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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-04-24 19:17:30 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-04-24 19:17:30 -0700
commitab51cac00ef2859f20a73d33a53f3a8987b65e11 (patch)
tree0965ed2cb75c77c252333cdb667537c44274353a /kernel
parent5ef58e29078261ef5195c7fee74768546b863182 (diff)
parent167ff131cb3dffccab8bb4d65a8d72e7c5ffc398 (diff)
downloadlinux-ab51cac00ef2859f20a73d33a53f3a8987b65e11.tar.bz2
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller: 1) Fix memory leak in netfilter flowtable, from Roi Dayan. 2) Ref-count leaks in netrom and tipc, from Xiyu Yang. 3) Fix warning when mptcp socket is never accepted before close, from Florian Westphal. 4) Missed locking in ovs_ct_exit(), from Tonghao Zhang. 5) Fix large delays during PTP synchornization in cxgb4, from Rahul Lakkireddy. 6) team_mode_get() can hang, from Taehee Yoo. 7) Need to use kvzalloc() when allocating fw tracer in mlx5 driver, from Niklas Schnelle. 8) Fix handling of bpf XADD on BTF memory, from Jann Horn. 9) Fix BPF_STX/BPF_B encoding in x86 bpf jit, from Luke Nelson. 10) Missing queue memory release in iwlwifi pcie code, from Johannes Berg. 11) Fix NULL deref in macvlan device event, from Taehee Yoo. 12) Initialize lan87xx phy correctly, from Yuiko Oshino. 13) Fix looping between VRF and XFRM lookups, from David Ahern. 14) etf packet scheduler assumes all sockets are full sockets, which is not necessarily true. From Eric Dumazet. 15) Fix mptcp data_fin handling in RX path, from Paolo Abeni. 16) fib_select_default() needs to handle nexthop objects, from David Ahern. 17) Use GFP_ATOMIC under spinlock in mac80211_hwsim, from Wei Yongjun. 18) vxlan and geneve use wrong nlattr array, from Sabrina Dubroca. 19) Correct rx/tx stats in bcmgenet driver, from Doug Berger. 20) BPF_LDX zero-extension is encoded improperly in x86_32 bpf jit, fix from Luke Nelson. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (100 commits) selftests/bpf: Fix a couple of broken test_btf cases tools/runqslower: Ensure own vmlinux.h is picked up first bpf: Make bpf_link_fops static bpftool: Respect the -d option in struct_ops cmd selftests/bpf: Add test for freplace program with expected_attach_type bpf: Propagate expected_attach_type when verifying freplace programs bpf: Fix leak in LINK_UPDATE and enforce empty old_prog_fd bpf, x86_32: Fix logic error in BPF_LDX zero-extension bpf, x86_32: Fix clobbering of dst for BPF_JSET bpf, x86_32: Fix incorrect encoding in BPF_LDX zero-extension bpf: Fix reStructuredText markup net: systemport: suppress warnings on failed Rx SKB allocations net: bcmgenet: suppress warnings on failed Rx SKB allocations macsec: avoid to set wrong mtu mac80211: sta_info: Add lockdep condition for RCU list usage mac80211: populate debugfs only after cfg80211 init net: bcmgenet: correct per TX/RX ring statistics net: meth: remove spurious copyright text net: phy: bcm84881: clear settings on link down chcr: Fix CPU hard lockup ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/cpumap.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/syscall.c13
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c38
3 files changed, 39 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
index 70f71b154fa5..3fe0b006d2d2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static int cpu_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *value,
return -EOVERFLOW;
/* Make sure CPU is a valid possible cpu */
- if (!cpu_possible(key_cpu))
+ if (key_cpu >= nr_cpumask_bits || !cpu_possible(key_cpu))
return -ENODEV;
if (qsize == 0) {
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index d85f37239540..7626b8024471 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -2283,7 +2283,7 @@ static void bpf_link_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
}
#endif
-const struct file_operations bpf_link_fops = {
+static const struct file_operations bpf_link_fops = {
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
.show_fdinfo = bpf_link_show_fdinfo,
#endif
@@ -3628,8 +3628,10 @@ static int link_update(union bpf_attr *attr)
return PTR_ERR(link);
new_prog = bpf_prog_get(attr->link_update.new_prog_fd);
- if (IS_ERR(new_prog))
- return PTR_ERR(new_prog);
+ if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(new_prog);
+ goto out_put_link;
+ }
if (flags & BPF_F_REPLACE) {
old_prog = bpf_prog_get(attr->link_update.old_prog_fd);
@@ -3638,6 +3640,9 @@ static int link_update(union bpf_attr *attr)
old_prog = NULL;
goto out_put_progs;
}
+ } else if (attr->link_update.old_prog_fd) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_put_progs;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
@@ -3653,6 +3658,8 @@ out_put_progs:
bpf_prog_put(old_prog);
if (ret)
bpf_prog_put(new_prog);
+out_put_link:
+ bpf_link_put(link);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 38cfcf701eeb..fa1d8245b925 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -2118,6 +2118,15 @@ static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
}
+static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+{
+ if (allow_ptr_leaks)
+ return false;
+
+ return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
+}
+
static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
@@ -2308,6 +2317,16 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
* which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
*/
state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ } else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
+ /* If value_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
+ * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
+ * (e.g. for XADD).
+ * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
+ * with spilled pointers.
+ */
+ verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n",
+ off);
+ return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
} else {
@@ -2673,15 +2692,6 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
return -EACCES;
}
-static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
- const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
-{
- if (allow_ptr_leaks)
- return false;
-
- return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
-}
-
static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
{
return cur_regs(env) + regno;
@@ -3089,7 +3099,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- if (atype == BPF_READ) {
+ if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
if (ret == SCALAR_VALUE) {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
return 0;
@@ -10487,6 +10497,7 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -EINVAL;
}
env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type];
+ prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
}
if (!tgt_prog->jited) {
verbose(env, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n");
@@ -10831,6 +10842,13 @@ err_release_maps:
* them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them.
*/
release_maps(env);
+
+ /* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets
+ for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning
+ */
+ if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
+ env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0;
+
*prog = env->prog;
err_unlock:
if (!is_priv)