net-timestamp: no-payload only sysctl

Tx timestamps are looped onto the error queue on top of an skb. This
mechanism leaks packet headers to processes unless the no-payload
options SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY is set.

Add a sysctl that optionally drops looped timestamp with data. This
only affects processes without CAP_NET_RAW.

The policy is checked when timestamps are generated in the stack.
It is possible for timestamps with data to be reported after the
sysctl is set, if these were queued internally earlier.

No vulnerability is immediately known that exploits knowledge
gleaned from packet headers, but it may still be preferable to allow
administrators to lock down this path at the cost of possible
breakage of legacy applications.

Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>

----

Changes
  (v1 -> v2)
  - test socket CAP_NET_RAW instead of capable(CAP_NET_RAW)
  (rfc -> v1)
  - document the sysctl in Documentation/sysctl/net.txt
  - fix access control race: read .._OPT_TSONLY only once,
        use same value for permission check and skb generation.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

3 files changed, 32 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 65a3798f43e6..a5bff2767f15 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <trace/events/skb.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 
 struct kmem_cache *skbuff_head_cache __read_mostly;
 static struct kmem_cache *skbuff_fclone_cache __read_mostly;
@@ -3690,11 +3692,28 @@ static void __skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 }
 
+static bool skb_may_tx_timestamp(struct sock *sk, bool tsonly)
+{
+	bool ret;
+
+	if (likely(sysctl_tstamp_allow_data || tsonly))
+		return true;
+
+	read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+	ret = sk->sk_socket && sk->sk_socket->file &&
+	      file_ns_capable(sk->sk_socket->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW);
+	read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 void skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			       struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *hwtstamps)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
 
+	if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, false))
+		return;
+
 	/* take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket */
 	sock_hold(sk);
 
@@ -3712,7 +3731,7 @@ void __skb_tstamp_tx(struct sk_buff *orig_skb,
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	bool tsonly = sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY;
 
-	if (!sk)
+	if (!sk || !skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, tsonly))
 		return;
 
 	if (tsonly)
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index 1c7a33db1314..93c8b20c91e4 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ __u32 sysctl_rmem_default __read_mostly = SK_RMEM_MAX;
 int sysctl_optmem_max __read_mostly = sizeof(unsigned long)*(2*UIO_MAXIOV+512);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_optmem_max);
 
+int sysctl_tstamp_allow_data __read_mostly = 1;
+
 struct static_key memalloc_socks = STATIC_KEY_INIT_FALSE;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(memalloc_socks);
 
@@ -840,6 +842,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		}
+
 		if (val & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID &&
 		    !(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID)) {
 			if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) {
diff --git a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
index 31baba2a71ce..fde21d19e61b 100644
--- a/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
+++ b/net/core/sysctl_net_core.c
@@ -321,6 +321,15 @@ static struct ctl_table net_core_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec
 	},
+	{
+		.procname	= "tstamp_allow_data",
+		.data		= &sysctl_tstamp_allow_data,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= &zero,
+		.extra2		= &one
+	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_RPS
 	{
 		.procname	= "rps_sock_flow_entries",