + remaining -= TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED; } #else *md5 = NULL; @@ -489,7 +578,7 @@ static unsigned tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, * SACKs don't matter, we never delay an ACK when we have any of those * going out. */ opts->mss = tcp_advertise_mss(sk); - size += TCPOLEN_MSS_ALIGNED; + remaining -= TCPOLEN_MSS_ALIGNED; if (likely(sysctl_tcp_timestamps && !dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_NO_TSTAMP) && @@ -497,22 +586,68 @@ static unsigned tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, opts->options |= OPTION_TS; opts->tsval = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when; opts->tsecr = tp->rx_opt.ts_recent; - size += TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; + remaining -= TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED; } if (likely(sysctl_tcp_window_scaling && !dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_NO_WSCALE))) { opts->ws = tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale; opts->options |= OPTION_WSCALE; - size += TCPOLEN_WSCALE_ALIGNED; + remaining -= TCPOLEN_WSCALE_ALIGNED; } if (likely(sysctl_tcp_sack && !dst_feature(dst, RTAX_FEATURE_NO_SACK))) { opts->options |= OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE; if (unlikely(!(OPTION_TS & opts->options))) - size += TCPOLEN_SACKPERM_ALIGNED; + remaining -= TCPOLEN_SACKPERM_ALIGNED; } - return size; + /* Note that timestamps are required by the specification. + * + * Odd numbers of bytes are prohibited by the specification, ensuring + * that the cookie is 16-bit aligned, and the resulting cookie pair is + * 32-bit aligned. + */ + if (*md5 == NULL && + (OPTION_TS & opts->options) && + cookie_size > 0) { + int need = TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE + cookie_size; + + if (0x2 & need) { + /* 32-bit multiple */ + need += 2; /* NOPs */ + + if (need > remaining) { + /* try shrinking cookie to fit */ + cookie_size -= 2; + need -= 4; + } + } + while (need > remaining && TCP_COOKIE_MIN <= cookie_size) { + cookie_size -= 4; + need -= 4; + } + if (TCP_COOKIE_MIN <= cookie_size) { + opts->options |= OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION; + opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)&cvp->cookie_pair[0]; + opts->hash_size = cookie_size; + + /* Remember for future incarnations. */ + cvp->cookie_desired = cookie_size; + + if (cvp->cookie_desired != cvp->cookie_pair_size) { + /* Currently use random bytes as a nonce, + * assuming these are completely unpredictable + * by hostile users of the same system. + */ + get_random_bytes(&cvp->cookie_pair[0], + cookie_size); + cvp->cookie_pair_size = cookie_size; + } + + remaining -= need; + } + } + return MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE - remaining; } /* Set up TCP options for SYN-ACKs. */ @@ -627,7 +762,6 @@ static int tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int clone_it, struct tcp_out_options opts; unsigned tcp_options_size, tcp_header_size; struct tcp_md5sig_key *md5; - __u8 *md5_hash_location; struct tcphdr *th; int err; @@ -698,7 +832,7 @@ static int tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int clone_it, } } - tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts, &md5_hash_location); + tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts); if (likely((tcb->flags & TCPCB_FLAG_SYN) == 0)) TCP_ECN_send(sk, skb, tcp_header_size); @@ -706,7 +840,7 @@ static int tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int clone_it, /* Calculate the MD5 hash, as we have all we need now */ if (md5) { sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK; - tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(md5_hash_location, + tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location, md5, sk, NULL, skb); } #endif @@ -2230,14 +2364,13 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, struct request_sock *req, struct request_values *rvp) { + struct tcp_out_options opts; struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct tcphdr *th; - int tcp_header_size; - struct tcp_out_options opts; struct sk_buff *skb; struct tcp_md5sig_key *md5; - __u8 *md5_hash_location; + int tcp_header_size; int mss; skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, MAX_TCP_HEADER + 15, 1, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -2298,14 +2431,14 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, /* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is never scaled. */ th->window = htons(min(req->rcv_wnd, 65535U)); - tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts, &md5_hash_location); + tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts); th->doff = (tcp_header_size >> 2); TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS); #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG /* Okay, we have all we need - do the md5 hash if needed */ if (md5) { - tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(md5_hash_location, + tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location, md5, NULL, req, skb); } #endif |