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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700
commit7a1e8b80fb1e8ead4cec15d1fc494ed290e4d2e9 (patch)
tree55a36d4256f1ae793b5c8e88c0f158737447193f /kernel
parenta867d7349e94b6409b08629886a819f802377e91 (diff)
parent7616ac70d1bb4f2e9d25c1a82d283f3368a7b632 (diff)
downloadlinux-7a1e8b80fb1e8ead4cec15d1fc494ed290e4d2e9.tar.bz2
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c46
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c144
2 files changed, 92 insertions, 98 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 45432b54d5c6..00411c82dac5 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -361,6 +361,24 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
+static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, bool audit)
+{
+ int capable;
+
+ if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
+ pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ capable = audit ? security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) :
+ security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), ns, cap);
+ if (capable == 0) {
+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
@@ -374,19 +392,27 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
*/
bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
- if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
- pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
- BUG();
- }
-
- if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
- current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
- return true;
- }
- return false;
+ return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
+/**
+ * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability
+ * (unaudited) in effect
+ * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap: The capability to be tested for
+ *
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
+ * available for use, false if not.
+ *
+ * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
+ * assumption that it's about to be used.
+ */
+bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
+{
+ return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
/**
* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 7002796f14a4..54d15eb2b701 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
*
* Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
*/
-static u32 seccomp_run_filters(struct seccomp_data *sd)
+static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
struct seccomp_data sd_local;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
@@ -554,20 +554,10 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
BUG();
}
#else
-int __secure_computing(void)
-{
- u32 phase1_result = seccomp_phase1(NULL);
-
- if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK))
- return 0;
- else if (likely(phase1_result == SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP))
- return -1;
- else
- return seccomp_phase2(phase1_result);
-}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
-static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd)
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
+ const bool recheck_after_trace)
{
u32 filter_ret, action;
int data;
@@ -599,10 +589,46 @@ static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd)
goto skip;
case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
- return filter_ret; /* Save the rest for phase 2. */
+ /* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
+ if (recheck_after_trace)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
+ if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
+ syscall_set_return_value(current,
+ task_pt_regs(current),
+ -ENOSYS, 0);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
+ ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
+ /*
+ * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
+ * notification may silently skip tracer notification.
+ * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system
+ * call that may not be intended.
+ */
+ if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+ do_exit(SIGSYS);
+ /* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */
+ this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ if (this_syscall < 0)
+ goto skip;
+
+ /*
+ * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
+ * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
+ * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
+ * a skip would have already been reported.
+ */
+ if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
- return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
+ return 0;
case SECCOMP_RET_KILL:
default:
@@ -614,96 +640,38 @@ static u32 __seccomp_phase1_filter(int this_syscall, struct seccomp_data *sd)
skip:
audit_seccomp(this_syscall, 0, action);
- return SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP;
+ return -1;
+}
+#else
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
+ const bool recheck_after_trace)
+{
+ BUG();
}
#endif
-/**
- * seccomp_phase1() - run fast path seccomp checks on the current syscall
- * @arg sd: The seccomp_data or NULL
- *
- * This only reads pt_regs via the syscall_xyz helpers. The only change
- * it will make to pt_regs is via syscall_set_return_value, and it will
- * only do that if it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP.
- *
- * If sd is provided, it will not read pt_regs at all.
- *
- * It may also call do_exit or force a signal; these actions must be
- * safe.
- *
- * If it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK, the syscall passes checks and should
- * be processed normally.
- *
- * If it returns SECCOMP_PHASE1_SKIP, then the syscall should not be
- * invoked. In this case, seccomp_phase1 will have set the return value
- * using syscall_set_return_value.
- *
- * If it returns anything else, then the return value should be passed
- * to seccomp_phase2 from a context in which ptrace hooks are safe.
- */
-u32 seccomp_phase1(struct seccomp_data *sd)
+int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
- int this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
- syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ int this_syscall;
if (config_enabled(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
- return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
+ return 0;
+
+ this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
+ syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
switch (mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */
- return SECCOMP_PHASE1_OK;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+ return 0;
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
- return __seccomp_phase1_filter(this_syscall, sd);
-#endif
+ return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false);
default:
BUG();
}
}
-
-/**
- * seccomp_phase2() - finish slow path seccomp work for the current syscall
- * @phase1_result: The return value from seccomp_phase1()
- *
- * This must be called from a context in which ptrace hooks can be used.
- *
- * Returns 0 if the syscall should be processed or -1 to skip the syscall.
- */
-int seccomp_phase2(u32 phase1_result)
-{
- struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
- u32 action = phase1_result & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
- int data = phase1_result & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
-
- BUG_ON(action != SECCOMP_RET_TRACE);
-
- audit_seccomp(syscall_get_nr(current, regs), 0, action);
-
- /* Skip these calls if there is no tracer. */
- if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
- syscall_set_return_value(current, regs,
- -ENOSYS, 0);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
- ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
- /*
- * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
- * notification may silently skip tracer notification.
- * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system
- * call that may not be intended.
- */
- if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
- do_exit(SIGSYS);
- if (syscall_get_nr(current, regs) < 0)
- return -1; /* Explicit request to skip. */
-
- return 0;
-}
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */
long prctl_get_seccomp(void)