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authorAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2017-12-18 20:12:00 -0800
committerDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>2017-12-21 02:15:41 +0100
commitbb7f0f989ca7de1153bd128a40a71709e339fa03 (patch)
tree1667911dc70762b44fac20651cd8e23b73c257cf /kernel
parent179d1c5602997fef5a940c6ddcf31212cbfebd14 (diff)
downloadlinux-bb7f0f989ca7de1153bd128a40a71709e339fa03.tar.bz2
bpf: fix integer overflows
There were various issues related to the limited size of integers used in the verifier: - `off + size` overflow in __check_map_access() - `off + reg->off` overflow in check_mem_access() - `off + reg->var_off.value` overflow or 32-bit truncation of `reg->var_off.value` in check_mem_access() - 32-bit truncation in check_stack_boundary() Make sure that any integer math cannot overflow by not allowing pointer math with large values. Also reduce the scope of "scalar op scalar" tracking. Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c48
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 982bd9ec721a..86dfe6b5c243 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1819,6 +1819,41 @@ static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
return res > a;
}
+static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ enum bpf_reg_type type)
+{
+ bool known = tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
+ s64 val = reg->var_off.value;
+ s64 smin = reg->smin_value;
+
+ if (known && (val >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || val <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF)) {
+ verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and %lld is not allowed\n",
+ reg_type_str[type], val);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (reg->off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || reg->off <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+ verbose(env, "%s pointer offset %d is not allowed\n",
+ reg_type_str[type], reg->off);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (smin == S64_MIN) {
+ verbose(env, "math between %s pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed\n",
+ reg_type_str[type]);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (smin >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF || smin <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+ verbose(env, "value %lld makes %s pointer be out of bounds\n",
+ smin, reg_type_str[type]);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
* Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
* If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -1887,6 +1922,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
+ if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, off_reg, ptr_reg->type) ||
+ !check_reg_sane_offset(env, ptr_reg, ptr_reg->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
@@ -2017,6 +2056,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EACCES;
}
+ if (!check_reg_sane_offset(env, dst_reg, ptr_reg->type))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
@@ -2046,6 +2088,12 @@ static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
+ if (!src_known &&
+ opcode != BPF_ADD && opcode != BPF_SUB && opcode != BPF_AND) {
+ __mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||