Merge branch 'linus' into locking/core, to resolve conflicts

Conflicts:
	kernel/locking/lockdep.c

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

3 files changed, 31 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index ecb9e75614bf..8bfd1aca7a3d 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1400,6 +1400,21 @@ config RCU_EQS_DEBUG
 
 endmenu # "RCU Debugging"
 
+config DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU
+	bool "Force round-robin CPU selection for unbound work items"
+	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
+	default n
+	help
+	  Workqueue used to implicitly guarantee that work items queued
+	  without explicit CPU specified are put on the local CPU.  This
+	  guarantee is no longer true and while local CPU is still
+	  preferred work items may be put on foreign CPUs.  Kernel
+	  parameter "workqueue.debug_force_rr_cpu" is added to force
+	  round-robin CPU selection to flush out usages which depend on the
+	  now broken guarantee.  This config option enables the debug
+	  feature by default.  When enabled, memory and cache locality will
+	  be impacted.
+
 config DEBUG_BLOCK_EXT_DEVT
         bool "Force extended block device numbers and spread them"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
index 49518fb48cab..e07c1ba9ba13 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.ubsan
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ config UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
 	  This option activates instrumentation for the entire kernel.
 	  If you don't enable this option, you have to explicitly specify
 	  UBSAN_SANITIZE := y for the files/directories you want to check for UB.
+	  Enabling this option will get kernel image size increased
+	  significantly.
 
 config UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
 	bool "Enable checking of pointers alignment"
@@ -25,5 +27,5 @@ config UBSAN_ALIGNMENT
 	default y if !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
 	help
 	  This option enables detection of unaligned memory accesses.
-	  Enabling this option on architectures that support unalligned
+	  Enabling this option on architectures that support unaligned
 	  accesses may produce a lot of false positives.
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 48ff9c36644d..f44e178e6ede 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1590,22 +1590,23 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
 			return buf;
 		}
 	case 'K':
-		/*
-		 * %pK cannot be used in IRQ context because its test
-		 * for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
-		 */
-		if (kptr_restrict && (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() ||
-				      in_nmi())) {
-			if (spec.field_width == -1)
-				spec.field_width = default_width;
-			return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
-		}
-
 		switch (kptr_restrict) {
 		case 0:
 			/* Always print %pK values */
 			break;
 		case 1: {
+			const struct cred *cred;
+
+			/*
+			 * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+			 * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+			 */
+			if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
+				if (spec.field_width == -1)
+					spec.field_width = default_width;
+				return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+			}
+
 			/*
 			 * Only print the real pointer value if the current
 			 * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
@@ -1615,8 +1616,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
 			 * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
 			 * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
 			 */
-			const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-
+			cred = current_cred();
 			if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
 			    !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
 			    !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))