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authorDavid Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>2017-06-10 22:50:28 -0400
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2018-01-15 12:07:47 -0800
commit8eb8284b412906181357c2b0110d879d5af95e52 (patch)
treefb1480a162d7999fbc739dc84ee3c44afc5f7b10 /mm/slub.c
parent4229a470175be14e1d2648713be8a5e8e8fbea02 (diff)
downloadlinux-8eb8284b412906181357c2b0110d879d5af95e52.tar.bz2
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting
This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/slub.c')
-rw-r--r--mm/slub.c11
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index bcd22332300a..f40a57164dd6 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -4183,7 +4183,7 @@ void __init kmem_cache_init(void)
kmem_cache = &boot_kmem_cache;
create_boot_cache(kmem_cache_node, "kmem_cache_node",
- sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node), SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN);
+ sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node), SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN, 0, 0);
register_hotmemory_notifier(&slab_memory_callback_nb);
@@ -4193,7 +4193,7 @@ void __init kmem_cache_init(void)
create_boot_cache(kmem_cache, "kmem_cache",
offsetof(struct kmem_cache, node) +
nr_node_ids * sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node *),
- SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN);
+ SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN, 0, 0);
kmem_cache = bootstrap(&boot_kmem_cache);
@@ -5063,6 +5063,12 @@ static ssize_t cache_dma_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
SLAB_ATTR_RO(cache_dma);
#endif
+static ssize_t usersize_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "%zu\n", s->usersize);
+}
+SLAB_ATTR_RO(usersize);
+
static ssize_t destroy_by_rcu_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !!(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU));
@@ -5437,6 +5443,7 @@ static struct attribute *slab_attrs[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_FAILSLAB
&failslab_attr.attr,
#endif
+ &usersize_attr.attr,
NULL
};