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author | Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> | 2016-10-14 16:07:23 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2016-10-16 11:02:31 +0200 |
commit | 9f7d416c36124667c406978bcb39746589c35d7f (patch) | |
tree | deffa5f8fa1a9133518757118a5d5bfd326feca2 /mm | |
parent | 9254139ad083433c50ba62920107ed55fc4ca5e2 (diff) | |
download | linux-9f7d416c36124667c406978bcb39746589c35d7f.tar.bz2 |
kprobes: Unpoison stack in jprobe_return() for KASAN
I observed false KSAN positives in the sctp code, when
sctp uses jprobe_return() in jsctp_sf_eat_sack().
The stray 0xf4 in shadow memory are stack redzones:
[ ] ==================================================================
[ ] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0xe9/0x150 at addr ffff88005e48f480
[ ] Read of size 1 by task syz-executor/18535
[ ] page:ffffea00017923c0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0
[ ] flags: 0x1fffc0000000000()
[ ] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ ] CPU: 1 PID: 18535 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #28
[ ] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
[ ] ffff88005e48f2d0 ffffffff82d2b849 ffffffff0bc91e90 fffffbfff10971e8
[ ] ffffed000bc91e90 ffffed000bc91e90 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
[ ] ffff88005e48f480 ffff88005e48f350 ffffffff817d3169 ffff88005e48f370
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] [<ffffffff82d2b849>] dump_stack+0x12e/0x185
[ ] [<ffffffff817d3169>] kasan_report+0x489/0x4b0
[ ] [<ffffffff817d31a9>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20
[ ] [<ffffffff82d49529>] memcmp+0xe9/0x150
[ ] [<ffffffff82df7486>] depot_save_stack+0x176/0x5c0
[ ] [<ffffffff817d2031>] save_stack+0xb1/0xd0
[ ] [<ffffffff817d27f2>] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ ] [<ffffffff817d05b8>] kfree+0xc8/0x2a0
[ ] [<ffffffff85b03f19>] skb_free_head+0x79/0xb0
[ ] [<ffffffff85b0900a>] skb_release_data+0x37a/0x420
[ ] [<ffffffff85b090ff>] skb_release_all+0x4f/0x60
[ ] [<ffffffff85b11348>] consume_skb+0x138/0x370
[ ] [<ffffffff8676ad7b>] sctp_chunk_put+0xcb/0x180
[ ] [<ffffffff8676ae88>] sctp_chunk_free+0x58/0x70
[ ] [<ffffffff8677fa5f>] sctp_inq_pop+0x68f/0xef0
[ ] [<ffffffff8675ee36>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd6/0x4b0
[ ] [<ffffffff8677f2c1>] sctp_inq_push+0x131/0x190
[ ] [<ffffffff867bad69>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0xe9/0xa20
[ ... ]
[ ] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ ] ffff88005e48f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ ] ffff88005e48f400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ ] >ffff88005e48f480: f4 f4 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ ] ^
[ ] ffff88005e48f500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ ] ffff88005e48f580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ ] ==================================================================
KASAN stack instrumentation poisons stack redzones on function entry
and unpoisons them on function exit. If a function exits abnormally
(e.g. with a longjmp like jprobe_return()), stack redzones are left
poisoned. Later this leads to random KASAN false reports.
Unpoison stack redzones in the frames we are going to jump over
before doing actual longjmp in jprobe_return().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: surovegin@google.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1476454043-101898-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/kasan.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.c b/mm/kasan/kasan.c index 88af13c00d3c..70c009741aab 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.c +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.c @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> #include "kasan.h" #include "../slab.h" @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ void kasan_unpoison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size) } } -static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, void *sp) +static void __kasan_unpoison_stack(struct task_struct *task, const void *sp) { void *base = task_stack_page(task); size_t size = sp - base; @@ -77,9 +78,24 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task) } /* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */ -asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_remaining_stack(void *sp) +asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark) { - __kasan_unpoison_stack(current, sp); + __kasan_unpoison_stack(current, watermark); +} + +/* + * Clear all poison for the region between the current SP and a provided + * watermark value, as is sometimes required prior to hand-crafted asm function + * returns in the middle of functions. + */ +void kasan_unpoison_stack_above_sp_to(const void *watermark) +{ + const void *sp = __builtin_frame_address(0); + size_t size = watermark - sp; + + if (WARN_ON(sp > watermark)) + return; + kasan_unpoison_shadow(sp, size); } /* |