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authorPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2017-01-18 02:53:44 -0800
committerPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2017-04-18 11:42:36 -0700
commit5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac (patch)
treeb7ba2116923723e193dfe7c633ec10056c6b1b53 /mm/slab.c
parent4495c08e84729385774601b5146d51d9e5849f81 (diff)
downloadlinux-5f0d5a3ae7cff0d7fa943c199c3a2e44f23e1fac.tar.bz2
mm: Rename SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated during an RCU read-side critical section. Of course, that is not the case. Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire slab of blocks. However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety". This commit therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> [ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find the new one. ] Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/slab.c')
-rw-r--r--mm/slab.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index 807d86c76908..93c827864862 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -1728,7 +1728,7 @@ static void slab_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct page *page)
freelist = page->freelist;
slab_destroy_debugcheck(cachep, page);
- if (unlikely(cachep->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
+ if (unlikely(cachep->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
call_rcu(&page->rcu_head, kmem_rcu_free);
else
kmem_freepages(cachep, page);
@@ -1924,7 +1924,7 @@ static bool set_objfreelist_slab_cache(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
cachep->num = 0;
- if (cachep->ctor || flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU)
+ if (cachep->ctor || flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)
return false;
left = calculate_slab_order(cachep, size,
@@ -2030,7 +2030,7 @@ __kmem_cache_create (struct kmem_cache *cachep, unsigned long flags)
if (size < 4096 || fls(size - 1) == fls(size-1 + REDZONE_ALIGN +
2 * sizeof(unsigned long long)))
flags |= SLAB_RED_ZONE | SLAB_STORE_USER;
- if (!(flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
+ if (!(flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
flags |= SLAB_POISON;
#endif
#endif