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author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2014-11-06 22:01:18 -0500 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2014-11-06 22:01:18 -0500 |
commit | 4e84b496fd2a226883920e0e0de4ed3f94898adf (patch) | |
tree | 662e314870fabf5d6e3bf25b955bd537eb72de54 /net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | |
parent | 5c91ae08e4500ebc8efd584c8b87c4040d5393ea (diff) | |
parent | 9d01412ae76fec5274a3d94a28a3552a742a60dc (diff) | |
download | linux-4e84b496fd2a226883920e0e0de4ed3f94898adf.tar.bz2 |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_input.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 60 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 196b4388116c..5f979c7f5135 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -2316,6 +2316,35 @@ static inline bool tcp_packet_delayed(const struct tcp_sock *tp) /* Undo procedures. */ +/* We can clear retrans_stamp when there are no retransmissions in the + * window. It would seem that it is trivially available for us in + * tp->retrans_out, however, that kind of assumptions doesn't consider + * what will happen if errors occur when sending retransmission for the + * second time. ...It could the that such segment has only + * TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS set at the present time. It seems that checking + * the head skb is enough except for some reneging corner cases that + * are not worth the effort. + * + * Main reason for all this complexity is the fact that connection dying + * time now depends on the validity of the retrans_stamp, in particular, + * that successive retransmissions of a segment must not advance + * retrans_stamp under any conditions. + */ +static bool tcp_any_retrans_done(const struct sock *sk) +{ + const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct sk_buff *skb; + + if (tp->retrans_out) + return true; + + skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk); + if (unlikely(skb && TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS)) + return true; + + return false; +} + #if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 1 static void DBGUNDO(struct sock *sk, const char *msg) { @@ -2411,6 +2440,8 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk) * is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false * fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */ tcp_moderate_cwnd(tp); + if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk)) + tp->retrans_stamp = 0; return true; } tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open); @@ -2431,35 +2462,6 @@ static bool tcp_try_undo_dsack(struct sock *sk) return false; } -/* We can clear retrans_stamp when there are no retransmissions in the - * window. It would seem that it is trivially available for us in - * tp->retrans_out, however, that kind of assumptions doesn't consider - * what will happen if errors occur when sending retransmission for the - * second time. ...It could the that such segment has only - * TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS set at the present time. It seems that checking - * the head skb is enough except for some reneging corner cases that - * are not worth the effort. - * - * Main reason for all this complexity is the fact that connection dying - * time now depends on the validity of the retrans_stamp, in particular, - * that successive retransmissions of a segment must not advance - * retrans_stamp under any conditions. - */ -static bool tcp_any_retrans_done(const struct sock *sk) -{ - const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); - struct sk_buff *skb; - - if (tp->retrans_out) - return true; - - skb = tcp_write_queue_head(sk); - if (unlikely(skb && TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS)) - return true; - - return false; -} - /* Undo during loss recovery after partial ACK or using F-RTO. */ static bool tcp_try_undo_loss(struct sock *sk, bool frto_undo) { |